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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters, all of them are self-contained works.
The first chapter, “Globalizing labor and the world economy: the role of human capital”
is a joint work with Prof. Dr. Fre´de´ric Docquier and Dr. Joe¨l Machado. We develop a
microfounded model of the world economy aiming to compare short- and long-run effects of
migration restrictions on the world distribution of income. We find that a complete removal
of migration barriers would increase the world average level of GDP per worker by 13% in
the short run and by about 54% after one century. These results are very robust to our
identification strategy and technological assumptions.
The second chapter, titled “Infrastructure Policy: the role of informality and brain drain”
analyses the effectiveness of infrastructure policy in developing countries. I show that, at
low level of development, the possibility to work informally has a detrimental impact on
infrastructure accumulation. I find that increasing the tax rate or enlarging the tax base
can reduce the macroeconomic performance in the short run, while inducing long-run gains.
These effects are amplified when brain drain is endogenous.
The last chapter, titled “The role of fees in foreign education: evidence from Italy and the UK”
is mainly empirical. Relying upon a discrete choice model, together with Prof. Dr. Michel
Beine and Prof. Dr. Lionel Ragot I assess the determinants of international students mobility
exploiting, for the first time in the literature, data at the university level. We focus on student
inflows to Italy and the UK, countries on which tuition fees varies across universities. We
obtain evidence for a clear and negative impact of tuition fees on international students inflows
and confirm the positive impact of quality of education. The estimations find also support for
an important role of additional destination-specific variables such as host capacity, expected
return of education and cost of living in the vicinity of the university.
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Introduction
This thesis aims to provide contributions to the economics of international migration literature. Nowa-
days, immigration-related issues occupy the top of the policy-makers agenda in the developed world.
Plenty of examples can be provided, it suffices to mention either the current political campaign for the
US presidency or the recent vote in the UK for the “Brexit”,1 to get a quick understanding of the im-
portance that the subject has gained. The large interest on migration issues in the political arena is
reflected in the economics literature, where research on migration has grown sharply in volume emerging
as a proper subfield as well (see Clemens et al. (2014)).
This manuscript is divided in three chapters, each one readable as a distinct paper. I present them
following their chronological order of development. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 follow a quantitative ap-
proach. Both chapters, set a theory which is then parametrized. Finally, counterfactual experiments are
conducted to assess the effectiveness of different policies.
On the contrary, Chapter 3 exploits a newly developed dataset to (econometrically) assess the deter-
minants of international students mobility.
Chapter 1, co-authored with Prof. Dr. Fre´de´ric Docquier and Dr. Joe¨l Machado, is titled “Globalizing
labor and the world economy: the role of human capital”. It provides new estimates on the economic
impact of liberalizing migration borders. As Hatton (2014) reports, the majority of voters in most
developed countries oppose immigration and this position is much more pronounced among low-skilled
individuals. This chapter disregards the policy formation process or, in a clearer way, it does not study
the process which leads to the implementation of one migration-policy in place of another one. On the
contrary, it provides new estimates of the impact of opening borders on both efficiency (GDP per worker)
and inequality.
This paper defines a microfounded model of the world economy able to highlight the link between
immigration policies and human-capital accumulation. The literature has already shown that emigration
prospects affect the incentives to acquire higher education. Additionally, our model also accounts for the
fact that both fertility and education choices are location specific. Relying on this theoretical framework
we evaluate the impact that opening borders would have on the trajectory of the two aforementioned
individuals’ (households) choices.
Our quantitative analysis reveals that the effects of liberalizing migration on human-capital accumu-
1The political debate is getting tougher, for instance the GOP candidate for the US presidency said that “I will build a
great wall- and nobody builds better than me, believe me- and I’ll build them very inexpensively. I will build a great, great
wall on our southern border, and I will make Mexico pay for that wall. Mark my words”.
1
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lation, income and inequality are gradual and cumulative. In case of a complete removal of migration
barriers, the world average level of GDP per worker increases by 13% in the short run, and by about
54% after one century. In addition, liberalizing migration gradually reduces the Theil index of inequality.
These results are very robust to our identifying strategy and technological assumptions. Sizable differences
are only obtained when we allow for an externality of schooling or cultural diversity on productivity, and
when our baseline (pre-liberalization) scenario involves a rapid takeoff of sub-Saharan Africa or emerging
countries.
Chapter 2 is titled “Infrastructure policy: the role of informality and brain drain”. Its main focus is
on the link between infrastructure accumulation and the informal economy in developing countries. It
also highlights the links between these two factors and the emigration of the highly skilled, “brain drain”.
There is substantial evidence on the positive impact of infrastructure investments on development, (for
instance see Calderon and Serven (2014)). However, in most developing countries a large fraction of in-
dividuals work in the informal economy not contributing to the implementation of massive infrastructure
investments. Also, a low level of development incentivizes emigration, especially of high-skilled individ-
uals. In this chapter, I develop a two-sector dynamic model with endogenous infrastructure and human
capital accumulation in the presence of these two exit options. Then, I calibrate the model for a subset of
60 developing countries, and conduct numerical policy experiments. I show that, at a low level of devel-
opment, the possibility to work informally has a detrimental impact on the infrastructure accumulation.
Hence, increasing the tax rate or enlarging the tax base can reduce the macroeconomic performance in
the short run, while inducing long-run gains. These short- and long-run effects are amplified when brain
drain is endogenous, they are also greater where the initial level of infrastructure is low and the brain
drain is large.
Chapter 3, “The role of fees in foreign education: evidence from Italy and the UK” is mainly empirical.
This paper, co-authored with with Prof. Dr. Michel Beine and Prof. Dr. Lionel Ragot, aims to contribute
at the literature devoted to the identification of factors influencing the location choice of foreign students.
Foreign higher education is an important economic subject for several reasons. First, the number of
international students has increased at a fast pace; while there were 0.6 millions international students in
1975, the OECD and UNESCO counted 4.5 millions of international students in 2012. Second, developed
countries need to know which are the pull factors of international-students mobility when competing
for attracting the best and the brightest talents. Importantly, Spilimbergo (2009) shows that foreign-
educated individuals promote democracy in their home country, but only if education is acquired in
democratic countries. We derive a gravity model based on a Random Utility Maximization model of
location choice for international students. The last layer of the model is estimated using new data on
students migration-flows at the university level for Italy and the UK. The particular institutional setting
of the two destination countries allows to control for the potential endogeneity of tuition fees. We obtain
evidence of a clear and negative effect of tuition fees on international-student mobility and confirm the
positive impact of quality of education. The estimations find also support for an important role of
additional destination-specific variables such as host capacity, expected return of education and cost of
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living in the vicinity of the university.
In summary, the main findings of this thesis are the following ones: first, it shows that the economic
impact of opening borders is greater in the long run than in the short run; second it obtains that more
restrictive fiscal policies leading to larger infrastructure investments may trigger development in the
long run; finally it reports that controlling for all other factors, tuition fees have a repulsive impact on
international students mobility.
3
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1Globalizing labor and the world
economy: the role of human capital
This paper is a joint work with Prof. Dr. Fre´de´ric Docquier and Dr. Joe¨l
Machado
Abstract
We develop a dynamic microfounded model of the world economy that jointly endogenizes income in-
equality and individual decisions about fertility, education and migration. We then use it to compare the
short- and long-run effects of immigration restrictions on the world distribution of income. Our calibra-
tion strategy perfectly fits the economic and demographic characteristics of the world, and allows us to
identify bilateral migration costs and visa costs for each pair of countries and two classes of workers. Our
quantitative analysis reveals that the effects of liberalizing migration on human capital accumulation,
income and inequality are gradual and cumulative. In case of a complete removal of migration barri-
ers, the world average level of GDP per worker increases by 13 percent in the short run, and by about
54 percent after one century. In addition, liberalizing migration gradually reduces the Theil index of
inequality. These results are very robust to our identifying strategy and technological assumptions. Size-
able differences are only obtained when we allow for an externality of schooling or cultural diversity on
productivity, and when our baseline (pre-liberalization) scenario involves a rapid takeoff of sub-Saharan
Africa or emerging countries.
1.1 Introduction
This paper provides a unified theory of bilateral migration, human capital formation, population growth
and worldwide income inequality. We use it to investigate the short-run and long-run effects of immi-
gration restrictions on the world economy. Our model is parametrized to match the recent evolution of
the world economy, to fit the demographic projections of the United Nations for the 21st century, and to
match the numbers of actual migrants (those who have already migrated) and desiring migrants (those
who have not yet migrated but express a desire to do so). Availability of bilateral data on actual and
5
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desired migration enables us to identify total migration costs and visa costs (i.e. policy-induced costs
borne by migrants to overcome the legal hurdles set by national authorities in destination and origin coun-
tries) as residuals of the migration technology. Although we find limited gains from removing migration
barriers in the short-run, we argue that long-run effects can be much greater. The reason is that relaxing
migration barriers stimulates human capital formation and reduces the world population growth rate.
These socio-demographic gains have been disregarded in the existing literature. Part of them are due
to the well-known brain gain mechanism, i.e. the effect of emigration prospects on the expected returns
to higher education. However, the main portion of these gains is purely mechanical and less disputable:
new migrants from developing to industrialized countries face a policy environment conducive to reduce
their fertility and increase investments in the basic education of their offspring. As basic education is a
prerequisite for higher education, this gradually increases the worldwide level of human capital and shifts
the world production frontier upwards.
The debate on the global efficiency and inequality implications of immigration barriers has been
recently revived in the academic literature. Some economists argue that immigration restrictions are
responsible for “trillion-dollar bills [left] on the sidewalk” (a summary of the existing literature is provided
in Clemens (2011)). In particular, these regulations are perceived as carrying considerable economic costs
for developing countries and preventing global inequality from declining Pritchett (2006). Most studies
show that liberalizing migration displaces billions of people, mainly from developing to industrialized
countries (i.e. from South to North). They find that liberalizing labor mobility induces an increase in
the world GDP in the range of 50 to 150 percent, making labor mobility the greatest source of efficiency
gains to expect from globalization.1 These benefits would mainly accrue to the emigrants originating from
poor countries. Still, aggregate gains can be obtained for the host population through the immigration
surplus; however, the latter are unequally distributed among capitalists and workers, or among categories
of workers.
A few recent contributions questioned the realism of the above-mentioned gains. On the one hand,
Collier (2013) and Borjas (2015) emphasized the social and cultural challenges that such large movements
of people may induce. The reasoning is the following: by importing their “bad”cultural, social and
institutional models, migrants may contaminate the entire set of institutions in their country of adoption,
levelling downwards the world distribution of technological capacity. Removing migration barriers can
reduce the worldwide level of income per capita if such contagion spillovers are large enough. There
is however no evidence that such contagion effects are important and unidirectional. On the contrary,
at current migration levels, many studies evidenced a positive transfer of technological, political and
behavioral norms from rich to poor countries (Spilimbergo (2009), Andersen and Dalgaard (2011), Beine
et al. (2008), Beine et al. (2013), Bertoli and Marchetta (2015)). It is however legitimate to argue that
displacing billions of workers from South to North could induce large spillovers of a different nature. On
the other hand, Docquier et al. (2015) argued that removing migration barriers would generate much fewer
1In comparison, removing the remaining barriers to trade and capital flows would generate small increases in world GDP
ranging from 0.5 to 4 percent for trade, and from 0.1 to 1.7 percent for capital (Clemens (2011)).
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migrants than what existing studies predict. Using the Gallup World Poll survey, they estimate that the
worldwide number of potential working-age migrants was around 386 million in 2000.2 This is six times
smaller than in previous studies and certainly tones down the risk of a massive technological or cultural
contagion. As far as efficiency is concerned, they obtain efficiency gains in the neighborhood of 11.5
percent of the world GDP, in partial equilibrium or with a standard constant-elasticity-of-substitution
technology. When various spillover effects are factored in, the gains remain limited, in the range of 7
percent (with congestion and schooling externalities in production) to 17 percent (with migration network
effects).
The whole literature on the welfare implication of immigration restrictions has adopted a short-run or
medium-run perspective, assuming a constant size and skill structure of the world population. Overall, it
concludes that the uncertainty surrounding the size of the gains from globalization is large, both because
the global income gains from letting workers move and the migration response to abolishing barriers are
unclear. In line with Docquier et al. (2015), we admit that the short-run effects of immigration barriers
might be limited. However, we argue here that the long-run effects are much more important. The reason
is that the existing literature has largely disregarded the interdependences between migration decisions
and the evolution of the world population.3 Changes in migration flows are likely to affect education
and fertility decisions. The majority of new migrants move from poor to rich countries and assimilate in
terms of fertility and education. Compared to their home country, policies towards basic education in the
North (such as mandatory education, generous subsidies, greater quality of education, etc.) make basic
education much more accessible for the new migrants’ offspring. This increases the pool of young adults
who will be eligible for higher education in the future generation. Exposed to a new environment and
different norms, migrants also change their fertility decisions. Many studies on internal migration have
found that it leads to convergence of fertility rates between migrants and urban natives.4 Convergence
is also obtained in studies of international migration, including Stephen and Bean (1992) and Lindstrom
and Saucedo (2002) for women of Mexican origin living in the US. 5 The effect of migration on fertility
and education also operates ex-ante, i.e. before migration occurs. The recent literature has shown that
emigration prospects stimulate incentives to acquire higher education in developing countries (see Stark
et al. (1997), Mountford (1997), Beine et al. (2001); Beine et al. (2008), Easterly and Nyarko (2008),
Docquier and Rapoport (2012)). This link between emigration prospects and human capital formation
has been identified in the micro literature. Identification strategies rely on survey data on the student
population, regional heterogeneity in emigration and education patterns, and quasi-natural emigration
shocks. 6 Quasi-natural experiments are investigated in Chand and Clemens (2008) on Fiji, or Shrestha
2Potential migrants include those who have already migrated and current non migrants who express a desire to migrate.
Data on desired emigration are described in Esipova et al. (2011).
3An exception is Mountford and Rapoport (2011), who developed a stylized model with endogenous education and
fertility by individuals in the sending countries and in one representative receiving economy. They show that (exogenous)
high-skilled migration shocks may improve the growth rate, and reduce the fertility rate of all the economies in the world.
For the first time, we incorporate similar ingredients into a micro-founded macroeconomic model of the world economy
including 195 receiving and sending countries, endogenize migration decisions, and then confront theory to data.
4See among others, Lee and Pol (1993) or Brockerhoff (1995).
5See also Chiswick and Miller (2012) and Fogli and Fernandez (2009).
6Survey data are used in Gibson and McKenzie (2011) on Tonga and Papua New Guinea or Kangasniemi et al. (2007)
on medical doctors in the UK. Studies exploiting regional variations are Batista et al. (2012) on Cape Verde, McKenzie and
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(2011) on Nepal.
Consequently, removing migration barriers reduces population growth and improves the skill structure
of the world labor force. The implications for the world economy are cumulative and gradual.
Our contribution is two-fold. First, we build a fully microfounded model that encompasses all the
channels aforementioned. Our framework is an abstract two-class overlapping-generations model (with
college graduates and less educated workers), which highlights the major economic mechanisms underlying
wage inequality and decisions about migration, fertility and education. Although the model is large
(because 195 countries are included), the mechanisms are transparent. The model has only a few equations
per country or country pair, uses consensus microfoundations, and can be parametrized using appropriate
identification methods.
We then revisit the effects of a complete removal of migration barriers from 2000 onwards and in-
vestigate its impact on the world distribution of income, using our dynamical framework. This is an
improvement with respect to the existing literature as the feedback effects from migration decisions on
fertility and education decisions have so far been disregarded. Our quantitative analysis reveals that the
long-run impact of migration restrictions exceeds by far the short-run impact. This is because liberalizing
labor mobility reduces population growth and improves the skill structure of the world labor force. In
line with Docquier et al. (2015) and the Gallup data in Esipova et al. (2011), a complete liberalization
of labor mobility increases the proportion of international migrants from 3.5 to 12.3 percent in the short
run. In our benchmark partial equilibrium scenario, the world average level of GDP per worker increases
by 13.1 percent when the shock occurs.7 The semi-elasticity of GDP to migration equals 1.5; this is
slightly greater than the level obtained in previous studies because in our framework, better migration
prospects stimulate the expected return to higher education and investments in college education. More-
over, additional migrants from poor to rich countries also face a new institutional environment which
favors investments in the basic education of their offspring. This increases the pool of young adults who
can access the higher education system among the next generation. Consequently, the rise in educational
attainment and the changes in the world distribution of income are gradual and cumulative. By the year
2100, the effects are four times larger than in the short run (+53.8 percent in the worldwide level of GDP
per capita). Our analysis shows that large efficiency gains can be expected from removing migration bar-
riers, but these large gains mostly arise in the long run and will impact the welfare of future generations.
As for inequality, the Theil index gradually decreases in all the scenarios. Again, the short-run effect is
small (-1.6 percentage point) but the long-run effect is larger (-10.7 percentage points).
We also investigate the effects of partial liberalization reforms, i.e. cuts in legal migration restrictions
by less than 100 percent. We show that the efficiency and inequality effects are roughly proportional to
the “liberalization rate”; in other words, cutting legal moving costs by ϑ percent allows to realize slightly
more than ϑ percent of the gains from a complete liberalization. We conduct a large set of robustness
checks. Overall, our conclusions are very robust to our identifying strategy and to assumptions about the
Rapoport (2011) on Mexico, or Ha et al. (2016) on China.
7Throughout the paper, the GDP per adult worker is the income measure of interest.
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technological environment. Results change only slightly when we use alternative interpretations of the
Gallup data on desired migration, when we deactivate the brain gain mechanism, or when we consider
many alternative specifications for the technologies of production and human capital formation. Sizeable
differences are only obtained under three variants of the model. On the one hand, more optimistic results
emerge when we consider the positive elasticity of productivity to birthplace diversity estimated in the
macro literature (as in Ottaviano and Peri (2006) or Alesina et al. (2013)). On the other hand, more
pessimistic results are found when we allow for schooling externalities in production, or when the baseline
(pre-liberalization) trajectory of the world economy involves a rapid take off of sub-Saharan Africa or
emerging countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A review of the literature on immigration barriers and
income is provided in Section 1.2. In Section 1.3, we describe a micro-founded model that links income
disparities and decisions about migration, education and fertility. The parametrization of the model is
explained in Section 1.4. Partial equilibrium results are presented in Section 1.5. A large set of extensions
and robustness checks are discussed in Section 1.6. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
Many studies have highlighted the global benefits from removing immigration restrictions. Some treated
migration as the outcome of a central planning problem (Benhabib and Jovanovic (2012); de la Croix and
Docquier (2015)) and provided theoretical and numerical predictions, using a stylized representation of
the world economy (one developing region and several destination countries, or a two-region framework)
and a simple treatment of moving costs (neglected, or calibrated using US interstate transportation costs).
Others investigated the economic impact of abolishing migration barriers using stylized models with two
regions (Iranzo and Peri (2009a), Klein and Ventura (2009)) or with a single “preferred” location for
the new migrants Kennan (2013). In these studies, the gains from removing migration restrictions arise
from the differences in total factor productivity across countries. These differences are magnified by the
mobility of physical capital, which “chases” labor.
Other recent studies evaluated the welfare impact of observed levels of migration. For example,
Giovanni et al. (2015) found positive effects of existing migration flows for both receiving and sending
countries. In their model, the gains in receiving countries arise from greater product variety available in
consumption and intermediate inputs. The gains in sending countries are due to incoming remittances.
Using a similar framework with market-size effects, Aubry et al. (2016) showed that most OECD countries
benefit from South-North migration, while intra-OECD migration is a zero-sum game with many losers
and only few winners. In the same vein, Battisti et al. (2014) also found positive effect of immigration to
OECD countries in a model of search and matching in which native and immigrant workers differ with
respect to job break-up risks and outside options. Although informative about the mechanisms at work,
these models do not cover the whole world economy or do not deal with a worldwide liberalization of
migration. Numerical illustrations provided in these studies are therefore too specific to be transposed
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to the world economy.
A second strand of literature uses multi-region models of the world economy to simulate the effect of
exogenous migration shocks. In particular, Winters (2001) or Walmsley and Winters (2005) simulated
the effect of an exogenous increase in developed countries’ immigration quotas on both high-skilled and
low-skilled migrants equivalent to 3 percent of the labor force (i.e. 0.45 percent of the world labor force).
Using a global computational-general-equilibrium model with two skill levels, they predicted a $150 billion
increase in the world GDP (+0.6 percent), i.e. a semi-elasticity of the world GDP to the share of migrants
of about 1.3. Migration is treated as an exogenous variable and their model cannot be used to infer the
effect of a complete removal of migration restrictions.
The endogeneity of migration decisions has been accounted for in a third strand of literature. Most
of these studies use static models and assume that a complete liberalization would lead to (real) wage
equalization across countries. On average, they predict that (i) at least 50 percent of the world population
would live in a foreign country after a complete liberalization, and (ii) eliminating all restrictions to labor
mobility would induce huge efficiency gains in the range of 50 to 150 percent of world GDP. A summary
of these predictions is provided in Clemens (2011). More precisely, in a scenario assuming mobile physical
capital and no differences in inherent productivity of people (i.e. a Mexican worker migrating to the US
is as productive as a US citizen), liberalization increases the world GDP by 147.3 percent in Hamilton
and Whalley (1984), 122.0 percent in Klein and Ventura (2007), 96.5 percent in Moses and Letnes (2004).
Less optimistic results are obtained when foreign workers are assumed to be less productive than natives
or when arbitrary migration costs are included. Iregui (2003) is the first to account for differences in
workers’ educational attainment (i.e. a low-skilled Mexican migrating to the US is as productive as
a low-skilled US worker but less than the average American). Under the same set of hypotheses, she
found that relocating people to equalize wages would increase the world GDP by 67.0 percent. In the
latter study, the semi-elasticity of the world GDP to the share of international migrants in the world
population is around 1.3.8 Incidentally, this semi-elasticity is identical to that obtained in the exogenous
migration framework of Winters (2001) or Walmsley and Winters (2005). Although the latter considers
many sectors and a few regions, output in each industry is modeled using a technology with two types
of workers as in Iregui (2003). In a world with exogenous total factor productivity levels and perfect
mobility of physical capital, the responsiveness of the world income to migration is thus characterized by
a semi-elasticity of 1.3 in the existing literature.
In a recent essay, Borjas (2015) revisited the efficiency gains from open borders in a context with
negative technological spillovers. The point of departure is a standard labor market model with fixed
capital stock and exogenous total factor productivity. The model is then calibrated to match the demo-
graphic and income disparities between the developed and the developing world. Initially, Borjas (2015)
disregards migration costs and predicts that a removal of migration barriers would displace 2.6 billion
workers (i.e. 95 percent of the South population and 79 percent of the world population) and increase the
8The semi-elasticity is computed dividing the deviation in the world GDP by the change in the world proportion of
migrants.
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world GDP by 40 trillion dollars (i.e. +57 percent compared to the pre-reform level). The semi-elasticity
of the world GDP to the share of international migrants (0.72) is lower than in previous studies for two
reasons. First, physical capital is assumed to be immobile across countries, while it “chases” labor in
previous studies. Second, the author assumes an income ratio of 4 between the North and the South.9
Redistributive effects turn out to be important as wages increase by 143 percent in the South and decline
by 40 percent in the North.10 In a second step, Borjas (2015) considers a scenario with technological
spillovers across countries, where migration levels down the distribution of productivity.
Echoing Collier (2013), the rationale is that migrants import their institutional model and contaminate
the entire set of institutions in the destination country. Borjas (2015) assumes that the post-liberalization
level of the total factor productivity in the North is a weighted average of the pre-liberalization levels in
the origin and destination regions. The weight allocated to the South technology varies between 0 and 1,
and is independent of the migration shock. Unsurprisingly, the global effect can become negative if the
weight given to the South technology is large enough. This happens when the weight allocated to the
South technology exceeds 0.5. Still, even in this scenario, the author predicts large migration responses
(+2.3 billion workers, i.e. 85 percent of the South labor force).
In the above-mentioned studies, private (or non-visa) migration costs are disregarded or modeled
in a simple way. This is an important shortcoming as the empirical literature on the determinants of
migration has long emphasized the role of geographic, linguistic and cultural distances. For example,
psychic and monetary moving costs explain why within-EU migration flows have been limited despite
large income differences between EU member states and a free mobility agreement, or why large income
disparities exist within countries.11 The first study assessing the size of “incompressible” moving costs
for all country pairs is Docquier et al. (2015). Using data on people’s willingness to emigrate from the
Gallup World Poll survey (see Esipova et al. (2011)), they identified a total number of potential migrant
workers, i.e. actual plus desiring migrants aged 25 and over, equal to 386 million (i.e. about 15 percent
of the figure predicted in Borjas (2015)). Accounting for network effects does not drastically change
the picture, mainly because an important mechanism through which network effects operate (i.e. family
reunification) becomes irrelevant if migration barriers were abolished. Using an upper-bound for the non-
visa component of the network effect, they obtain a total number of 589.5 million potential migrants. They
quantified the effect of liberalization on the world economy using a model jointly endogenizing migration
decisions and economic performances. They use a “backsolving” calibration strategy to identify total
migration costs and visa costs as residuals of the migration technology. In partial equilibrium or in
general equilibrium with perfect capital mobility and without technological externalities, they obtain
a 11.9 percent increase in the world GDP after a complete liberalization, and a semi-elasticity of the
9Assuming that migration costs are equal to 10 times the annual average income in the South, the number of migrants
reduces to 2.46 billion (75 percent of the world population) and the gain falls to 28.1 trillion dollars (i.e. +40.1 percent).
Hence, the semi-elasticity falls to 0.54.
10Despite fixed capital stock, the semi-elasticity of the world GDP to the share of migrants becomes 1.09 if the income
ratio equals 6.
11In Germany, the average GDP per inhabitant in Hamburg (EUR 47,100) is 2.3 times greater than in Brandenburg
(EUR 20.500). In Italy, GDP per inhabitant is twice as large in Lombardy (EUR 33,500) than in Campania or Calabria
(EUR 16,400; values for 2008; see EUROSTAT (2011)). The same ratio is observed in the US between Connecticut (USD
68,167) and Mississippi (USD 32,348; values for 2008; see Bureau of Economic Analysis (2014)).
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world GDP to the share of migrants of 1.3. This is in line with the existing studies accounting for skill
differences across people (Iregui (2003), Winters (2001), Walmsley and Winters (2005)). Hence, their
relatively small efficiency effect is entirely explained by the inclusion of incompressible migration costs,
and not by the technological features of their model. Similar results are obtained when congestion is
included or when migrants and natives are imperfect substitutes within each education category. When
migration network effects are accounted for, the world income increase by 17 percent while the semi-
elasticity remains unchanged. When country-specific levels of total factor productivity are affected by
human capital, the semi-elasticity falls to 0.9 and the efficiency gains of a liberalization is much lower
(+7 percent in the world income). The reason is that on average, new migrants are more educated
than natives left behind (positive selection in emigration) but less educated than workers in destination
countries (negative selection in immigration). Almost all regions therefore end up with a lower fraction
of skilled workers among their workforce after a liberalization. In line with Borjas (2015), removing
immigration barriers levels down the distribution of total factor productivity in the presence of schooling
externalities, but to a much lesser extent and for different reasons.
Overall, this literature on the global effects of migration barriers mainly relies on static models that
disregard the relationships between migration decisions and the evolution of the size and structure of
the world population. This paper shows, both theoretically and numerically, that the efficiency and
redistributive effects of immigration restrictions are gradually amplified when population growth and
human capital accumulation are endogenized.
1.3 Theory
In this section, we develop an integrated model describing interdependencies between bilateral migration
flows, human capital formation, population growth and worldwide income disparities. Our world economy
model accounts for the technological and behavioral responses to migration policy reforms. It endogenizes
migration flows across countries and encompasses three channels of transmission of migration shocks.
First, as stated above, skill-biased changes in emigration prospects stimulate people to acquire tertiary
education. Second, newly educated individuals left behind as well as new migrants moving from poor
countries (where the access to and quality of the education system are low) to rich countries (where the
access and quality are high) change their fertility and their investment in the basic education (primary
and secondary levels) of their offspring. Third, movements of human capital can affect cross-country
disparities in total factor productivity and wages. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
providing explicit microfoundations to the link between education, fertility and migration in a multi-
country framework with many origin and destination countries.
Our model assumes two-period lived agents (adults and children). Adults are the only decision mak-
ers. They maximize their well-being and decide where to live, whether to invest in their own (higher)
education, how much to consume, and how much to invest in the quantity and quality (i.e. basic ed-
ucation) of their children. We distinguish between college-educated adults and the less educated and
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assume that preferences are represented by a two-level nested utility function. Working-age individuals
have heterogeneous abilities to acquire higher education, and heterogeneous preferences over destination
countries.
The number of working-age natives from country k (k = 1, ...,K) at time t is denoted by Nk,t which
divides into Nhk,t college graduates and N
l
k,t less educated. The proportion of college graduates in the






. Each native decides whether to emigrate or not;
Nskj,t(s = h, l) denotes the number of emigrants from k to j. After migration, the resident labor force










denotes the proportion of college








The sections below describe the microfoundations of fertility, education and migration decisions, as
well as income determination. Bilateral migration and higher education decisions are examined in Section
1.3.1. Fertility and basic education decisions are modeled in Section 1.3.2. Aggregates and population
dynamics are characterized in Section 1.3.3. Section 1.3.4 describes the technology. The intertemporal
equilibrium is defined in Section 1.3.5. Finally, our measure of worldwide income inequality is explained
in Section 1.3.6.
1.3.1 Migration and higher education decisions
Individual decisions to emigrate and acquire higher education result from the comparison of discrete
alternatives. To model them, we use a logarithmic outer utility function with a deterministic and a
random component. The utility of an adult a of cohort t, born in country k, living in country i, and
acquiring (higher) education type s is given by:
Uski,t = ln v
s
i,t + ln(1− xski,t) + ln(1− zsa,k) + εsa,ki, (1)
where ln vsi,t ∈ < is the deterministic level of utility that can be reached in the location i at period t
(explained in Section 1.3.2), and xski,t ∈ [0, 1] captures the effort required to migrate from country k to
country i (such that xskk,t = 0). Migration costs x
s
ki,t vary across country pairs and education levels. We
distinguish between visa costs and private costs. Private costs, denoted by xski,t, cover a wide range of
hurdles faced by migrants in finding employment, housing, living far from one’s community, deciphering
foreign cultural norms, adjusting to a new linguistic and economic environment, etc. Legal or visa costs
(xski,t − xski,t) represent policy-induced costs borne by the migrant to overcome the legal hurdles set by
national authorities at destination and origin.
Individuals are heterogeneous in their ability to acquire higher education and in their preference for
alternative locations. The individual-specific level of effort required to be of type s = (h, l) in country
k is denoted by zsa,k ∈ [0, 1]. Basic education is a prerequisite to invest in higher education. We have





∈ [0,∞], a monotonic and increasing function of zha,k, follows a Pareto distribution.
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The country-specific CDF is given by






where τk > 0 is the country-specific lower bound of the distribution in country k and α > 0 is a common
shape parameter governing the responsiveness of higher education decisions to the expected returns to
schooling. Parameter τk features the access to higher education in country k.
The individual-specific random taste shock for moving from country k to i is denoted by εsa,ki ∈ < and
follows an iid Type-I extreme value distribution,12 also known as the double exponential distribution:








where µ > 0 is a common scale parameter governing the responsiveness of migration decisions to income
disparities, and γ ≈ 0.577 is the Euler’s constant.
The timing of decisions is the following. In the first stage, individuals who received basic education
discover their education type, (zsa,k,t). They do not know their migration type (ε
s
a,ki,t) but know its
distribution. Given their perfect expectations about vsi,t and x
s
ki,t, they decide whether to acquire higher
education or not. In the second stage, they discover their migration type (εsa,ki,t) and decide whether to
emigrate or to stay in the home country. The third stage of the utility maximization process determines
ln vsi,t and is explained in Subsection 1.3.2.
First stage. Individuals acquire higher education if the expected utility gain from being college edu-
cated exceeds the effort cost. Under the Type I Extreme Value distribution, de Palma and Kilani (2007)
derived the expression for the ex-ante expected utility. In our augmented framework with endogenous














An individual chooses to educate if the expected benefits from college education exceed the training






















1/µ + (V hk,t)
1/µ
(vlk,t)
1/µ + (V lk,t)
1/µ
, (2)
where vsk,t determines the component of expected utility explained by the home country characteristics,
and (V sk,t)
1/µ ≡∑i 6=k(vsi,t)1/µ(1− xski,t)1/µ is the component linked to emigration prospects.
In a closed economy framework (xski,t = 1 ∀s, i 6= k), the critical level of effort below which college





1/µ). In an open economy (i.e. when
12More general distributions were used in Bertoli and Moraga (2013), Bertoli and Marchetta (2015) or Ortega and Peri
(2013), who allow for a positive correlation in the realization of the shock across similar countries. This can be helpful
to derive micro-founded gravity models accounting for multilateral resistance to migration. This is less an issue in our
“non-estimation” paper since our backsolving identification strategy described in Section 1.4 is such that we fit the data
perfectly.
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V sk,t > 0 for some s), the expected return to education is affected by emigration prospects. From Eq. (2),
we have:







The skill structure of emigration costs is a key determinant of V hk,t/V
l
k,t; because of skill-selective
immigration policies and the greater ability of educated workers to gather information about destination
countries, many migration corridors are such that xhki,t < x
l
ki,t and exhibit positive selection.
As stated above, basic education is a prerequisite to invest in higher education. Let us denote the
proportion of working-age individuals who received basic education when young (i.e. in the previous
period) in country k by qk,t−1. The critical level of ability in Eq. (2) determines the fraction of them
who find it optimal to acquire higher education. Given the Pareto distribution of the ability to acquire
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Proposition 2. The average responsiveness of investment in college education to emigration prospects
depends on past education levels (qk,t−1) and access to higher education (τk).
The effect of emigration prospects on the proportion of college graduates thus varies across countries
with the lagged enrollment rate in basic education and with access to higher education (τk). The latter
is likely to depend on the country’s development level, urbanization rate, public spending on tertiary
education, etc. In the next sub-section, we show that the enrollment rate in basic education depends
itself on the lagged proportion of college graduates (i.e. college-educated invest more in the basic education
of their offspring). This explains the strong persistence in human capital data and implies that a shock
in emigration prospects induces gradual effects on the world economy.
Second stage. When education is determined, individual a chooses to emigrate to country i if ln vsi,t +
ln(1−xski,t) + εsa,ki exceeds the level attainable in any other location.13 Under the Type I Extreme Value
distribution, McFadden (1984) showed that the probability to emigrate is governed by a logit expression.






























are governed by the same logit model. It follows that the emigrant-to-
13Note that in the present framework, migration is permanent and irreversible. Kennan and Walker (2011) developed a
framework which allows for sequential migration decisions (i.e. multiple moves). As noted by the authors, the addition of
more dimensions complicates the computation exponentially. This is particularly true in a large multi-country framework
as the one we develop here. Nevertheless, we account for temporary migrants in a robustness check.
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Skill-specific emigration rates are endogenous and comprised between 0 and 1. Eq. (4) states that
the ratio of emigrants from country k to country i to stayers in country k (i.e. individuals born in k who
remain in k), is an increasing function of the utility achievable in country i and a decreasing function of the
utility in the country of origin k. The proportion of migrants from k to i also decreases with the bilateral
migration cost xski,t. Heterogeneity in migration tastes implies that emigrants select all destinations such
that xski,t < 1 (if x
s




ki,t < 1 exhibit
bidirectional migration flows, in line with existing data. In addition, the aggregate emigration rate(
psk,t
)
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The skill ratio of emigration rates increases with V hk,t and decreases with V
l


























induce a positive association between
human capital formation (Hk,t) and the ratio of emigration rates (ρk,t). Local expected utility shocks(
∆vsk,t
)
induce a negative association between Hk,t and ρk,t.
In particular, shocks increasing the expected utility of college graduates abroad (e.g. greater skill
selection in the major destination countries) have a positive effect on human capital formation (Hk,t) and
on the positive selection of emigrants (as reflected by the ratio of emigration rates ρk,t). Shocks increasing
the expected utility of the less educated abroad have a negative effect on both variables. Proposition





capital formation (Hk,t) in a multi-destination framework (see Stark et al. (1997), Mountford (1997),
Beine et al. (2001), Beine et al. (2008), Easterly and Nyarko (2008), Docquier and Rapoport (2012)).
1.3.2 Fertility and basic education decisions
We now endogenize ln vsk,t as resulting from the third stage of the utility maximization process. The inner













. In logs, we have:
ln vsk,t = (1− θ) ln csk,t + θ lnnsk,t + θλ ln qsk,t, (6)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] and λ ∈ [0, 1] are preference parameters for fertility and children’s basic education.
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Each adult receives a wage rate wsk,t per unit of time worked. Raising a child requires a time cost
φ, and providing a child with basic education induces a monetary education cost esk,t. For the sake of
tractability we do not explictly microfound esk,t, we interpret this exogenous variable as a proxy of the
country k development at time t, see also Section 1.4.14 We allow non-educated children to work and earn
a wage wck,t per unit of time spent on the labor market (reflecting country-specific, social and institutional
norms towards child labor).









k,t(1− φnsk,t) + nsk,t(1− qsk,t)wck,t. (7)
























From Eqs. (7) and (8), the total net cost of children is equal to a fraction θ of the wage rate, and the







k,t − (1− qsk,t)wck,t
,
in which qsk,t, the proportion of children receiving basic education, is endogenous.
Assume first that Eq. (9) holds with equality (interior solution with qsk,t < 1). Combining Eqs. (8)













In line with intuition, the fertility rate decreases with the wage rate (wsk,t) and increases with the child’s
wage rate (wck,t). Children’s basic education increases with the adult’s wage rate (w
s
k,t), decreases with
the education cost (esk,t) and with child’s wage rate (w
c
k,t).
From Eq. (11), the condition under which such an interior solution emerges writes as:
wsk,t ≤
(1− λ)esk,t + wck,t
φλ
. (12)
If Eq. (12) does not hold, we have a corner solution with qsk,t = 1. Substituting q
s
k,t = 1 in Eq. (8)
14Tanaka et al. (2014) study the effect of immigration-inflows on the quality of basic education in destination countries.
They find that immigration may decrease quality due to congestion effects in public school and also lead natives to opt to
private, and more expensive, schools.
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Countries differ in terms of technology and policies. The wage ratio between college graduates and
the less educated can be denoted by σk,t ≡ whk,t/wlk,t. The wage ratio between children and low-skilled
adults is denoted by ωk,t ≡ wck,t/wlk,t. The ratio of basic education costs to the high-skilled wage rate is
denoted by ξsk,t ≡ esk,t/whk,t. These country-specific “institutional” variables fully characterize the fertility





















































Relocating people from poor countries (high fertility and low investment in basic education) to rich
countries (low fertility and high investment in basic education) gradually changes the dynamics of the
world population. Substituting the optimal levels of utility and basic education investment into (6)
defines the optimal level of indirect utility, ln vsk,t. We have
ln vsk,t = (1− θ) lnwsk,t + ln Ωsk,t, (16)
where ln Ωsk,t ≡ θ lnnsk,t + θλ ln qsk,t + (1 − θ) ln(1 − θ) depends on the optimal levels of fertility and
investment in basic education. Given Eqs. (14) and (15), the latter levels only depend on the trajectory






















and the “institutional component” of utility(
Ωsk,t
)
follow an exogenous time path.
In the EXIT scenario, a migration policy reform only affects disparities in inner utility if low-skilled
and high-skilled wages are endogenous. The elasticity of indirect utility to the wage rate is equal to
(1− θ), and from Eq. (4), the elasticity of the migrant-to-stayer ratio to the ratio of indirect utility
levels equals 1/µ. Hence, the elasticity of the migrant-to-stayer ratio to the ratio of wage rates equals
(1− θ) /µ. Obviously, in a partial equilibrium context with exogenous wage rates, bilateral emigration
rates are constant.
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1.3.3 Aggregates and dynamics
The average fertility rate and proportion of children receiving basic education are given by






k,t + (1− hk,t)qlk,tnlk,t
nk,t
. (18)




, is determined by migration and
fertility decisions, and we assume that low-skilled workers and employed children are perfect substitutes





























The dynamics of the native population (Nk,t) and the proportion of college graduates in the adult
population (Hk,t) are given by
Nk,t = Lk,t−1nk,t−1 (21)
and by Eq. (3). It clearly appears that Ni,t is a pre-determined variable, whereas Hk,t is not because
adults’ investment in higher education is determined at time t.
1.3.4 Production technology
We assume that output is proportional to labor in efficiency units, equivalent to a model without slowly
accumulating factors featuring a globalized economy with a common international interest rate. This
hypothesis is in line with Klein and Ventura (2009) and Kennan (2013), both papers assume that capital
“chases” labor. Also this assumption is in line with the evidence reported in Caselli and Feyrer (2007);








where Ai,t (.) denotes total factor productivity and F (.) features the substitutability between high-skilled
and low-skilled workers.
The wage rates are determined by the marginal productivity of labor:



























In our numerical analysis, we consider several variants of the production technology, with linear or
CES specification for F (.) and with exogenous or endogenous levels of total factor productivity Ak,t (.).
In the benchmark, we consider a partial equilibrium framework with exogenous wages, assuming that
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Ak,t (.) grows at the same rate in all countries and F (.) is linear with an exogenous and constant relative
productivity σk in each country k. We stick to the partial equilibrium scenario as a benchmark because
there is not a consensual estimate for the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled
workers, see Docquier et al. (2015). In the CES case, the wage ratio between high-skilled and low-
skilled workers σk,t (one plus the skill premium) becomes endogenous. In other variants, we account
for schooling externalities, diversity spillovers or congestion effects, allowing Ak,t (.) to vary with the
proportion of high-skilled in the working-age population (hk,t), with an indicator of birthplace diversity








Our benchmark scenario assumes an EXIT trajectory of institutional characteristics and a linear pro-
duction function with exogenous levels of total factor productivity (equivalent to a partial equilibrium
framework).15 In this context, an intertemporal equilibrium for the world economy can be defined as
follows:













of bilateral migration costs, a functional form for F (.), and a set {Nk,t, qk,t−1}∀k,t of predetermined














such that (i) wages wsk,t maximize profits, as depicted in
Eqs. (22), (23) and (24), (ii) the proportion of college graduates in the native labor force Hk,t satisfies
Eq. (3), (iii) adults’ fertility rates and investment in basic education maximize location-specific utility, as
depicted in Eqs. (10) and (11), (iv) the allocation of the world labor force maximizes utility, as depicted




ik,t , hk,t ≡ Lhk,t/(Lhk,t + Llk,t), Eqs. (17), (18) are
satisfied, (vi) labor supply is determined by Eqs. (19) and (20), and (vii) the evolution of the native adult
population is governed by Eq. (21).
In Sections 1.4 and 1.5, we parametrize a baseline intertemporal equilibrium for the world economy and
simulate the effects of liberalization shocks. For example, a complete removal of legal migration barriers
means that xski,t is decreased to x
s
ki,t for all k, i, s and t. In the robustness checks described in Section
1.6, we retain the EXIT hypothesis but consider scenarios with endogenous wages, i.e. endogenous wage
ratios (σk,t) and total factor productivity levels (Ak,t).
1.3.6 World distribution of income
As a by-product of the intertemporal equilibrium, the model endogenizes the level of income inequality
among the world citizens. We use the Theil index of inequality and compute it on adults’ wage using the
15As Docquier et al. (2015) report there is no agreement in the literature about the value which characterizes the elasticity
of substitution between high- and low-skilled workers. This leads us to consider as a benchmark the partial equilibrium
scenario. Several variants with endogenous skill premia are considered in Section 1.6. We also assume that natives and
migrants of the same education-type (low-and high-skilled) are equally productive. We acknowledge that following the
results of Coulombe and Tremblay (2009) this assumption may be relaxed.
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where SHW sk,t is the share of the world labor income earned by adults of type s living in country k at
time t and SHNsk,t is the share of the world adult population of individuals of type s.
16
1.4 Parametrization
The model is calibrated on the year 2000, the last year for which comprehensive migration matrices by
education level are available. The horizon of our simulations is 2100 and one period represents 25 years.
Our parametrization strategy is designed to match the evolution of the world economy between 1975 and
2000, and to fit the demographic projections of the United Nations for individuals aged 25 and over for
the period 2000-2100 (United Nations (2011)).17 By implication “children” are the ones aged less than 25
while adults are the remaining ones. Our baseline scenario corresponds to the partial equilibrium EXIT
scenario described in Definition 1. Hence, the time path of total factor productivity (Ak,t) is exogenous
and workers are perfect substitutes in production, i.e. the technological function F (.) is linear.
Structural parameters {θ, λ, φ, µ, α} - Preferences are assumed to be identical across countries and
time invariant. The set of structural parameters is calibrated using insights from the literature. As
for parameter φ, the time-cost of having a child, evidence in Haveman and Wolfe (1995) suggests that
the opportunity cost of a child is equivalent to about 15 percent of the parents’ time endowment. This
means that the maximal fertility rate equals 6.7 children per adult, or 13 per couple. As for the altruism
parameter θ, the literature provides a range of values between 0.10 in de la Croix and Gosseries (2009),
0.17 in de la Croix and Doepke (2004), 0.27 in de la Croix and Doepke (2003). As for the preference
for basic education λ, de la Croix and Doepke (2003) and de la Croix and Doepke (2004) used values of
0.635 and 0.6, respectively, while de la Croix and Gosseries (2009) used 0.578. In line with these papers,
we use (θ, λ, φ) = (0.3, 0.6, 0.15). In a robustness analysis, we decrease parameters θ and λ by 0.1.
As for the scale parameter of the distribution of migration tastes µ, Bertoli and Moraga (2013) found
an elasticity of bilateral migration to the wage ratio (wsj,t/w
s
k,t) between 0.6 and 0.7. Given the values of
the preference parameters and plugging the solution of the maximization problem given by Eq. (16) into
Eq. (4), this elasticity equals (1− θ)/µ in our model. By choosing µ = 1, the responsiveness of migration
to wage disparities in our model is thus in line with the empirical literature.
Parameter α, the common shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of the ability to acquire higher
education, governs the responsiveness of higher education decisions to the expected returns to schooling,
as appearing in Eq. (3). We iterated on α (and the vector of τk,t, as explained below) in order to
match the elasticity of human capital formation to the high-skilled emigration rate found in the empirical
16The Theil index can be decomposed in within-country and across-country components. However, as shown in a previous
version of this paper, the within-country component is marginally affected as we only consider two different categories of
workers. Moreover, in a setup with constant wages the changes in the Theil index are driven by the evolution of the workers’
distribution.
17This assumption implies that individuals live for 50 years and allows us to use jointly the Defoort (2008) and Artuc¸
et al. (2015) datasets.
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literature. To conduct this exercise, we simulate several liberalization shocks of high-skilled migration
for all country pairs and select α in order to match the average long-run elasticity of the pre-migration
proportion of college graduates to the high-skilled emigration rate equal to 0.20 in developing countries,








- Mincerian returns to schooling,
MRi, are available for 54 countries around the year 2000 in Hendricks (2004). For the same countries,
we use Barro and Lee (2013) data and compute the difference in years of schooling in 2000, DYk,2000,
between college graduates and the less educated workers. The wage ratio between college graduates and
less educated adult workers is then computed as σk,2000 = (1 +MRk,2000)
DYk,2000 . For countries where
data is not available, we predict the wage ratio using a log-linear function of the skill ratio in the resident
labor force.18 For subsequent periods, our baseline trajectory assumes exogenous and constant returns
to schooling, σk,t = σk,2000∀k, t.






, we first use
cross-country data on the skill structure of the resident labor force in 1975 (Li,1975) from Defoort (2008)
and of the native labor force in 2000 (Ni,2000) from Artuc¸ et al. (2015). Under the identifying assump-
tions that nhk,t = q
h




k,t−1 to perfectly match the average fertility rate














. It is worth noticing that our worldwide average level of differential fertility
nhk,1975/n
l
k,1975 is around 0.6, which corresponds to the average level reported in Kremer and Chen (1999).
Using Eq. (13), ξhk,1975 is calibrated to be compatible with n
h
k,1975 = 1. For subsequent periods, n
l
k,t and
qlk are adjusted to match the medium variant of the UN demographic projections (United Nations (2011)).
We then calibrate the trajectory of ωk,t to match the time path for n
l
k,t∀k, t.19 Hence, ωk,t is 3, 24.8,
44.8 and 44.8 percent lower than ωk,1975 in the years 2000, 2025, 2050 and 2075 respectively. With this
time path for ωk,t, our labor force projections are in line with the medium demographic projections of
the United Nations (4.903, 6.370 and 7.202 billion in 2025, 2050 and 2075, respectively). We also assume
ξsk,t = ξ
s
k,1975∀k, s, t. Note that this determines the trajectory of ln Ωsk,t in (16) as well as the trajectory




from Eqs. (19) and (20).
Under the linear technology assumption, the level of total factor productivity in 2000 can be identified




k,2000). Data on gross
domestic product are obtained from the World Development Indicators World Bank (2010). Using Eqs.
(22), (23) and (24), this determines the wage structure in all countries. For subsequent periods, total
factor productivity Ak,t grows at a constant and homogeneous rate of 1.5 percent per year (i.e. 45 percent
per period) in all the countries, Ak,t = Ak,t−1 (1 + 0.015) 25. This determines the baseline trajectory of
vsk,t in (16). Alternative geopolitical scenarios are considered in Section 1.6.
18A simple OLS regression gives lnσi,2000 = 0.25− 0.31 ln hi,001−hi,00 with R
2 = 0.57.
19The United Nations forecast do not provide any endogenous mechanism for their predicted decrease in the fertility rate.
We match their forecasts varying accordingly ωk,t.
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Finally, decisions about higher education are governed by the Pareto distribution of the effort cost to
acquire tertiary education. Although α is assumed to be common to all the countries, the lower bound of
the distribution, parameter τk,t, is allowed to vary across countries. For a given α, τk,2000 is calibrated
so as to match the proportion of college graduates in the labor force of country k in 2000. For subsequent












, we use the









by education level. Once vsk,t is identified




can then be recovered for each pair of countries
as residuals of Eq. (4). For subsequent periods, our baseline scenario assumes that xski,t = x
s
ki,2000 are
constant for all k, i, s, and t.
Figure 1.a depicts the identified levels of migration cost obtained for the 200 largest migration corridors
(representing about 70 percent of the world migration stock). Bubble sizes are proportional to the bilateral
stock of migrants in the year 2000. On average, mobility costs are smaller for college graduates (vertical
axis) than for the less educated (horizontal axis). We obtain mean levels equal 0.935 for college graduates
(standard error of 0.136), and to 0.973 for the less educated (standard error of 0.062). Considering the
1000 largest corridors (representing 92 percent of the world migration stocks), the mean levels increase to
0.965 and 0.988, respectively. The data reveal that 61 percent of bilateral migration corridors are empty;
these corridors are characterized by xski,2000 = 1 in our model.
Our calibration strategy thus perfectly fits migration data. In the benchmark trajectory of the world
economy, we assume that migration costs are constant. Migration costs sum up the legal costs incurred
to obtain a visa and the private costs incurred by migrants to move and assimilate in the destination
country. We aggregate four waves of the Gallup World Poll survey data on desired migration to identify
the magnitude of private migration costs in 2000 (xski,2000). The survey includes two relevant questions
on intentions to emigrate: “Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to
another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?”, and “To which country would
you like to move?” As in Docquier et al. (2015), we consider that “having the opportunity” is interpreted
by the respondents as the complete absence of policy restrictions to movement. On the one hand, this
interpretation is likely to overestimate the importance of legal costs and thereby the effect of a complete
liberalization. On the other hand, our baseline scenario disregards migration multiplier effects induced
by networks. We identify incompressible private costs (1− xski,2000) as a residual of Eq. (4) after adding
the skill-specific number of individuals who express a desire to emigrate to the actual migration stocks.
As for total migration costs, we assume that xski,t = x
s
ki,2000 are constant for all k, i, s, and t. In Section
1.6, we allow private migration costs to decrease with the size of the bilateral migration stock.
Figure 1.b depicts the share of total migration costs explained by legal immigration restrictions. The
structure is identical to that of Figure 1.a. On average, legal costs represent a greater proportion of
the total for college graduates (vertical axis) than for the less educated (horizontal axis). We obtain a
mean share of 0.113 percent for college graduates (and a standard error of 0.125), and of 0.018 for the
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less educated (standard error of 0.034). This confirms that legal costs account for a small proportion of
total migration costs. Private (psychic and monetary) moving costs are important and explain why labor
mobility is relatively limited despite large income disparities within and between countries. These private
costs are more important for the less educated, who usually contemplate a smaller number of potential
destinations. Considering the 1000 largest corridors, the mean levels fall to 0.049 and 0.014, respectively.
Validation - Our parametrization strategy uses all the degrees of freedom of the data to identify
the structural parameters and country characteristics. Hence, our model cannot produce a test of its
assumptions. In order to establish the relevance of our identification method, we examine whether our
identified country-specific parameters exhibit realistic correlations with observations for related variables
that are not matched by our model but viewed as traditional determinants in the empirical literature.
Correlation rates are presented in Table 1.
The first column shows that the calibrated relative income of children is negatively correlated with
development, the quality of institutions, the level of public expenditure per student in secondary educa-
tion, and positively correlated with the share of the population living in rural areas. More importantly,
the correlation with the proportion of economically active children is large (58 percent). Variable ωi,1975
captures well parents’ incentives to rely on child labor. The second column shows that the calibrated cost
of basic education decreases with development and increases with the share of population living in urban
areas, where access to schooling is more limited. Finally, the effort required to acquire higher education
is negatively correlated with development, the quality of institutions, the level of public expenditure per
student in secondary and tertiary education, and positively correlated with the share of the population
living in rural areas.




GNI per capitaa -0.49 -0.28 -0.63
Government effectivenessb -0.48 -0.08 -0.54
Political stabilityb -0.33 -0.12 -0.45
Share of rural populationa 0.42 0.36 0.63
Economically active children (percentage of 7-14)a 0.58 0.32 0.61
Public education expend. per student (secondary level)a -0.59 -0.01 -0.52
Public education expend. per student (tertiary level)a -0.08 -0.11 -0.16
Data sources: a World Bank (2010) and b Kaufmann et al. (2008)
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1.5 Opening borders: partial equilibrium
We use our model to simulate the effects of a permanent removal of migration barriers, i.e. a shift in
legal migration costs, assuming that the shock occurs in 2000. Results for the year 2000 are therefore
fully comparable to those obtained in the static framework with exogenous population size and structure
of Docquier et al. (2015). In this section, we assume that the production function is linear and that
productivity growth is identical across countries. Hence, removing migration restrictions has no effect on
wages. The income distribution across countries (as measured by the Theil index) is however affected by
the changes in the workers’ skill distribution. This partial equilibrium scenario corresponds to the EXIT
set of hypotheses described in Proposition 4 and Definition 1. Extensions with endogenous wages are
amply discussed in Section 1.6.
We first consider liberalization variants in which, for each pair of countries, the legal costs of migration
are reduced by ϑ percent. Hence, ϑ can be interpreted as the liberalization rate. The change in legal
migration costs writes as:
xski,t −→ xski,t − ϑ(xski,t − xski,t) ∀s, k, i, t
Four values of ϑ are considered, 25, 50, 75 and 100 percent. The latter scenario corresponds to a
complete removal of legal migration restrictions. Figure 2.a to 2.d describe the effect of these shocks on
the proportion of migrants in the world population, the worldwide level of GDP per worker, the semi-
elasticity of the world GDP to the proportion of migrants, and the Theil index of income inequality.20
The liberalization rate is measured on the horizontal axis, and each curve corresponds to a time period.
Figure 2.a shows that the change in the worldwide proportion of international migrants is almost
proportional to the liberalization rate. The greatest effect is obtained in 2000, the period at which the
shock occurs. Then, it slightly decreases over time because the population living in developing countries
gradually falls relative to the baseline trajectory. In the year 2000, a 25 percent cut in migration barriers
increases the worldwide proportion of immigrants from 3.5 percent to 6 percent (+2.5 percentage points)
while a complete liberalization raises it to 12.3 percent (+8.7 percentage points). By 2100, a 25 percent
cut in migration barriers increases the average proportion of immigrants by 2.4 percentage points while
a complete liberalization raises it by 7.1 percentage points.
A key finding of our analysis is that removing migration barriers stimulates the acquisition of human
capital. There are three reasons for this. First, in line with the brain gain literature (see Stark et al.
(1997), Mountford (1997), Beine et al. (2001); Beine et al. (2008), Easterly and Nyarko (2008), Docquier
and Rapoport (2012)), increased emigration prospects stimulate the expected return to education; the
fraction of young adults acquiring higher education increases as from the year 2000. As shown in Table 2.a,
the worldwide proportion of college graduates increases from 11.2 to 12 percent (+ 0.8 percentage points)
under the full liberalization scenario. Second, wherever they live, newly educated parents have higher
propensities to educate their children. Third, newcomers in rich countries, educated or not, face a better
20In the Appendix (Section 1.8.1), we discuss (and provide tables) on the impact of liberalization-shocks on the size and
the distribution of the world population.
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environment (lower education costs, no child labor) for providing basic education to their offspring. The
latter two effects are dynamic by nature. Enrollment in basic education increases as from 2000, and the
pool of young adults who can access the higher education system gets larger as from 2025. Consequently,
the rise in educational attainment is gradual and cumulative. In 2100, the world proportion of college
graduates increases by about 6.7 percentage points as compared to the baseline (from 17.7 percent in
the baseline to 24.4 percent under the complete liberalization scenario). In parallel, the world average
fertility rate and the world population size decrease gradually (i.e. -4.3 % in the year 2100 as compared to
the baseline scenario). These socio-demographic changes exert a strong influence on the efficiency gains
from removing migration barriers.
Figure 2.b reveals that the efficiency gains are slightly concave in the liberalization rate: reducing
migration barriers by 50 percent allows the realization of slightly more than 50 percent of the gains that
can be achieved under a full liberalization. In the year 2000 (the short run), reducing migration barriers
by 25 percent increases the world average level of GDP per worker by 3.8 percent as compared to the
baseline scenario. A complete liberalization increases GDP per worker by 13.1 percent. The concentration
of workers in higher productivity countries and the gradual changes in the accumulation of human capital
imply that the economic gains of liberalizing migration flows are cumulative. Hence, by the year 2100,
the effects are four times larger than in the short run: the worldwide level of GDP per worker increases
by 19.1 and 53.8 percent when migration barriers are reduced by 25 and 100 percent, respectively.
Figure 2.c reveals that the semi-elasticity of the world GDP to the proportion of migrants is almost
independent of the liberalization rate. In the year 2000, it is around 1.5, which is slightly above the 1.33
semi-elasticity obtained in the static frameworks of Docquier et al. (2015), Iregui (2003), Winters (2001)
or Walmsley and Winters (2005). This is because our model endogenizes the decision to acquire college
education. As from the year 2000, removing migration barriers increases expected returns to schooling and
the worldwide proportion of college graduates.21 In addition, given the gradual and cumulative changes
in human capital accumulation, the semi-elasticity increases over time. In 2100, the semi-elasticity lies
between 7.5 and 8 depending on the liberalization rate. Figure 2.d shows that the distribution of income
is less unequal in a world with lower mobility restrictions. Removing migration barriers relocate workers
from poor countries (where inequality is high) to rich countries (where inequality is lower). In the short
run, the Theil index decreases by 0.4 percentage points if migration costs are reduced by 25 percent, and
by 1.6 percentage points if migration is fully liberalized. By the year 2100, deviations from the baseline
scenario are equal to -2.9 and -10.7 percentage points for a 25 and 100 percent reduction in migration
costs, respectively.
Focusing on the complete liberalization scenario, Tables 2.a and 2.b give the changes in the average
proportion of college-educated adults and in the average level of GDP per worker in 11 regions: USA
(the United States), EU15 (the 15 initial members of the European Union), CANZ (Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand), GCC (countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council), MENA (Middle East and North-
21As it appears in the robustness section, simulating the model without this brain gain effect reduces the semi-elasticity
to 1.4 in 2000 (see Section 1.6.2), in line with previous studies.
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ern Africa), SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa), CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States, ex-Soviet Union),
CHIND (China and India), ASIA (Rest of Asia), LAC (Latin American and Caribbean countries), and
OTHERS (remaining countries).22
In the short run, GDP per worker decreases in all developed regions. The effect ranges from -0.5
percent in the EU15 to -6.1 percent in the USA and -7.1 percent in GCC. On the contrary, GDP per
worker increases in the developing regions. The effect ranges from +0.6 percent in CHIND and CIS to
+10.2 percent in SSA. Given that wages are exogenous in the partial equilibrium scenario, these results
are entirely driven by the change in the skill composition of the regional labor force. Human capital
decreases in developed regions due to massive inflows of immigrants who are on average less educated
than natives. In the long run, the world average proportion of educated workers increases from 17.7 to
24.4 percent (i.e. by 6.7 percentage points). Human capital accumulation gradually reduces the negative
impact of the immigration shock in developed regions (i.e. in 2100, the decrease in average GDP per
worker is around -2.0 percent in the USA, and -0.1 percent in the EU15).
In developing regions, emigrants are generally positively selected (i.e. emigrants are on average slightly
more educated than non migrants). For this reason, removing migration barriers induces a short-run
decrease in human capital in all developing regions in the static context of Docquier et al. (2015). In our
framework with endogenous formation of human capital, the proportion of college-educated natives in
2000 increases in most regions due to greater incentives to acquire higher education (see the discussion in
section 1.6.2). In the long run, further human capital accumulation and decreases in the average fertility
imply cumulative gains in all developing regions. In 2100, the change in GDP per worker reaches 21.9
percent in Asia and 40.8 percent in SSA as compared to the baseline scenario.
1.6 Opening borders: extensions
In this section, we assess the robustness of our results to various identifying and technological assump-
tions. We first use alternative interpretations of the Gallup data in Section 1.6.1. The sensitivity to the
technology of human capital formation is assessed in Section 1.6.2. We then simulate our model assuming
technological non linearities or externalities associated with cultural diversity in Sections 1.6.3 and 1.6.4.
Finally, we consider scenarios with smaller or greater growth rates for African countries and the BRICs
in Section 1.6.5. For these robustness checks, we focus on the complete liberalization scenario (ϑ = 100
percent), and provide results for the worldwide level of GDP per worker and the Theil index of inequality
only (see Figure 3).
1.6.1 Potential migration
In the benchmark scenario, we computed the stock of potential migrants (i.e. effective + desired migrants)
and its bilateral structure, assuming that current migrants do not relocate to another destination, dis-
regarding potential temporary migration, and disregarding network effects. In a first set of robustness
22Our simulations provide country-specific results, which are available upon request. We have aggregated them at the
regional level for the sake of clarity and comparability with other studies.
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checks, we follow Docquier et al. (2015) and consider three variants of the potential migration stock,
starting from the partial equilibrium scenario:
 First, we use the same size and structure of desired migration, but consider that current migrants
do relocate proportionally to the bilateral structure of desired migration. This scenario is labeled
as “Reloc”.
 Second, we use the Gallup World Survey and identify the proportion of non-migrants expressing a
desire to emigrate temporarily to another country.23 We include the latter in the set of potential
migrants and assume that each temporary migrant stays almost 30 percent of a whole career in
the destination country, i.e. about 8 years. We use the same bilateral structure as for permanent
migration. This scenario is labeled as “Temp”.24
 Third, we account for network externalities that allow private migration costs to be compressed
when the size of the bilateral diaspora increases. We use the same elasticities of incompressible
migration costs to the total diaspora size as in Docquier et al. (2015), i.e. -0.05 for college graduates
and -0.20 for the less educated. This scenario is labeled as “Network”.
Results of the potential migration variants are depicted in Figures 3.a and 3.b. Overall, the order
of magnitude of the efficiency and inequality effects of liberalizing migration are very similar to those
obtained in the partial equilibrium scenario.
Under the “Reloc” variant, desired migration is much more concentrated in high-income countries
than effective migration. The proportion of immigrants in high-income countries reaches 37.0 percent
in 2000 (compared to 35.1 percent in the partial equilibrium scenario). Figure 3.a shows that efficiency
gains are therefore greater in this scenario. In the short run, the worldwide average level of GDP per
worker increases by 14.4 percent while long run efficiency gains amount to 57.4 percent (compared to
13.1 and 53.8 percent in the partial equilibrium scenario). As migrants concentrate in richer regions,
fertility decreases slightly more and human capital formation is amplified. The higher concentration of
less educated immigrants slightly reduces the level of income per worker in the most developed countries.
Hence, this scenario also implies a stronger decrease in income inequality, as shown in Figure 3.b.
Accounting for temporary migration increases the number of additional migrants by 61.4 million in the
short run and 106.9 million in the long run compared to the partial equilibrium scenario (this represents
an increase of 10.7 percent in the short run, and 12.7 percent in the long run). In the short run, the
proportion of immigrants reaches 38.2 percent in developed countries and 3.8 percent in developing
countries. In 2100, these immigration rates are equal to 21.7 and 4.4 percent, respectively. The higher
number of migrants reinforces the positive effects of liberalization. Education increases and a higher
number of people move to countries with lower fertility such that the world population is slightly smaller
23The Gallup Survey identified temporary migrants making the same questions reported in Section 1.4 but with per-
manently being replaced by temporary. As Docquier et al. (2015) notice there is a large overlap between the two types
of questions and we follow them by considering temporary migrants only the ones who declared that they would like to
migrate only temporary.
24Similarly to Docquier et al. (2015) we assume that 30% of temporary migrants move abroad for the full period while
the remaining ones (70%) stay put.
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than in the partial equilibrium scenario. As shown in Figure 3.a, world GDP per capita increases by 15
percent in the short run (compared to 13.1 percent in the partial equilibrium scenario), and the long-run
effect reaches 59.2 percent (compared to 53.8 percent in the benchmark). Accounting for temporary
migrants also reinforces the effect on inequality.
As for network externalities, they raise the number of global migrants by 58.7 percent in the short run,
and by 40.1 percent in the long run as compared to the partial equilibrium scenario. In the short-run,
the proportion of foreign-born workers increases to 47.6 and 6.4 percent in developed and developing
regions, respectively. The size of global efficiency gains increases as shown in Figure 3.a. Changes in the
average level of GDP per worker now amount to 20.2 percent in the short run and 67.8 percent in the
long run. Network effects have a stronger impact on the private migration costs of the less educated;
this negatively affects the proportion of educated workers in the richest countries. However, lowering
emigration costs also triggers greater incentives to acquire education in developing countries. The rise in
the worldwide proportion of college educated adults in 2100 is greater (+7.2 percentage points) than in
the partial equilibrium scenario (+6.7 percentage points). Overall, we observe a sharper decline in the
average level of GDP per worker of developed countries, whereas higher incentives to educate increase the
gains observed in developing regions. The decrease in the Theil index is thus larger than in the partial
equilibrium scenario, and is reinforced by the fact that the demographic weight of developing countries
decreases in this scenario.
1.6.2 Human capital
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of our results to some identifying assumptions. The endogeneity
of education and fertility decisions has strong implications for our results. We thus assess whether our
efficiency and inequality responses are robust to the inclusion of the brain gain mechanism and to the
levels of the preference parameters affecting basic education decisions. We simulate the model using the
partial equilibrium environment and the three following variants:
 First, we assume a constant proportion of college graduates among those who received basic edu-
cation when young. This means that we consider the second term as constant in Eq. (3). This
scenario is labeled as “No brain gain”.
 Second, we use an altruism parameter, θ, equal to 0.2 (instead of 0.3 in the benchmark). This
scenario is labeled as “Low altr”.
 Third, we use a preference for basic education, λ, equal to 0.5 (instead of 0.6 in the benchmark).
This scenario is labeled as “Low educ”.
Results of the potential migration variants are depicted in Figures 3.c and 3.d. Again, the order
of magnitude of the efficiency and inequality effects are very similar to those obtained in the partial
equilibrium, benchmark scenario.
Under the “No brain gain” variant, the proportion of college graduates is fixed in the short run and the
gradual changes in human capital accumulation are smaller compared to the benchmark. The worldwide
33
Essays on the Macro-Analysis of International Migration
proportion of college-educated workers increases in only 55 and 69 countries in the short and long run,
respectively (against 118 and 126 in the partial equilibrium scenario, respectively). This robustness check
evidences that the global rise in education is mainly triggered by the improved access to basic education
(i.e. the concentration and assimilation of new migrants in countries where the access to basic and tertiary
education is better and fertility is lower). While the long-run fraction of college-educated workers reaches
24.4 percent in the partial equilibrium scenario, it now reaches 23.3 percent (+5.6 percentage points
relative to the baseline scenario). This means that the brain gain mechanism explains about one sixth
of the long-run increase in human capital. When brain gain effects are deactivated, changes in the world
average level of GDP per worker and in the Theil index of inequality are slightly lower than those obtained
in the benchmark scenario.
Using a smaller altruism parameter in the “Low altr” scenario changes the baseline trajectory of
the world economy. It reduces the worldwide average fertility rate to a value slightly below unity in
the long run (as compared to 1.14 in the benchmark scenario). Compared to the benchmark scenario,
pre-liberalization population growth rates are smaller and the worldwide proportion of college-educated
workers is greater. The latter reaches 24.5 percent in the long run, compared to 17.7 percent in the
benchmark scenario. Nevertheless, the size of the efficiency gains from removing migration barriers
decrease a little. As far as inequality is concerned, liberalization has a greater effect on the average
fertility of developing countries. By reducing the demographic weight of these countries, it leads to a
stronger decline in inequality.
In the “Low educ” scenario, decreasing the preference parameter for basic education increases fer-
tility and reduces the proportion of college graduates. These changes also affect the pre-liberalization
trajectory of the world economy. By 2100, the proportion of college-educated workers in the new base-
line equals 15.5 percent, as compared to 17.7 percent in the partial equilibrium case. In the long run,
liberalization increases the worldwide level of GDP per worker by 56 percent (compared to 53.8 percent
in the benchmark scenario). While the global proportion of migrants is virtually unchanged with respect
to the benchmark scenario, migrants tend to be more concentrated in developed countries. This is par-
ticularly true for high-skilled migrants from poor countries. Overall, opening borders is less beneficial for
developing countries, which lose more talented workers and exhibit greater population growth rates. The
decrease in inequality implied by a liberalization is thus slightly less pronounced than in the benchmark
scenario.
1.6.3 Technological non linearities
Our benchmark scenario assumes a linear technology (constant skill premium), exogenous TFP levels,
and an unconstrained absorption capacity by the receiving countries. Three alternative scenarios are
considered here:
 First, we assume a CES specification for F (.). As in Docquier et al. (2015), we set the elasticity
of substitution to 3.0 in all the countries, and calibrate the country-specific preference parameters
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for college-educated workers so as to match the wage ratios σk,t observed in 2000. This scenario is
labeled as “CES”.
 Second, we consider the possibility of a positive schooling externality on TFP (see Peri et al. (2013)).
We assume that the elasticity of TFP to the proportion of college graduates in the labor force equals








where ABasek,t and h
Base
k,t stand for the TFP levels and
proportion of college graduates in the baseline scenario. This scenario is labeled as “Schooling”.
 Third, we account for limited absorption capacity and allow TFP to decrease with the size of the
labor force. Ciccone and Hall (1996) recommended using an elasticity of -0.03, representing the








where LBasek,t stands for the
total adult population in the baseline scenario. This scenario is labeled as “Congest”.
Results of the potential migration variants are depicted in Figures 3.e and 3.f. In the “CES” and
“Congest” scenarios, the order of magnitude of the efficiency and inequality effects is very similar to
those obtained in the partial equilibrium scenario. Adding schooling externalities reduces the efficiency
gains from liberalizing migration, but induces larger effects on inequality.
Under the CES technology, the skill premia becomes endogenous. Low-skilled wages increase and
high-skilled wages decrease with the proportion of college graduates in the workforce. This change in
the production function only marginally impacts our results. Efficiency gains increase slightly less than
under the partial equilibrium scenario. Average GDP per worker increases by 12.7 percent in the short
run and 53.0 percent in the long run. Efficiency gains are slightly higher in developed countries while
marginally lower in developing countries. The decrease in inequality is less marked than in the partial
equilibrium scenario because returns to schooling increase in high-income countries.
Under the “Schooling” scenario, productivity decreases in high-income countries due to the immigration-
driven change in the proportion of college graduates. Lower economic performances in developed countries
reduce incentives to emigrate and to acquire college education. For these reasons, the global efficiency
gains from removing migration barriers are smaller than those obtained in the partial equilibrium sce-
nario. They amount to 10.2 and 49.5 percent in the short and long run, respectively. The inequality effect
also changes because productivity decreases in developed countries (due to a decline in human capital)
and increases in developing countries (due to the brain gain mechanism). Consequently, we observe a
stronger decline in inequality compared the partial equilibrium scenario, especially in the short run.
Accounting for congestion has a negligible impact on our results. Productivity in traditional immigra-
tion countries is negatively affected by congestion whereas productivity increases in emigration countries
due to the lower pressure on their resources. The global efficiency gains are slightly smaller than those
obtained in the partial equilibrium scenario (12.3 and 49.8 percent in the short and long run, respec-
tively). As congestion implies a decrease in the average income per worker in developed countries and an
increase in developing countries. Hence, the Theil response to a liberalization is slightly more important
than in the partial equilibrium scenario.
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1.6.4 Cultural diversity
In this section, we account for potential gains and costs from cultural diversity. Although cultural
diversity may directly impact utility, acting as an amenity or a disamenity, we only treat its effect as a
shift in TFP. We proxy cultural diversity using a birthplace diversity index of the labor force (Divk,t) for
each country and period. Our index measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in
a country originate from two different birthplaces. We then allow TFP to vary positively or negatively
with this index. The empirical literature has provided ambiguous results on the sign and magnitude of
this effect. We consider three scenarios and assume that the diversity effect on TFP is only observed in
high-income OECD destination countries:
 Our first variant assumes a negative effect of cultural diversity on TFP. We follow Parrotta et al.
(2014) who found a negative effect of workers’ diversity by nationality on the productivity of Danish





. This negative externality can be due to negative effects on
communication or cooperation among workers. Another channel of transmission advocated by
Collier (2013) is trust (or mutual regard). The effect of trust on the log of TFP has been identified
in Knack and Keefer (1997); their long-run coefficient is around 0.30. At the same time, Alesina
and La Ferrara (2002) showed that diversity by race reduces trust by 0.24. Although the latter
effect pertains exclusively to race, not national origin, combining these effects and linearizing at the
current level of diversity gives an effect of diversity on TFP which is exactly equivalent to the effect
of birthplace diversity identified in Parrotta et al. (2014). We thus assume a negative elasticity of
-0.075 in our first variant, labeled as “Low cult”.
 Our second variant is even more pessimistic and arbitrarily assumes a negative coefficient of -0.15,
twice as high as in the previous scenario. This scenario is labeled as “High cult”.
 On the contrary, in our third variant, we consider a positive effect of birthplace diversity on TFP.
Such a positive effect has been identified in empirical studies based on aggregate data by country
(see Alesina et al. (2013)) or US metropolitan areas (see Ottaviano and Peri (2006)). Here we
linearize the IV, state-effect specification for wages estimated by Ottaviano and Peri (2006). This






. This scenario is labeled as “Cult benefits”.
Results of the cultural diversity variants are depicted in Figures 3.g and 3.h. Under the two scenarios
considering the negative elasticities of productivity to diversity, the order of magnitude of the efficiency
and inequality effects are very similar to those obtained in the partial equilibrium scenario. However, at
the level of the positive elasticity obtained in the macro literature, birthplace diversity sharply increases
the efficiency gains from removing migration barriers, but also changes the inequality response, leading
to more inequality in the short run.
After removing migration barriers, birthplace diversity increases in almost all the countries of the
world (i.e. 190 countries in the short run, and 180 countries in the long run). Exceptions are to be
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found mainly among small island developing states. Therefore, under the “Low cult” scenario, the TFP
level decreases in most countries. Benefits accruing from liberalization are thus lower than in the partial
equilibrium scenario. In the short run, average GDP per worker increases by 11 percent (compared to
13.1 percent in the partial equilibrium case) while it rises by 52.4 percent in the long run (compared to
53 percent in the partial equilibrium). The inequality response is similar to that obtained in the partial
equilibrium scenario. Inequality decreases slightly more in the short run, but the difference with respect
to the benchmark almost disappears in the long run. The same patterns are obtained under the “High
cult” scenario, although they are amplified. Efficiency gains are further reduced in the short run (+8.9
percent) and in the long run (+51 percent).
Results are different if we consider the positive elasticity of productivity to birthplace diversity es-
timated in the macro literature. Since developed countries host the majority of potential migrants, a
positive externality means that the level of TFP increases in the richest countries of the world. This
reinforces the efficiency gains from removing migration barriers. In the short run, the average level of
GDP per worker increases by 36.1 percent (three times more than in the partial equilibrium scenario),
and the long run gains reach 65.8 percent. In addition, if rich countries benefit from birthplace diversity,
a complete liberalization of migration increases cross-country disparities in productivity. In the short run
and after 25 years, liberalizing migration makes the world distribution of income more unequal. This
effect disappears in the long-run because of the gradual changes in human capital accumulation.
1.6.5 Geopolitics
In our benchmark scenario, TFP growth (1.5 percent per year) is assumed to be homogeneous across
countries. We consider here three geopolitical variants:
 The first assumes that the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) grow by 3 percent per year
from 2000 to 2100. This means that by 2100, the BRICs will be 4.3 times as rich as in the baseline
scenario. This scenario is labeled as “High BRIC s”.
 The second variant assumes that Africa (both Northern and sub-Saharan African countries) grows
by 3 percent per year from 2000 to 2100. This means that by 2100, Africa will be 4.3 times as rich
as in the baseline scenario. This scenario is labeled as “High Africa”.
 On the contrary, the third variant assumes that Africa grows by 1 percent per year from 2000 to
2100. This means that by 2100, Africa will be 40 percent poorer than in the baseline scenario. This
scenario is labeled as “Low Africa”.
Results of the potential migration variants are depicted in Figures 3.i and 3.j. Assuming that the
BRICs grow faster than the rest of the world implies that these countries catch up with the developed
countries in the baseline. This implies that workers from this countries have less incentives to emigrate,
and that the BRICs become more attractive for foreign migrants. The first effect dominates. Hence,
the world migration stock after liberalization now amounts to 741 million in 2100, as compared to 844
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million in the partial equilibrium scenario. The world average proportion of migrants reaches 12.3 and
9.5 percent in the short and long run, respectively. This reduces the scope of efficiency gains, as reflected
in Figure 3.i. The effect on the world GDP peaks at 27.5 in 2050 and then decreases to 25 percent
in the long run. As BRICs countries converge towards developed countries but diverge with respect to
developing countries, the Theil index decreases slightly less than in the partial equilibrium.
Under the “High Africa” variant, the effects are similar to those of the previous scenario. The
convergence of Africa reduces the incentives for Africans to emigrate. The impact of a liberalization on
efficiency gains follows the pattern observed in the “High BRIC ” scenario. In the long run, efficiency
gains amounts to 34.2 percent in 2100; this is much lower than the gains obtained in partial equilibrium
(53.8 percent). The effect on the Theil index is virtually identical of the partial equilibrium scenario. On
the contrary, under the “Low Africa” variant, greater income disparities between Africa and the rest of
the world stimulate emigration flows. Efficiency gains are identical to those of the benchmark whereas
the change in inequality is more pronounced.
1.6.6 Accounting for remittances
Our benchmark simulation does not account for remittances that migrants send back to their home
country. The average ratio of remittances to GDP is low in developing countries (3 percent), and 135
countries exhibit a lower ratio than the mean. However, this ratio is much greater in some countries (36
percent in Tonga, 34 in Lesotho, 29 in Bosnia, 22 in Jordan, 20 in Samoa, 17 in West Bank and Gaza, 16
in Albania, 15 in Haiti, Yemen and Cape Verde). In many of these countries, the after-liberalization ratio
of emigrants to stayers is three to six times larger than in the baseline. This can induce huge changes in
the level of remittances and income. Hence, accounting for remittances is likely to affect the size of our
effects.
It is however difficult to include remittances for different reasons. First, the literature has emphasized
different motives to remit (altruism, exchange of services, risk diversification, reimbursement of loans,
etc.) and the weights of these motives vary across countries or country pairs. Second, there is no
consensus about who remits more and who receives more (college graduates or the less educated). Survey
data collected in Bollard et al. (2011) show that the correlation between the amount remitted and the
level of education of emigrants is also country-specific. Third, in a fully micro-founded model, individuals
should anticipate remittances in their migration and education decisions, and the amount remitted would
itself depend on the size of migration flows. The properties of our model would be much more complex
while the literature has not identified robust and general effects of remittances on education decisions
and other types of investment. In other words, there is no consensual strategy to include remittances in
such a model and to parametrize remittance patterns.
To assess the role of remittances, we adopt here an ad hoc strategy. Although we acknowledge the fact
that remittances could affect the size of our efficiency gains (through their impact on education, fertility
and migration), we assume that these efficiency effects are of second-order importance and only focus on
inequality responses. We compute the after-transfer inequality index considering that remittances have
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no effect on education, fertility and migration.
Our model endogenizes the level of pre-transfer income of all migrants and non migrants. In 2000,
we can easily compute the aggregate labor income of all emigrants from any country i (EMWi,2000),
the aggregate income generated in country i (Yi,2000), and calibrate the propensity to remit of emigrants
from country i (ri) that perfectly fits the observed ratio of remittances to GDP (REMi,2000) in 2000.
This gives ri = REMi,2000Yi,2000/EMWi,2000. Then we simulate the income distribution after a complete
liberalization and in all subsequent periods, assuming that ri is constant (high-remittance variant) or that
the elasticity of ri to the emigrant/stayer ratio equals -0.5 (low-remittance variant):
25 we obtain a new
ratio of remittances to GDP, REMi,t = ri,tEMWi,t/Yi,t. Results for the average remittances/GDP ratio
in developing countries, and for the after-remittance Theil index of inequality are depicted in Figures 4.a
and 4.b.
Figure 4.a provides the changes in the remittances/GDP ratio in developing countries, expressed in
percentage point of deviation from the baseline. Under a constant propensity to remit, a full liberalization
increases the remittances/GDP ratio in developing countries by 6 percentage points in 2000, and by 5.5
percentage points in 2100. As shown in Figure 4.b, the decrease in the after-remittance Theil index
(’High Rem’ curve) is much more pronounced than in the before-remittance index (’No Rem.’ curve).
However, if the propensity to remit is elastic to the emigrant-to-stayer ratio, the remittances/GDP ratio
only increases by 1.4 to 1.9 percentage points in all the years. The decrease in the after-remittance Theil
index (’Low Rem’ curve) is then much closer to that obtained for the before-remittance index. In sum,
the fall in inequality induced by a liberalization can be accentuated by remittances, but this is the case
if and only if the propensity to remit of emigrants is sufficiently inelastic to the emigrant-to-stayer ratio.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of immigration barriers on the world distribution of income. We develop
a theoretical framework that accounts for education and fertility responses to migration policy reforms.
Quantitatively, we show that the efficiency and redistributive effects of immigration restrictions gradually
increase over time when population growth and human capital accumulation are endogenized. In a partial
equilibrium framework, a complete liberalization of labor mobility increases the world average level of
GDP per worker by 13 percent in the short run, and by about 54 percent after one century. The main
reason is that new migrants moving from developing to developed countries face a favorable environment
(lower education costs, no child labor) for providing basic education to their children and decreasing
their fertility. This increases the pool of young adults who are eligible for higher education in the future
generation. Some of them will invest in college education and will have a greater propensity to provide
education to their own offspring. Hence, the effects on human capital accumulation, income and inequality
are cumulative: liberalizing migration gradually increases the world proportion of college educated and
reduces population growth.
25This elasticity is compatible with Faini (2007) and Niimi et al. (2010), who found an elasticity of remittances to the
stock of emigrants of 0.5. Freund and Spatafora (2008) found an elasticity between 0.65 and 0.75.
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These mechanisms are robust to our identifying assumptions and are also valid in the case of a partial
liberalization, provided that the cut in migration restrictions is global (i.e. identical for all the country
pairs and educational groups). We thus demonstrate that the long-run gain from liberalizing cross-
border migration exceeds by far the short-run effect, although the magnitude of these effects varies when
we allow for an externality of schooling or cultural diversity on productivity, and when our baseline (pre-
liberalization) scenario involves a rapid takeoff of sub-Saharan Africa or emerging countries. Nevertheless,
in the most likely scenarios, large efficiency gains can be expected from removing migration barriers, but
these large gains mostly arise in the long run and will impact the welfare of future generations. This
makes it difficult to find redistributive policies to compensate the losers, mainly the current cohorts of
low-skilled nationals residing in high-income countries.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Regional Effects of a liberalization on the distribution and the size of
the world population.
In this section we analyze the effect of a liberalization on the size and the distribution of the world
population. This discussion and the tables refer to the partial equilibrium scenario. Total population
is the sum of the adults (people aged 25+) and children (people older less than 25). This definition
makes our population numbers different from the UN data. This discrepancy is due to the fact that,
in our parametrization, the living population between year 2000-2025 is equal to the sum of the labor
force at year 2000 plus the labor force at year 2025. On the contrary, our parametrization is set to
match UN labor force projections. However, comparing the baseline and the liberalization scenarios
gives valuable information on how the distribution of people across countries would be affected by less
stringent or none migration-restriction policy. Intuitively, and as confirmed by Tables 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.d
and 3.e a liberalization would increase the population size of the world’s developed regions. This effect is
substantial already at year 2000, for instance in the full liberalization scenario we estimate a 28.3 percent
larger population in the developed regions. The estimated increase is lower for partial liberalization
liberalization policies, see Table 3.a. Even if migrants assimilate in terms of education- and fertility-
choices the population increase gets larger in the long-run; population in developed region would be more
than twice larger in the full liberalization scenario, see Table 3.e. The developed regions that would face
the largest population increase are GCC (the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council), for which we
estimate 126.9 increase in the short run, and a population more than twice larger in the long run. On
the contrary, population size would fall sharply in the developing regions. The effect is stronger in the
SSA (sub-Saharan Africa) and MENA (Middle East and African Countries). Finally we find that the net
effect, namely on the world population as a whole, is slightly negative both in the short run and in the
long run.
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2Infrastructure policy: the role of
informality and brain drain
abstract
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of infrastructure policy in developing countries. In these countries
public infrastructure is mainly funded by local taxes and individuals can evade taxation either by moving
to the informal sector or by emigrating abroad. I develop a two-sector, dynamic model with endogenous
infrastructure and human capital accumulation in the presence of these two exit options. Then, I calibrate
the model for a subset of 60 developing countries, and conduct numerical policy experiments. I show that,
at low level of development, the possibility to work informally has a detrimental impact on infrastructure
accumulation. Hence, increasing the tax rate or enlarging the tax base can reduce the macroeconomic
performance in the short run, while inducing long-run gains. These short- and long-run effects are
amplified when brain drain is endogenous, they are also greater where the initial level of infrastructure
is low and the brain drain is large.
2.1 Introduction
There is compelling empirical evidence that public infrastructure matters for development, and that the
level of infrastructure is critically low in developing countries. For instance, Lin and Doemeland (2012)
report that almost one billion and a half people have no access to electricity; Foster et al. (2010) report
that the per-capita production of electricity is so low in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) that
the average household cannot power one light bulb for six hours a day. In this context, increasing the
level of infrastructure is essential to achieve development, as Figure 5 suggests by illustrating the positive
correlation between GDP per capita and two proxies of infrastructure. Although the raw correlation
illustrated in Figure 5 does not necessarily involve a causal relationship, I shall review the abundant
literature on the causal impact of infrastructure on development in Section 2.2.
In this paper, I argue that the difficulty to raise fiscal revenues is one of the main reasons why invest-
ments in infrastructure are small in developing countries. To investigate and quantify the effectiveness of
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infrastructure policy, I develop a two-sector dynamic model with endogenous infrastructure and human
capital accumulation. The rationale is that developing countries need to accumulate both factors to
achieve development, and the infrastructure policy affects their speed of accumulation. The formal sector
represents the official economy and uses low-skilled and high-skilled workers; the total factor productivity
of formal firms is positively affected by the levels of public infrastructure and human capital. On the
contrary, the informal sector only uses low-skilled labor, and is characterized by an exogenous total factor
productivity. It serves as a subsistence sector for the less educated workers. The government finances
infrastructure by taxing the income of workers employed in the formal economy; taxation affects low-
skilled workers’ decision to work formally or informally. As far as international migration is concerned, I
develop two variants of the model. The first one considers brain drain as an exogenous phenomenon; in
the second one, brain drain is endogenous and decreases with the domestic high-skilled wage rate. The
interplay between informality and brain drain, two important exit options in developing countries, limits
the tax base and the capacity of the government to finance infrastructure.
The assumptions of my model are in line with the existing literature. First, I assume that public
infrastructure is mainly funded by local taxes. This is in line with Foster et al. (2010), who report that
the African taxpayer finances as much as two thirds of the overall spending in infrastructure investments.
Second, taxpayers can evade taxation by moving to the informal sector or by emigrating abroad. In
poor countries, the productivity gap between the informal and formal sector is small, and the informal
sector drains a large proportion of the low-skilled labor force. Ju¨tting and de Laiglesia (2009) and
Schneider (2012) report that half of the workforce in developing countries could be considered as informal.
Increasing the tax rate makes informality relatively more attractive for the low-skilled. I thus consider
the size of the informal sector as endogenous, in line with the “dual economy” theory of Lewis (1954).
La Porta and Shleifer (2014) provide supporting evidence of this theory by showing its ability to replicate
five critical stylized facts about the informal economy in developing countries.1 Building on the data
used in La Porta and Shleifer (2014), Figure 6 shows the negative correlation between informality and
development. Besley and Persson (2014) report that low-income countries have small tax rates (varying
between 10 and 20% of GDP), while in developed countries the average level of taxation is close to the
40% of GDP; they argue that this discrepancy is due by the larger size of the informal sector which makes
the sensitivity of taxable income to the tax rate much greater than in developing countries.2 Finally,
when low-skilled workers become informal, the skill premium decreases in the formal sector, thereby
increasing the brain drain and restraining human capital accumulation.3 A large fraction of high-skilled
1First, the informal sector has a huge relative size in developing countries. Second, its productivity is extremely low
compared with the formal firms. Third, the productivity of informal firms is too low for them to be incorporated in the
formal sector. Fourth, the informal economy is largely disconnected from the formal one economy. Fifth, as a country
develops, the size of the informal sector shrinks.
2The same paper argues that the most striking difference between formal and informal firms is the level of education
of their managers. 7% of the managers of informal firms have a college degree compared with 76% for formal firms. Skill
differences between workers across sectors are considerably smaller. Gennaioli et al. (2014) estimate a 30% increase in
returns per extra year of education of managers, while an extra year of worker education would increase average returns
only by 7%.
3Many papers focus only on brain drain, considering low-skilled emigration rates as exogenous or negligible. Examples
are: de la Croix and Docquier (2012), Grossmann and Stadelmann (2011) and Cellini (2007).
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individuals emigrate from developing countries.4 My assumptions are in line with Docquier et al. (2016),
who demonstrate that the informal sector compresses the skill premium. In my model, this encourages
high-skilled individuals to leave their home country. I use the model to analyze the short-run and long-run
effects of infrastructure policy reforms. In the variant with exogenous brain drain, I can characterize the
intertemporal equilibrium of the economy, show it is unique, and derive the theoretical conditions under
which an expansive infrastructure policy (implying an increase in the tax rate) is beneficial or detrimental
for the economy. In line with the Laffer curve, an expansive reform is beneficial if the tax rate does not
exceed a threshold, which depends on the elasticity of formal sector production to human capital. Above
the threshold, the reform reduces the level of infrastructure and the high-skilled wage. In the second
variant, the brain drain becomes endogenous and this reduces the tractability of the model, although I
can prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium. I calibrate the two variants of the model for 60 developing
countries, and conduct various numerical experiments. This allows me to compare the effectiveness of
infrastructure policy in the developing world. I consider three numerical experiments.
The first experiment should only be seen as a thought experiment. I simulate a ban of the informality,
as if total productivity would fall to zero in this sector. Banning informality is clearly neither a feasible
option (as part of it involves home production) nor a desirable option (informality serves as a subsistence
sector for many workers) in developing countries. Nevertheless, this experiment helps illustrating the role
of the informal sector at low levels of development. My results show that informality is responsible for
huge losses in public infrastructure;5 in addition “banning” the informal sector would substantially reduce
brain drain flows.6 The ban of informality has sizable effects on the brain drain in both the short and
long run, and on infrastructure accumulation in the long run. Indeed, bringing low-skilled workers back
to the formal sector has an immediate effect on high-skilled wages and emigration rates. This gradually
increases the stock of public infrastructure, human capital accumulation, and total factor productivity.
However, the income of low-skilled workers decreases in the short-run. Despite the large infrastructure
gains, for most countries these losses are persistent even 75 years after the shock and the average income is
found lower in the counterfactual. In the second experiment, I assume that informal workers can be taxed
at the same rate as formal workers. Taxing informal activities mechanically increases the tax base, and
also generates multiplier effects in the long-run (the same qualitative effects as the ban of informality). It
reduces the size of the informal sector, increases the high-skilled wage rate, and decreases the brain drain.
On the contrary, low-skilled wages fall proportionately to the tax rate. At the current level of taxation, I
predict that the informal sector can totally disappear in some countries (what is referred to as a “regime
switching”). This is the case of China, Kenya, Liberia, Chad and Gambia. In all countries the GDP per
capita decreases in the short run while in the long run, for most of the countries, I predict an increase
of this variable. In the last set of experiments, I consider moderate changes in the tax rate and assess
the country-specific effects on macroeconomic performance. In most cases, high-skilled workers suffer a
4Docquier and Rapoport (2012) provide a review of the literature that studies the link between development and high
skilled migration.
5In the long run I estimate an increase of the public stock of infrastructure between 5% (Peru) to 400% (Gambia).
6The largest effect of informality on brain drain is found for Gambia, for this country I predict a ample drop from 70%
to 30%.
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short-run welfare loss, due to the greater tax-rate and to the fall in the skill premium. However, 75 years
after the shock, the policy becomes effective; the welfare gain is substantial for the high-skilled, whereas
low-skilled workers are unaffected (at least if the informal sector does not disappear). These short-run
and long-run effects are amplified when brain drain is endogenous. In the short-run, the GDP per capita
decreases in all countries. In the long run, due to the larger infrastructure investments, the GDP per
capita will be larger in all countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as following. Section 2.2 provides a summary of the related
literature. Section 2.3 depicts the model, distinguishing between exogenous and endogenous brain drain.
The quantitative analysis is described in Section 2.4. Section 2.4.1 explains the parametrization for the
models. Section 2.4.2 discusses the results of my numerical experiments, and Section 2.4.3 assesses the
robustness of the results to the choice of parameter values. Section 2.5 concludes.
Figure 5: Infrastructure and Development
The left panel shows the correlation between electric consumption per capita and GDP per capita in
year 2010. The right panel shows the correlation between telephone lines per 100 people and GDP per
capita in year 2010. Data on GDP and infrastructure indicators are taken from the World Bank.
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Figure 6 comes from La Porta and Shleifer (2014). Data on the percent of labor force employed in the
informal sector and GDP comes from World Bank.
2.2 Related Literature
The role of infrastructure in economic development has been investigated in a large number of studies.
Building on Gramlich (1994), infrastructure can be defined as “natural monopolies such as highways,
other transportation facilities, water and sewer lines, and communication systems”. In some studies,
education, sanitation and electricity facilities are considered as infrastructure as well. Although part of
the infrastructure can be privately owned I shall consider that is entirely funded by public taxes in my
model.
There is a theoretical literature analyzing the optimal level of infrastructure, hypothesizing that
infrastructure influences the level of total factor productivity (see Bougheas et al. (2000)).7 The seminal
paper of Barro (1990) treats productive public expenditure as a flow variable, and demonstrates that
the optimal tax rate to finance infrastructure is equal to the elasticity of aggregate output with respect
to public capital; this result is known as the “Barro rule”. Contrary to Barro (1990), Futagami et al.
(1993) consider that it is the stock of infrastructure that affects the national output, and this stock
accumulates slowly. In this context, the welfare-maximizing tax rate is lower than the one computed by
Barro; this is due to the fact that public investments are not immediately productive. Similarly, but in
7For a comprehensive review of continuous time, dynastic models addressing the long-run impact on economic growth of
infrastructure investments, see Irmen and Kuehnel (2009). Calderon and Serven (2014) also provide a more succinct review
of both theoretical and empirical literatures.
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discrete time, Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) determine the optimal tax rate in a dynamic model; the
optimal tax rate is equal to the “Barro rule” divided by the representative agent’s discount factor.8 The
literature has also demonstrated that some categories of public infrastructure can show different degrees
of congestion. This arises when infrastructures are partially rival, i.e. when the use of the infrastructure
by one firm decreases its availability for the other firms. In line with Futagami et al. (1993) and Glomm
and Ravikumar (1994), my model assumes that it takes one period for infrastructure investments to
increase total factor productivity, and accounts for congestion effects defining infrastructure in per capita
terms.
Several types of methods have been used to quantify the effect on infrastructure on productivity,
growth and income. Some exploit quasi-natural experiments to identify the economic impact of particular
infrastructure projects. For example, Duflo and Pande (2007) investigate the impact of the construction
of dams in India over the period 1971-1999. They find that constructing a dam makes the downstream
populations better-off, while leaving the welfare of people living in the vicinity of the dam unchanged.
This study provides evidence that the construction of large infrastructure facilities deeply affects the
income distribution between districts within a country. Wang and Wu (2015) study the economic effects
of the Quinzang railway construction on local development in Tibet and China. This massive project
was almost entirely funded by the central government, and the authors predict an average 33% increase
in GDP per capita in the counties served by the railway. However, these results cannot be generalized to
other infrastructure projects or to other regions. Asturias et al. (2016) use a static general equilibrium
model of internal trade to assess the welfare impact of the construction of the Golden Quadrilateral in
India, a large road infrastructure project in India, that connects the four major cities in the country.
They find that gains largely overcome costs,9 estimating welfare gains equal to $3.1 billion dollar per
year while the government invested $5.2 billion dollar.10
Hundreds of papers have estimated the elasticity of aggregate output (usually proxied by the GDP per
capita or by measures of private output) to public infrastructure using cross-country regressions. One of
the first papers is that of Aschauer (1989), which uses a measure of private output as dependent variable.
Aschauer (1989) finds that a 1% increase in the stock of public capital increases private output by 0.39%.
Calderon and Serven (2014) build a synthetic index of infrastructure to assess its impact on GDP. They
employ a principal component analysis to aggregate various types of infrastructure (i.e. telecommuni-
cations, electric power and roads); the dependent variable is the GDP per capita of 88 countries, and
the time span is the 1960-2000 period. They obtain a long-run elasticity varying between 0.07 and 0.10.
Studies focusing on developing countries find additional evidence of a positive impact of infrastructure.
For instance, Estache et al. (2005) estimate a growth regression on sub-Saharan countries considering five
types of infrastructure (telecoms, electricity, roads, sanitation and water) in the set of covariates. They
8In the absence of informality and endogenous brain drain I obtain the same result in my model. See appendix, Subsection
2.6.2.
9Their framework also accounts for pro-competitive gains.
10Interestingly the authors exploit firm level data on both formal and informal Indian firms. This data report huge
differences in productivity between formal and informal plants. The last ones while accounting for 89% of employment and
around 20% of total value added.
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obtain positive and significant estimates for the infrastructure elasticities, but heterogeneous effects by
infrastructure type. Electricity-related facilities induce an elasticity of 0.50. On the contrary, infrastruc-
tures linked to sanitation have no significant impact on GDP growth. Caldero´n and Serve´n (2010) using
their own estimate on the impact of infrastructure on growth determine the contribution of infrastruc-
ture investments by multiplying the coefficients with the change in average stocks between 2001-2005 and
1991-1995. They find that the largest contribution of infrastructure development to growth was attained
in South-Asia, where they estimate that infrastructure investments led to a 2.7% larger yearly growth
rate. In sub-Saharan countries, the contribution of infrastructure was smaller, 0.7% per annum, due to
deterioration of the quality of infrastructure. Straub and Terada-Hagiwara (2011) focus on Asian Coun-
tries for the period between 1990-2007. In spite of the fact that infrastructure investments correlate well
with positive growth performances, the authors do not find evidence for a positive effect of infrastructure
investments on productivity.
Overall, Straub (2011) and Calderon and Serven (2014) provide reviews of the empirical literature,
showing that the range of estimates is very large. In the same vein, Bom and Ligthart (2014) conduct
a meta-analysis of existing estimates of the elasticity of private output to public capital. The authors
consider 68 papers over the period 1983-2008, and combine 578 regression results. They only consider
studies that proxy infrastructure with monetary values, contrary to other studies such as the previously
cited Calderon and Serven (2014) who use data on physical proxies (for instance, electricity, telecommu-
nication and roads). Estimated values of the elasticity markedly differ across studies, and range between
-0.17 and 2.04. The simple average is equal to 0.188. The meta-analysis of Bom and Ligthart (2014)
reveals an average long run elasticity of GDP to core infrastructure of 0.17. This is the value that I shall
use in my model (see Section 2.4.1).
In a one-sector dynamic model with endogenous infrastructure accumulation, a series of papers by
Rioja quantitatively assess the effect of infrastructure investments on GDP. After calibrating the model
on seven Latin American countries,11 Rioja (2003a) shows that infrastructure investments have sizable
effects on GDP. This analysis recommends that around 10% of GDP should be devoted to increasing
infrastructure. However, when investments exceed a threshold of 14% of GDP, they imply welfare losses.
The author splits infrastructure expenditures into two components, construction and maintenance invest-
ments. The optimal level of maintenance investments equals 2% of GDP. In a similar framework, Rioja
(2003b) estimates the welfare losses due to an ineffective stock of infrastructure, namely the cost borne by
having infrastructure not in good condition. He finds that Latin American countries pay a steady-state
penalty of about 40% of real GDP per capita for under-using their infrastructure (i.e. using it 74% as
effectively as industrial countries do).
My model also endogenizes infrastructure accumulation but distinguishes between two production
sectors, the formal and the informal economies. This allows me to examine the effect of infrastructure on
the productivity gap between these sectors, and the effect of informality on the government capacity to
finance infrastructure investments. The interaction between the accumulation of a public infrastructure
11Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
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and the informal sector is analyzed in Loayza (1996). He theoretically shows that, due to a lower available
amount of public capital, a larger informal sector negatively affects GDP growth. I assume that public
infrastructure influences the productivity of formal firms, but not the productivity of informal firms,
hence assuming that escaping taxation prevents the use of public infrastructure. In addition, the stock
of educated workers also affects the productivity of formal firms (through a schooling externality), as
well as the wage of low-skilled workers employed in these firms (through labor complementarity). Hence,
the level of infrastructure and the level of human capital influence the incentives of (low-skilled) workers
to work informally. Simultaneously, when low-skilled workers leave the formal sector, this decreases the
wage of high-skilled workers in formal firms. These mechanisms are similar to Docquier et al. (2016), who
study the relation between development and the informal sector, and analyze the impact of the latter on
education. Contrary to Docquier et al. (2016), I assume exogenous school enrollment rates, but I allow
high-skilled workers to emigrate abroad when high-skilled wages are low. It is widely recognized that the
emigration rate of high-skilled workers is sensitive to economic and institutional conditions in the home
country (see Grogger and Hanson (2011)); and the brain drain is particularly large in small, low-income
countries (see Docquier and Rapoport (2012)). The conjunction of low infrastructure and informality
are important factors reducing high-skilled wages and causing the emigration of talented workers. My
model thus accounts for the negative effects of the brain drain on human capital accumulation, in line
with Bhagwati and Hamada (1974).12 It formalizes the complex links between informality, infrastructure
and human capital accumulation, which can be the source of multiplicity of equilibria, in line with de la
Croix and Docquier (2012).
12A strand of the literature shows that a positive level of high-skilled migration may be beneficial to the source country
due to the positive feedback effects on education decisions. See Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997) and Beine et al.
(2001). However, the growth-maximizing rate of emigration is much smaller than the emigration rate observed in most
developing countries.
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2.3 Theory
I model an economy where two productive sectors, labeled as the formal and the informal sectors, produce
a homogeneous good according to two different production technologies. The formal sector represents
the official (or recorded) economy. On the contrary, in line with Docquier et al. (2016), I define the
informal economy as “the part of the economy that is not taxed, monitored by any form of government
or included in gross national product”.13 It is worth noticing that unrecorded activities exist in countries
from all income groups. However, the nature of informality differs between developing and developed
countries. In developed countries, the informal sector consists of firms’ activities that are hidden from the
State for tax, social and labor reasons; informal/unreported and formal/declared activities are governed
by the same production technology. In developing countries, informal and formal firms are inherently
different and use different technologies. For example, La Porta and Shleifer (2014) describe the differences
between formal and informal firms in the developing world using a dual perspective.14 According to the
dual theory, the informal sector uses a low-skill intensive technology, and serves as a subsistence sector
for many individuals. The decision of low-skilled workers to operate in this sector is made by necessity,
to escape extreme poverty. A direct implication of the dual theory is that above a certain level of
development, the subsistence part of the informal sector disappears and the only motive to act informally
is to elude taxes. The discrete time model developed in this paper is consistent with the dual perspective,
and views informality as a subsistence sector; however, taxation of formal activities influences the size of
the informal sector.
More precisely, I assume that firms acting in the formal sector are characterized by a Cobb-Douglas
technology that uses both high-skilled and low-skilled workers as inputs. Moreover, the total factor
productivity of formal firms is endogenous; it is positively affected by the stock of public infrastructure
and by the level of human capital of formal workers. The government finances infrastructure investments
by levying taxes on formal workers’ wages. Conversely, informal firms produce according to a linear
technology using low-skilled labor only. The total factor productivity of informal firms is constant and
independent on the level of infrastructure.15 Informality thus serves as a subsistence sector and plays the
same role as a minimum-income scheme.
Docquier et al. (2016) use similar technological assumptions to study the dynamic implications of
informality, through its impact on human capital accumulation and long-run-growth. I extend their pro-
ductive sector by including infrastructure and taxation; this allows me to study the impact of informality
13Gerxhani (2004) gives several definitions of the informal sector. The closest to the one used in this paper and in Docquier
et al. (2016) dates back to Feige (1981), who argue that the main distinctive feature of the informal economy is that its
output is omitted from the official national accounts. Specifically, he defines the informal economy as “all economic activities
which because of accounting conventions, non-reporting or under-reporting, escape the social measurement apparatus, most
notably the national accounts”.
14In line with La Porta and Shleifer (2014), there exists competing theories explaining the informal economy. For instance,
De Soto (1990) considers the informal sector as a reservoir of entrepreneurial energy held back by government regulations;
inciting these firms to become formal would be beneficial for development. Instead, Farrell (2004) recommends a suppression
of the informal sector; he defines informal firms as those violating the government regulations and unfairly competing with
formal firms.
15The qualitative results of the model are not affected if the elasticity total factor productivity of informal firms to the
stock of infrastructure is smaller than the elasticity of the productivity of formal firms. In line with Docquier et al. (2016),
my model does not account for brain waste, namely high-skilled workers employed in low-skilled jobs provided by informal
firms.
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on human capital and infrastructure accumulation. In my framework, the size of the informal sector
does not only depend on human capital and on the productivity gap between sectors; it also depends on
the tax rate imposed by the government. Another difference is that Docquier et al. (2016) focus on the
interplay between informality, returns to schooling, child labor and education choices. In my model, I
simplify the treatment of education but I account for high-skilled emigration rates. Human capital accu-
mulation depends on the intensity of the brain drain. My baseline model assumes exogenous high-skilled
emigration flows. In a second variant of my model, I endogenize high-skilled emigration decisions. In
both cases, I show that the dynamics of infrastructure depends on the prevailing regime, with or without
informal firms.
2.3.1 Production
As already mentioned, the formal and the informal sectors produce the same homogeneous good. Formal
firms produce according to a Cobb-Douglas technology using high- and low-skilled workers as inputs. Ht
denotes the quantity of high-skilled workers, while Lf,t is the quantity of low-skilled workers acting in






where α is the elasticity of formal-sector output with respect to high-skilled labor, and Af,t stands for
the level of total factor productivity in the formal sector at time t. I assume α > 0.
Total factor productivity (TFP) in the formal sector is a function of the stock of infrastructure per













where A0, which I assume larger than zero, is an exogenous productivity scale factor. The elasticity of
TFP to infrastructure is denoted by ε. The parameter φ, which I assume larger than zero, denotes the
elasticity of TFP to the skill ratio (this is a special case of Lucas (1988)). I assume that 0 < ε < 1 and
that α+ φ < 1.
The labor market is competitive and formal firms maximize profits:
Yf,t − wh,tHt − wl,tLt, (27)
The profit-maximizing level of employment equalizes the marginal productivity of high-skilled and
low-skilled workers with their gross wage rates. It follows that the after-tax wage rates, wh,t and wl,t,
are given by:16
16I assume that the high-skilled wage rate is always greater than the low-skilled one. At the end of Section 2.3.4, I discuss
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wh,t = (1− τ)αA0zα+φ−1f,t kεt , (28)
wl,t = (1− τ) (1− α)A0zα+φf,t kεt . (29)
where τ is the tax rate on formal income. I also assume that 0 < τ < 1.
By assumption, the production technology of informal firms is a linear function of the quantity of
low-skilled labor.17
Yi,t = BLi,t, (30)
where Li,t denotes the quantity of low-skilled workers employed in the informal sector. As in the formal
sector, the labor market is competitive. Consequently, the wage of low-skilled workers in the informal
sector is equal to their marginal productivity.18
The scale factor B characterizes the exogenous level of total factor productivity in the informal sector.
Without loss of generality, it can be expressed as a fraction of A0:
B = A0γ. (31)
In line with the definition of informality, low-skilled workers employed by informal firms are not
subject to the government control and to taxation. Hence, they simply earn a net salary equal to B.
Low-skilled workers are perfectly mobile across sectors. They decide to join the informal sector if and
only if informal sector firm offers a salary that is greater or equal to the after-tax salary offered by the










Two different equilibrium regimes can be obtained for our economy:19
 Informal regime: Some informal firms produce, and some low-skilled workers are employed by
informal firms. Hence, the equilibrium net salary of low-skilled workers is equal to B (the marginal
productivity of labor in the informal sector) in both sectors.
 Formal regime: Only formal firms produce. The after-tax salary of low-skilled workers exceeds the
marginal productivity of labor in the informal sector.
The total workforce, after migration, of the economy is equal to:
17The tax rate is one of the key variable that determine the size of the informal sector, hence the model accounts for
tax-based informality as well.
18If a production function such as Yi,t = BLi,tk
ε
t with ε < ε was considered, the qualitative results of our model would
be similar.
19The condition which sets the prevailing regime will be discussed below.
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Nt ≡ Ht + (Lf,t + Li,t) .
For the sake of clarity, I distinguish between two measures of the skill ratio:
{










At each period of time, two types of working-age individuals populate the economy. High-skilled individu-
als have higher education whereas low-skilled individuals represent the remaining part of the workforce. I
label these two categories respectively by {h, l}. Low-skilled workers, by comparing the net wages offered
by formal and informal firms, decide to work formally or informally.
The evolution of the population is governed by education, fertility and emigration decisions. For
simplicity, the first variant of my model follows de la Croix and Docquier (2012) and considers exogenous
school enrollment rates, fertility rates, and emigration rates by education level. First, I assume that high-
skilled workers educate all their children; on the contrary, low-skilled workers have more children and only
educate a fraction q of them. It is natural to consider that q, reflecting education policy, urbanization
and other country characteristics, varies across countries. As policy is not endogenized here, I treat q
as exogenous. Second, I denote by nh and nl the exogenous fertility rates of high-skilled and low-skilled
individuals (I assume nh < nl). Third, emigration rates depends on education as well. I denoted by m
and m the emigration rates of high-skilled and low-skilled adults. These emigration rates are considered
as exogenous in the first variant of the model; I shall endogenize the high-skilled migration rate in the
second variant.
2.3.3 Infrastructure
At each period, the government taxes the income of formal workers at an exogenous rate τ . These
resources are used to finance the stock of infrastructure that will be available in the next period. The
model is calibrated under the assumption that the length of one period is 25 years. I assume a full
depreciation of the infrastructure stock after one period. This corresponds to a depreciation rate of
about 4% per year. I assume infrastructure is not immediately productive to match the fact that massive
infrastructure projects become productive only on a long-time horizon perspective, similarly to Futagami
et al. (1993) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994). For instance, the OECD reports that it takes an average
of 4-6 years to build a nuclear plant, to which the time for planning should be added. Another example is
the construction of the Assuan Dam in Egypt, which became fully productive 16 years after the beginning
of the construction.
The model specifies infrastructure in per capita terms. I interpret it as a monetary index proxying
the available stock of infrastructure per worker, in the country. For instance, I assume that what matters
is the amount of usable electricity, clean water, roads and telecoms lines per worker. Eq. (33) defines the
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2.3.4 Formal and Informal Regimes
The informal regime arises when the pair of skill ratio and stock of infrastructure, (kt, zt), is such that
in case of full employment in the formal sector, the wage paid by the formal firms to low-skilled workers
would be smaller than the one paid by the informal firms. I refer to this regime as the informal regime.
Under this regime, a fraction of the low-skilled labor force finds it optimal to become informal, and we
have (zf,t > zt). Exit to informality stops when both sectors offer the same after-tax salary. I can write:
Lemma 1. The informal regime arises when the level of infrastructure, kt, is below an endogenous critical
level k˜ (zt) that decreases with the skill ratio of the whole economy. Otherwise, the formal regime arises.
Proof. Replacing zt to zf,t in Eq. (28) gives the low skilled wage under the formal regime. If the
following is true:
wl,i,t > wl,f,t.
The infrastructure available at time t is lower than the endogenous critical level given by:







where Ψ ≡ γ(1−τ)(1−α) .
It follows that:






Proof. By equalizing Eqs. (29) and (31) and then solving for zf,t I obtain the skill ratio in the formal
sector prevailing under the informal regime. Corollary 1 implies that the after-tax, low-skilled wages are
equalized under the informal regime.
Amaral and Quintin (2006) provide evidence that identical workers earn similar wages across sectors.
Finally, I determine the conditions under which the salary of high-skilled workers exceeds the salary of
the low-skilled, whatever the equilibrium regime.
Under the formal regime the high-skilled wage is greater than the low-skilled wage if the following
condition on parameter is satisfied:
zf,t ≡ zt < α
1− α. (36)
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This condition is obtained by replacing zf,t with zt in the wages paid by formal firms, given by Eqs.
(28) and (29), and by assuming the former is larger than the latter. Instead, under the informal regime,
Eq. (35) defines the skill ratio in the formal sector. Assuming that the high-skilled wage is greater than













This critical level is obtained from Eq. (35) and from the condition reported in Eq. (36) to the
informal regime.
2.3.5 Dynamics
In the variant with exogenous migration, the evolution of the economy is regime-specific and is charac-
terized by three equations.
The first one determines the evolution of the skill ratio in the whole population. Denoting by n = nhnl





(1−m) (nzt + q)
(1− q) (1−m) . (38)
Eq. (38) exhibits an interior fixed point under the following condition:
(1−m)n
(1− q) (1−m) < 1. (39)
The second equation governs the growth rate of workforce:
gt =
nh (1−m) zt + Θ
1 + zt
, (40)
where Θ ≡ nl ((1−m) (1− q) + (1−m) q).
Third, two equations determine the dynamic of infrastructure depending on the prevailing regime
(formal or informal). The stock of infrastructure depends on the tax rate raised by the government.
Exploiting Eqs. (25), (33), (38) and (40), I obtain the two possible cases below:







nh (1−m) zt + Θ , (41)







nh (1−m) zt + Θ . (42)
Eqs. (38), (40) and (42) define the dynamic system that characterizes the informal regime; in this
system, Eq. (41) must be replaced by Eq. (42) to characterize the formal regime.
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2.3.6 Intertemporal Equilibrium
The labor market equilibrium condition requires:
Ht = Ht, (43)
Lf,t + Li,t = Lt.
Hence, the intertemporal equilibrium of my economy can be defined as following:
Definition 2. Given an initial workforce of size N0, an initial number H0 of high-skilled workers, and an
initial level of infrastructure k0, an intertemporal equilibrium consists in a sequence of wages {wh,t, wl,t},
a sequence of skill ratio in the economy {zt}, a sequence of skill ratio in the formal sector {zf,t}, and a
sequence of infrastructure levels {kt} such that: (i) formal and informal firms maximize profits and wages





such that the labor markets clear (namely (43) holds), (iii) the skill ratio evolves according to (38); (iv)
depending on (34) either Eq. (35) or zf,t = zt define the skill ratio in the formal sector, (v) depending on
(34), the stock of infrastructure evolves according either to (41) or (42), and (vi) the government balances
its budget, (33) is satisfied.
I can the prove the existence and uniqueness of a temporary equilibrium:
Proposition 5. Given zt−1 the temporary equilibrium of period t exists and is unique. For any z¯t there
exists a unique intertemporal equilibrium.
Proof. Let consider an economy at a given period t with a given amount of workers (Ht, Lt) and a given
stock of infrastructure kt. Depending on Eq. (34) at period t the economy is either under the formal
or the informal regime. It suffices to notice that the equations which set the wages, (28), (29) and (31)
are single valued to prove both the existence and uniqueness of the temporary equilibrium. To prove
the second statement, consider an economy at time t characterized by a given value of the skill ratio,
zt. The subsequent level of the skill ratio is uniquely determined by Eq. (38). Moreover, the level of
infrastructure per capita at period t + 1 is uniquely determined (depending on the prevailing economy
regime) by either Eqs. (41) or (42). It follows that for a given initial pair of skill ratio and infrastructure
levels {zt, kt} the sequence {zt, kt}∞t=t is uniquely determined.
2.3.7 Steady State
A steady state of this economy is a fixed point, (z, k) of the dynamical system defined by Eqs. (38) and
(41) for the formal regime, or by Eqs. (38) and (42) for the informal regime.20
Proposition 6. The economy has a unique and locally stable steady state.
20In Section 2.6.1.1 of the technical appendix, I report the equations that determine the skill ratio and infrastructure loci
in the (kt, zt). I also show that the two curves which make up the infrastructure loci cross each other at the informality
frontier.
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Proof. The assumption on parameters stated in Eq. (39) assures that the discrete dynamic equation
defined by Eq. (38) has one positive fixed point in the space (zt, zt+1). This fixed point does not depend
on the level of infrastructure. Consequently, the skill ratio loci in the space (zt, kt) is a parallel line of
the x-axis, see Figure (7). Differently, the infrastructure loci is defined by two upward sloping curve,21
which cross each other only at the informality frontier.22 Consequently, depending on the position of
the skill ratio loci, the steady state lies either in the formal or in the informal region. This suffices to
prove the uniqueness of the steady state for such economy. The technical appendix provides the equations
which set the skill ratio and the infrastructure steady state levels (depending on the economic regime), see
Subsection 2.6.1.1. As to check the stability of the steady state I study the direction field of the dynamical
system. The technical appendix reports such analysis, which suggests the stability of the steady state.
Anyhow, both Eqs. (41) and (42) are non-linear in kt. Consequently I examine the stability of the steady
state by computing the eigenvalues of the respective Jacobian Matrix evaluated at the steady state. For
the informal regime I label this matrix Ji. Skill ratio dynamics, see Eq. (38), does not depend on the
amount of infrastructure hence in order to obtain the trace and the determinant of Ji it suffices to derive
Eq. (38) w.r.t. zt and Eq. (42) w.r.t. kt. I label with λ1 and λ2 the eigenvalues of Ji evaluated at
the steady state. I also assume that no eigenvalue of Ji has modulus exactly equal to 1. Under these
assumptions I can exploit the Hartman-Grobman theorem, see Azariadis (1993). Then




























Given that ε, α, φ are all larger than 0 both the trace and the determinant of Ji are larger than zero.
From now on I assume that ε < α+ φ, thus it follows that both the trace and determinant belong to the
interval (0 1). Consequently both eigenvalues are positive and lower than 1 implying the asymptotically







The phase diagram on Figure 7 is computed using the calibrated parameters of Bolivia described in
Section 2.4.1. The decreasing solid curve is the informality frontier. When the pair of skill ratio and
infrastructure is above the informality frontier only formal firms produce (i.e. the economy is in the
informal regime). The straight dashed line parallel to the x-axis determines the skill ratio steady state.
The increasing curve determines the infrastructure loci. The dotted curve defines the loci in the informal
region while the dashed-dotted determines the one which marks the formal region. They cross each other
at the informality frontier. The black circle highlights the steady state; the arrows shows its stability in
a neighborhood of the steady state.
21I previously assumed (ε < 1) and (α+ φ < 1).
22This result is proved in Section 2.6.1.1 of the appendix.
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2.3.8 Fiscal Policy
In this baseline version of the model, I consider that education, fertility and emigration decisions are
exogenous. Hence a change in the tax rate, τ , only affects the low-skilled individuals’ decision to work
formally or informally. The informality frontier, defined by Eq. (34), always move upwards when the
tax rate increases. In fact, an increase of the tax rate, for any level of kt, induces a larger outflow of
low-skilled workers to the informal sector, thereby increasing the skill ratio in the formal economy. I thus
have:
Proposition 7. Under the formal regime, if there is no regime switching at time t, a rise in the tax
rate τ (i.e. ∆τ > 0), increases the stock of infrastructure at time t + 1 (i.e. kt+1 (τ + ∆τ) > kt+1 (τ)).
Instead, under the informal regime and if there is no regime switching at time t+ 1, a rise in the tax rate
increases the stock of infrastructure available at time t+ 1 (i.e. kt+1 (τ + ∆τ) > kt+1 (τ)) only if the tax
rate at time τ satisfies the following condition:
τ < α+ φ. (44)
Proof provided in the appendix, (see Subsection 2.6.1.2).
By definition, under the formal regime neither high-skilled nor low-skilled workers can escape taxation.
Consequently, an increase in the tax rate at time t, at least if there is no regime switching, increases the
stock of infrastructure of the next period. Differently, under the informal regime, the same rise in the
tax rate induces two opposite effects. First, a larger tax rate makes the after-tax salary less attractive in
the formal sector; consequently, some low-skilled individuals decide to emigrate to the informal sector.
Second, formal workers pay higher taxes. These two opposite effects cancel out each other when the tax
rate is equal to the threshold defined in Eq. (44).
Under the informal regime, the immediate impact of a rise in taxation differ across individuals. The
larger tax rate does not affect the low-skilled wage, as the latter is totally determined by the informal-
sector technology. Instead, the after-tax wage immediately decrease for the high skilled. The larger
tax rate makes their net salary smaller, and this fiscal effect is reinforced by the outflow of low-skilled
workers to the informal sector. Through labor complementarity (a larger skill ratio in the formal sector zf,t
negatively impacts the skill premium), this reduces the high-skilled wage further. The next proposition
characterizes the change, between period t and period t+1, induced by a rise in taxation on the after-tax
salary of the high-skilled.
Proposition 8. Let consider an increase of the tax rate τ at time t (i.e. ∆τ > 0). If the economy is in
the informal regime at period t and there is not regime switching at period t + 1, a rise in the tax rate







If there is a regime switching at period t + 1 (to the formal regime, a rise in the tax rate positively
affects the high-skilled wage if the condition stated in Eq. (44) is satisfied.23
23It suffices to exploit an absurdum argument to show that the RHS of Eq. (45) is always smaller than the RHS of Eq.
(44).
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The proof is provided in the appendix, (see Subsection 2.6.1.2).
The high-skilled wage increases at period t+1 if the gains inducing by the larger stock of infrastructure
exceeds the losses due to both the larger tax rate and by the smaller skill premium.
If the economy at time t is under the informal regime and if there is no regime switching, the fiscal
policy change does not affect the salary of the low-skilled. Conversely, if there is regime switching (to the
formal regime), the salary of the low skilled must be larger.
2.3.9 Extension with endogenous brain drain
I now extend the model by endogenizing the size of the brain drain (mt).
24 Each high-skilled worker now
decides whether to emigrate to a rich country (denoted by ∗) or to stay in the origin country. In line with
the random utility model (see Delogu et al. (2014), among others), I assume that high-skilled individuals
have heterogeneous preferences for the two possible locations. The utility of individual i is supplemented
with random terms, η¯t,i in the no-migration case or η¯
∗
t,i in the case of emigration, which capture the
heterogeneity in migration costs, in the attachment to the home country, or in the capacity to integrate
abroad. This random terms are assumed to follow a type 1 extreme value distribution function,
F (η) = e−e(
η
µ−γ) η <,
where µ denotes the scale parameter of the distribution, and γ is the Euler’s constant.
The utility of staying at home is equal to the log of the net-of-tax wage rate, log (wh,t), supplemented
with the random component at home η¯t,i. In case of emigration to the rich country, high-skilled migrants
earn a net-of-tax and net-of-migration-cost salary w∗t , which is considered as exogenous. I assume w
∗
t > 0
The utility of emigrating is equal to the log of the net wage abroad, log (w∗t ), supplemented with the
random term η¯∗t,i. Therefore, the probability that a high-skilled worker emigrates at time t is defined as:
P = Pr
[
ln (wh,t) + η¯t,i < ln (w
∗





When the random term follows a type 1 extreme value distribution, we can use the McFadden’s theo-
rem (see McFadden (1974)) and express the probability of emigrating (equivalent here to the proportion















Assuming µ = 1, the equation that governs the high-skilled emigration rate is given by:
m¯t =
w∗t
w∗t + (1− τ)αA0zα+φ−1f,t kεt
. (46)
With endogenous brain drain, the skill ratio cannot be treated as a pre-determined variable. The
skill ratio and the stock of infrastructure per worker are now simultaneously determined, which makes
24I consider that low-skilled emigration rates are exogenous. As Docquier and Rapoport (2012) report, low skilled
emigration rates (m) are much smaller than the high-skilled ones and less responsive to push-pull factors.
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the model more complicated to solve. This is because the brain drain affects the law of motion of the
skill ratio and the stock of infrastructure per worker. Eq. (46) shows that the high-skilled emigration
rate decreases with stock of infrastructure per worker. At the same time, the stock of infrastructure per
worker depends on the size of the resident workforce, as shown by Eq. (33), which is itself affected by
the high-skilled emigration rate. Hence, the prevailing stock of infrastructure per worker and the skill
ratio are simultaneously determined. In addition, as in the baseline variant with exogenous brain drain,
the laws of motion of our variables depends on the prevailing economic regime (formal vs. informal).
If the informal regime prevails, zf,t is fixed and the high-skilled emigration rate only depends on the
stock of infrastructure per worker.25 On the contrary, under the formal regime (zf,t ≡ zt), the high-skilled
emigration rate and the the stock of infrastructure influence each other. Consequently, the law of motion
of the skill ratio now depends on the prevailing economic regime as well as on the skill ratio loci depicted
in the phase diagram, see Figure 8.26 In addition, the equation defining the infrastructure loci becomes
an implicit function and the one which characterizes the formal regime is a function of zt and zt+1.






The intertemporal equilibrium of the economy with endogenous brain drain can be defined as following:
Definition 3. Given an initial workforce of size N0, an initial number of high skilled workers H0,
and an initial level of infrastructure k0, an intertemporal equilibrium consists in a sequence of wages
{wh,t, wl,t, w∗t }, a sequence of skill ratio in the economy {zt}, a sequence of skill ratio in the formal sector
{zf,t}, a sequence of infrastructure levels {kt} and a sequence of high-skilled-migration rate m¯t such that
depending on the economic regime (34), (i) formal and informal firms maximize profits and wages are





such that the labor markets clear, namely Eq. (43) holds, (iii) the skill ratio evolves according to Eq.
(54), (iv) depending on (34) either Eq. (35) or zf,t = zt defines the skill ratio in the formal sector, (v)
the stock of infrastructure evolves according to Eq. (55), (vi) the brain drain is determined by Eq. (46),
and (vii) the government budget constraint Eq. (33) is balanced.
As the skill ratio and the stock of infrastructure per worker are jointly determined, there is a possibility
of obtaining multiple equilibria. However, the next proposition proves the uniqueness of the temporary
equilibrium; uniqueness is obtained because there is a unique high-skilled emigration rate compatible
with Eq. (46). We have:
Proposition 9. Assuming perfect foresight, there is only one equilibrium migration rate in the informal
regime if condition (α+ φ < 1) holds. Otherwise, a high-skilled migration rate equal to 1 can be an
equilibrium, while another interior equilibrium exists.
In Subsection 2.6.1.4 of the technical appendix, I provide the proof of proposition 9. The proof
is based on a fixed-point argument. I start considering the equation that determines the high-skilled
emigration rate. In the informal regime, I plug the value of the skill ratio in the formal sector, given by
Eq. (35), into the brain drain Eq. (46). Subsequently, I exploit the equation that governs the dynamics of
25This can be shown by plugging Eq. (35) into Eq. (46).
26The technical appendix, in Subsection 2.6.1.3 report the equations defining the dynamics of infrastructure and human
capital. In the same Subsection I also report the equations defining both the infrastructure and skill ratio loci of the phase
diagram.
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infrastructure, accounting for the fact that infrastructure is now a function of the high-skilled emigration
rate as well. Hence, plugging the value of infrastructure set by Eqs. (55) into (46) gives a condition
in which the high-skilled-migration rate appears on both sides. An equilibrium emigration rate is a
solution of this equation. Under the informal regime, as the proof in the Appendix shows, the RHS
is always a decreasing function in the interval [0 1] and is always smaller than one on this interval.
Consequently, this function crosses a 45 degree line only once. The same holds under the formal regime.
Nevertheless, relaxing condition (α+ φ < 1) implies that when migration rate approaches unity, the RHS
becomes equal to unity as well. Hence, an emigration rate equal to one can become an equilibrium.
This equilibrium arises because when the skill ratio approaches zero, the marginal productivity of high-
skilled labor tends to zero. The assumptions on parameters, however, rule out this trivial possibility.
Indeed, when (α+ φ < 1), the marginal productivity of high-skilled labor tends to infinity when the
high-skilled-migration rate approaches unity, thereby preventing a full brain drain to be an equilibrium.
2.4 Quantitative Assessment
The theoretical model highlights that in developing countries, infrastructure accumulation depends on
the attractiveness of the informal sector. The baseline model shows that an increase in taxation has
heterogeneous effects on high-skilled and low-skilled workers. I show that under the informal regime,
increasing taxation does not affect the net income of the low-skilled while the dynamic impact on the
high-skilled wage depends on its effect on the infrastructure accumulation and on the skill premium.
The effects for high-skilled workers are amplified in the model with endogenous brain drain. Moreover,
in this extended model, a developing countries may switch from informality to the formal regime by
accumulating larger stocks of infrastructure and human capital. The short-run and long-run responses
to a fiscal shock depends on the parameters of the model.
Hence, in this section, I quantitatively assess the impact of policy reforms affecting the tax base or the
tax rate. I first describe my parametrization strategy which is common to both variants of the model. I
calibrate the model on 60 developing countries at the year 2000.27 One period lasts 25 years and I assume
each country is at its steady state in the year 2000. As informality is observed in all countries, the steady
state belongs, by construction, to the informal region. The parametrization strategy is designed so as
to perfectly match, for each developing country, the data on the evolution of the size and structure of
the labor force between 1975-2000, on the size of the formal sector, on the size of the labor force in
the informal sector, and on the skill premium. The first Subsection explains my data sources and my
calibration strategy. Then, the other Subsections discuss the results of my policy experiments.
2.4.1 Calibration Strategy
In the set of parameters, I distinguish between common (structural) elasticities and country-specific
characteristics. The set of structural parameters is (ε, φ, n, µ). A key elasticity is ε, which links the level
27The quantitative appendix reports the list of countries, see Subsection 2.6.3.1. The same table report the country code
and the calibrated values of {αj , A0,j , , kss,j , γj}.
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of total factor productivity to the stock of infrastructure per worker. As IMF (2014), I use the value
computed by Bom and Ligthart (2014), who find an average elasticity of output to core infrastructure
of 0.17. Another important elasticity is φ, which captures the education externality. I follow de la Croix
and Docquier (2012), who use an elasticity of 0.277. They obtain this value by regressing the level of
total factor productivity on the skill ratio using a sample of 142 developing countries in the year 2000.28
As in de la Croix and Docquier (2012), I also set the fertility differential n to 0.605 in all countries.29
The last structural parameter is µ, the scale parameter of the distribution of migration taste shocks. As
outlined in Section 2.3.9, I set it to unity. This choice implies an elasticity of the high-skilled emigration
rate to the ratio of net wages equal to one.
As far as country characteristics are concerned, data on income tax rate are taken from Dobbs (2013).
He provides estimates on public infrastructure investments as a percentage of GDP for the period 1992-
2001. This variable is computed for some countries and for most regions of the world.30 According to
Figure 9, the country that invested the highest share of its GDP in infrastructure is China, where the
average investment rate in public infrastructure was equal to 8.5% of GDP between 1992 and 2001. Much
smaller levels are obtained for Africa and the Middle East, where average investments in infrastructure
were equal to 3.6% of GDP.

















































Data on average investments on infrastructure (as a % of GDP) for the period 1992-2001 comes from Dobbs (2013). The tax rate
borne by formal sector workers matches these estimates.
28Following the same paper, I recall that there is still a debate about the size of the education externality. For instance,
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) find no effect of schooling on productivity, whereas Iranzo and Peri (2009b) find a value of
0.44 for the US States.
29They use data on on fertility rates from Kremer and Chen (1999) and then compute the differential fertility for the
period 1985-1989 and for 26 developing countries. They find that the correlation between country-specific levels of the
fertility differential and the human capital of women is small. On this basis, they assume that the fertility differential is
independent of the level of development.
30If Dobbs (2013) does not provide a country estimate, I use the average level of the region to which the country belongs.
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Some other country-specific parameters and endogenous variables,31{
nl,j , nh,j , αj ,mj ,mj , zss,j , zss,f,j
}
for each country j,32 are calibrated by combining various data sources
and to match some moments. From Defoort (2008) and Docquier et al. (2009), I use data on the size and
education structure of the labor force in the years 1975 and 2000. This allows me to compute the gross
growth rate of the workforce, g2000,j . Furthermore, Docquier et al. (2009) provide data on emigration
rates by education level for each source country. I use them as proxies for m2000,j and m2000,j .
33 Using
g2000,j , n, and the skill-specific emigration rates, I identify the low-skilled fertility rate, nl,j , as the solution
of Eq. (40). I also obtain nh,j after dividing nl,j by n.
From Docquier et al. (2009), I compute the skill ratio in year 2000, zss,j . I combine this variable with
data on the size of the informal sector labor force. Such data were compiled in Schneider (2012), after
exploiting OECD and World Bank data. In particular, Schneider (2012) provides estimates of the level
of informal employment for 60 developing and transition countries and for the year 1998. The sample
include 33 African countries (average proportion of informal workers equal to 54.2% of the labor force),
12 Asian countries (average proportion equal to 46.5%), 9 Latin American countries (average proportion
equal to 46.5%), and 6 European transition economies (average proportion equal to 50.0%).34 This allows
me to identify the skill ratio in the formal sector, zss,f,t, one of the key variables of my model, using:
zss,f,j =
H2000,j
L2000,j (1− sj) , (47)
where sj is the size of the informal labor force in country j as reported in Schneider (2012) for the year
1998, H2000,j and L2000,j are the stocks of high-skilled and low-skilled workers reported in Docquier et al.
(2009).
Then, I calibrate α, the elasticity of official GDP to the stock of high-skilled, so as to match data
on the skill premium. From Section 2.3.1, the wage ratio between high-skilled and low-skilled workers
in the formal sector is equal to WR = α(1−α)zf,t . Hendricks (2004) provides Mincerian measures of
returns per year of schooling for 54 countries around the year 2000. From Barro and Lee (2013) I can
assess the difference in years of schooling between a high-skilled and a low-skilled worker.35 In the
following, MR2000,j , means the Mincerian return in country j, while DY2000,j stands for the difference
in years of schooling between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Therefore, the wage ratio is given by
WR2000,j = (1 +MR2000,j)





I also assume that α is time invariant. Finally, a last set of country-specific parameters and the value of
31The subscript ss stands for steady state.
32m2000,j is endogenous in the second variant, in such a case the right notation requires the drop of the year from the
subscript, namely mss,j .
33They define as high-skilled workers all individuals aged 25 and over with at least one year of college education.
34A key assumption made on estimating the informal sector labor force is that its magnitude in cities is at least as high
as in rural areas, which is clearly a conservative assumption.
35For some countries, data on Mincerian returns or on years of education are not available. In such cases, I proxy






with R2 = 0.57.
74
Essays on the Macro-Analysis of International Migration
infrastructure per capita at the steady state are calibrated,(




, are calibrated using the assumption that the year 2000 is a steady state (the
subscript ss stands for steady state). I need to calibrate A0,j and γj , the formal and informal scale
parameters, qj the fraction of children receiving higher education in low-skilled families, and kss,j , the
stock of infrastructure per worker. Furthermore, when brain drain is endogenous I also calibrate w∗j ,
the high-skilled net wage abroad. I identify the level of these variables by numerically solving a non-
linear system at the steady state. In the exogenous brain drain case (A0,j , qj , kss,j , γss,j) are determined
simultaneously, solving numerically (for each country considered) the non-linear system delineated by
Eqs. (25), (35), (49), (53).36 I use data on GDP in USD dollars for the year 2000 from World Bank
(2012). For the extended model with endogenous brain drain, I add the equation which governs the brain
drain, Eq. (46), and then I solve for
(




. The equations defining the steady state levels
of the skill ratio and the stock of infrastructure change as well. I numerically solve a new system which
includes Eqs. (57) and (59) instead of Eq. (49) and Eq. (53).37 Figure 10 shows the calibrated values
of the stock of infrastructure per worker for all countries considered. A table in Subsection 2.6.3.1 of the
Appendix reports the list of the countries with the associated code and the calibrated value of the stock
of infrastructure per worker.



























































































































This figure reports the calibrated values of infrastructure, kss. In the appendix, Section 2.6.3.1 provides the association between
countries codes’ and countries’ names.
36In Section 2.6.1.1 of the Technical Appendix, I report Eqs. (49), (53) which set, respectively, the skill-ratio and
infrastructure- levels at the steady state for the model with exogenous brain drain.
37In Section 2.6.1.3 of the Technical appendix, I report Eqs. (57) and (59). These equations define the skill ratio and
infrastructure loci for the model with endogenous brain drain.
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Figure 10 shows that the calibrated value of kss reaches its greatest value in Slovenia. Among Asian
countries, China is the country where the index reaches its greatest value, in spite of the fact that it looks
evidently too small when compared to some European and African countries.
I validate the parametrization strategy by computing correlations between the calibrated values of kss
and physical measures of infrastructure. Table 4 shows that the calibrated infrastructure index exhibits
strong correlations with actual measures of infrastructure.
Table 4: Correlation between kss and official proxies for infrastructure
Var (year 2000) k00
Paved roads (%) 0.49
Kwh per capita 0.69
Telephone Lines 0.74
Electricity Losses -0.20
Data Source: World Bank (2010)
The first row shows that kss is positively correlated with the percentage of paved roads (69%). Im-
portantly, the correlations between kss and the production of Kwh per capita (69%) or the number of
telephone lines (74%) are large. Finally, the last row shows that infrastructure is negatively correlated
with a measure of electric power transmission and distribution losses.
2.4.2 Simulations
I now use the calibrated model to simulate the country-specific responses to three policy reforms, which
affect either the tax base or the income tax rate. I simulate the effects of these reforms on the trajectory
of the stock of infrastructure per worker (kt), of wages (wh,t and wl,t), and of the high-skilled emigration
rate (m¯t). In all cases, the shock occurs in the year 2025 and is assumed to be permanent. I study its
short- and long-run effects (abusing the standard terminology, I refer to the year 2100 when describing
the long-run effects), considering both variants, namely with exogenous and endogenous emigration rates.
In the first numerical experiment, labeled as “Removing informality”, I simulate the effect of a total
ban of the informal sector. The shock consists in setting γ = 0, so that all low-skilled workers are forced
to join the formal sector, then paying taxes and contributing to the funding of public infrastructure.
The informal sector is usually described as a heterogeneous sector including registered firms activities
hidden from the state, wage employment or self-employment in unregistered small-scale business units,
and sometimes home production. A total ban of informality is neither a feasible option (as part of
it involves home production) nor a desirable option (informality serves a subsistence sector for many
workers) in developing countries. This experiment must only be considered as a thought experiment that
illustrates the effect of the informal sector on the marginal productivity and income of workers at low
level of development. Results are discussed in Subsection 2.4.2.1.
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In the second numerical experiment, labeled as “Taxing informality”, I allow the government to
tax informal workers at the same rate as the formal ones. A large share of informality (including the
overwhelming share that involves market transactions) is tolerated by the State in developing countries.
The reasons are multiple, such as the incapacity of the State to develop or maintain social programs, its
incapacity to manage unemployment, the fear of a bankruptcy of the economy, the fear of social tensions,
etc. I disregard the political implications of changing the tax base, and consider this scenario as another
thought experiment illustrating the role of tax evasion. Contrary to the first experiment, which induces a
drastic fall in the marginal productivity of low-skilled workers (due to their massive inflow in the formal
sector), this shock induces smaller effects on their marginal productivity. However, it implies that all
low-skilled workers become fiscal contributors. Results are discussed in Subsection 2.4.2.2.
The third numerical experiment, labeled as “Fiscal policy”, considers a 1 percentage point increase in
the tax rate borne by formal workers. This scenario can be considered as a feasible policy reform. It allows
understanding the dynamic implications of an expansive fiscal policy for infrastructure accumulation,
human capital accumulation, brain drain and development. Results are discussed in Subsection 2.4.2.3.
2.4.2.1 Removing Informality
I start simulating the effect of a total ban of informal activities (setting γ = 0) from the year 2025 onward.
In this counterfactual experiment, I prevent low-skilled workers from using the informal technology in
developing countries, although they have incentives of doing so.38 As infrastructure is defined as a
stock variable (see Eq. (33)), the shock has gradual implications for the economy. When brain drain
is exogenous, the stock of infrastructure per worker does not change in the short-run. Instead, when
emigration rates are endogenous, the inflow of low-skilled workers in the formal sector increases the
marginal productivity of high-skilled workers and reduces the brain drain. The stock of infrastructure
per worker is then negatively affected in the short-run. However, a sizable impact on infrastructure is
obtained in the long-run, after taxes have been invested. For each country in my sample, Figure 11 shows
the long-run effect of banning informality on the stock of public infrastructure per worker, measured
as percentage of deviation from the initial steady state. The grey bars show the effect obtained under
exogenous brain drain, while the black bars show the additional gains obtained once emigration rates are
endogenous.
The change in the stock of infrastructure per worker varies across countries. These variations are
explained by the initial size of the informal sector, which is itself determined by the country-specific
parameters of the model. As far as the exogenous migration scenario is concerned, it is possible to
identify the exact equation that governs the percentage change in public infrastructure. This equation
is reported in Subsection 2.6.3.2 of the appendix; it shows that the relative change in infrastructure is a
function of a set of parameters and initial conditions (zss, kss , γ, α and τ). To disentangle the sources
of variation across countries, I use the model with exogenous migration and compute the correlation
between the change in public infrastructure per worker and each of these five determinants. Table 5
38On the contrary, high-skilled workers in developed countries have no incentive to work in the subsistence sector given
the large productivity gap between the two sectors.
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reports these correlations. I find that the relative change in public infrastructure is negatively correlated
with each determinant. Consequently, countries starting with a lower initial level of infrastructure, with
a smaller tax rate, with a less productive informal sector, or with a lower value of α experience larger
effects on the public-infrastructure stock.








The solution is more complex under the endogenous brain drain scenario. Figure 11 clearly illustrates
that larger effects on infrastructure are obtained when the brain drain responds to the shock (see black
bars). In this context, I compute the correlations between the extra-gain in public infrastructure gains
and the high-skilled emigration rates in year 2000. Unsurprisingly, the size of the extra-gain is highly
correlated with the current brain drain rate (the correlation is equal to 0.76). Banning the informal sector
suddenly reduces the number of high-skilled emigrants. This effect materializes in the short-run, right
after the shock. This is due to the rise in the domestic skill premium induced by the inflow of low-skilled
workers in the formal sector. In subsequent periods, the brain drain rate slightly decreases due to gradual
effect of the stock of public infrastructure on total factor productivity. Hence, the variations in the brain
drain are correlated with the change in the stock of public infrastructure provided in Figure 11. Figure 12
illustrates the long-run change in the brain drain for a subset of countries (I only select countries where
the high-skilled emigration rate exceeds 20% in the year 2000). It demonstrates that a large portion of the
current brain drain can be explained by the existence of the informal economy in developing countries.
Considering the extreme example of Gambia, a complete ban of informality reduces the brain drain from
70 to 30% in the long run.
Despite large long-run effects on the stock of public infrastructure, the model with exogenous brain
drain predicts a negative effect on the GDP per capita, both in the short run and in the long run. This
is due to the fact that low-skilled workers, the large majority of workers in poor countries, earn less. In
the model with endogenous brain drain, banning informality increases human capital and productivity;
the effect on GDP per capita becomes ambiguous. For ten developing countries (Gambia, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Uganda), I predict a positive effect on GDP
per capita in the long-run. In the other countries, the effect is negative: banning informality hurts low-
skilled workers and benefits the highly skilled. The gains for the highly skilled are large and governed
by three effects: a higher skill premium (due to the inflow of low-skilled workers in the formal sector),
an uncertain effect on human capital in the formal sector (due to lower brain drain and the inflow of
low-skilled workers), and a higher stock of infrastructure (due to greater tax base).
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Endogenizing the brain drain has different implications for the low-skilled and high-skilled workers.
When the brain drain decreases, total factor productivity is positively affected. However, the supply
of human capital increases and this negatively affects the skill premium. The calibrated model shows
that the latter effect dominates for the highly skilled. In the case of exogenous brain drain, the rise in
high-skilled wage rates are greater, as illustrated on Figure 13, which provide the short-run and long-run
changes in high-skilled wage for the set of countries where the brain drain rates are above 20% in the
year 2000.
The opposite outcomes emerge for the low-skilled. Banning informality substantially decreases the
low-skilled wage rate (due to the decrease in marginal productivity). The fall in income is attenuated
when the brain drain is endogenous. In most countries, the effect remains negative in the long run. In
three countries only (Gambia, Liberia and Kenya), the long-run wage rates gets larger after banning
informality, as shown on Figure 14.
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Figure 11: Removing Informality: effect on ∆k2100/kss
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Africa
This graph shows the change in the stock of infrastructure per worker in the year 2100, as percentage of the initial steady state
level. The grey bars show the effect obtained under exogenous brain drain scenario, while the black bars show the additional gains
obtained once emigration rates are endogenous.
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Figure 13: Removing informality: effect on 4wh,t/wh,ss
















































































This graph shows the predicted short- and long-run changes in the high-skilled wage rate under both variants of the model, and for
the subset of countries with high-skilled emigration rates above 20% in the year 2000. The black bars give the effect obtained with
endogenous brain drain while the grey bars give the effect obtained when the brain drain rates are constant at their 2000 level.
82
Essays on the Macro-Analysis of International Migration
Figure 14: Removing Informality: effect on 4wl,t/wl,ss
(Grey bars: exogenous brain drain; Black bars: endogenous brain drain)
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This graph shows the predicted short- and long-run changes in the low-skilled wage rate under both variants of the model, and for
the subset of countries with high-skilled emigration rates above 20% in the year 2000. The black bars give the effect obtained with
endogenous brain drain while the grey bars give the effect obtained when the brain drain rates are constant at their 2000 level.
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2.4.2.2 Taxing Informality
In this Subsection, I assume that the income generated in the informal economy can be taxed at the
same rate as in the formal sector. This experiment is at odds with the definition of the informal sector
I provide in Section 2.3. However, in poor countries, a large part of the informal economy consists of
unregulated and exempted market transactions, and it is relevant to investigate whether making these
transactions taxable could boost development.
Taxing informality implies that the informality frontier becomes independent on the tax rate, as shown
in Section 2.3.4. If the labor income in the informal sector can be taxed, the size of the informal sector
decreases in the short run and in the long run. The decrease is gradual and cumulative as it takes time for
additional public revenues to be invested in public infrastructure. In the case of endogenous brain drain,
the rise in total factor productivity discourages high-skilled workers to emigrate, and this incites even
more low-skilled workers to join the formal sector. Figure 16 shows the effect of taxing informality on the
level of informal employment for the model with endogenous brain drain. The black bars represent the
predicted drop of informal employment at year 2100. The grey bars show the level obtained at year 2000.
Each bar shows the actual size of informal employment at year 2000. In all countries, taxing informality
induces a sizable decrease in informal employment. Interestingly, the calibrated model predicts a switch
from the informal to the formal regime in some countries. In the exogenous brain drain scenario, the
regime switching occurs only in China as early as in the year 2025.
Accounting for endogenous brain drain induces greater effects. The brain drain rate decreases from
the year 2025 on, although the change becomes substantial in the long run. Figure 15 compares the long-
run emigration rates after taxing informality (the black bars) with the actual emigration rates observed
in the year 2000 (grey bar), for the subset of countries characterized by a current brain drain rate above
20% in year 2000. In some countries (Chad, Gambia, Lesotho, Rwanda and China) the brain drain is
divided by slightly less than two in the year 2100. Hence, the case for regime switching becomes stronger.
In China, the regime switching still occurs in the year 2025. Seven other cases of regime switching are
identified when emigration is endogenous. In Kenya and Liberia, the regime switching occurs in the year
2050. In Chad, Gambia, Gambia, Mali and Togo, it occurs in the year 2075.
How does taxing informality affect public infrastructure? As in the previous section, it is possible to
identify the exact equation that governs the percentage change in public infrastructure the exogenous
migration scenario. This equation is provided in Subsection 2.6.3.2 of the appendix. The relative change
in the stock of infrastructure per worker is a function of {γ, kss, τ, α, zss.}. Table 6 gives the correlation
between simulated changes in public infrastructure and their determinants. The correlations are negative
and usually smaller than after banning informality, except the correlation with τ . In the case of endoge-
nous brain drain, I cannot identify the exact equation governing the infrastructure response. However, I
can numerically compute the correlation between the extra-gain in infrastructure and the current level
of the brain drain. The correlation coefficient is equal to 0.34. When the shock does not induce a regime
switching, the low-skilled wage rate decreases by a fraction equal to the tax rate. In the long run, positive
effects on low-skilled wage rates can be obtained if the changes in infrastructure and human capital are
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large enough, or if there is a regime switching. This occurs in a very limited number of countries. On the
contrary, the high-skilled wage rate increases both in the short run and in the long run. Figure 17 shows
the long-run changes in the high-skilled wage rate for countries characterized by a current brain drain
rate above 20%. With exogenous brain drain, the high-skilled wage rate increases by more than 50%
in some countries. As in the previous Subsection, it increases more when the brain drain is exogenous.
Overall, the effect on the low-skilled dominates in the short-run. Hence, taxing informality decreases the
2025 level of GDP per capita in all countries and under both variants of the model. On the contrary,
both variants predict an increase in GDP per capita in the long run.








Figure 15: Taxing Informality: effect on m¯2100 − m¯2000
(Grey bars: long-run emig. rate; Black bars: actual emig. rate in 2000)
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This graph compares the long-run brain drain rate obtained after taxing informality (black bars) with the observed level in the
year 2000. I only consider the subset of countries with emigration rates larger than 20% in the year 2000.
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Figure 16: Taxing Informality: long-run effect on informal employment
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% of Informal Employment in year 2000  and its decrease at year 2100
Africa
This graph compares the size of the informal sector at year 2000 and year 2100 (year 2100) w.r.t. the model with endogenous
brain drain. The grey parts of the bars show the predicted size of the informal sector at year 2100 while each bar reports the
actual size of the informal sector at year 2000.
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2.4.2.3 Fiscal Policy
In this last Subsection, I simulate the effect of a one-percent increase in the formal income tax rate,
assuming this shock is permanent. In the exogenous brain drain scenario, informal employment increases
in the short run. The adjustment stops when the, low-skilled before-tax wage rate is one percent greater
in the formal sector. Hence, the shock has not effect on the net income of low-skilled workers. This
outflow of low-skilled workers pushes the high-skilled wage rate downwards. These two effects reduce the
tax base and the effectiveness of the fiscal reform. Hence, GDP per capita decreases in all countries in
the short run. In the endogenous brain drain case, the decrease in the high-skilled wage rate leads more
high-skilled workers to leave their country. This larger brain drain reinforces the negative effect on GDP
per capita.
Gradually, as additional public revenues are invested in infrastructure, the change in total factor
productivity increases the effectiveness of the fiscal policy. Despite the short-run adverse effects, both
public infrastructure and human capital substantially increase in the long run. Figure 18 reveals that a
small increase in the tax rate has large positive effects on the long-run stock of infrastructure per worker.
The figure reports the relative deviation from the initial steady state in the cases of exogenous (grey bars)
and endogenous (black bars) brain drain.
Long-run changes in infrastructure are always larger when brain drain is endogenous. This is because
the change in infrastructure increases total factor productivity and high-skilled wage rates in the formal
economy. In addition, long-run gains are substantial, ranging between 40 to 80 percent. For the exogenous
brain drain model, I provide the exact equation that governs the percentage deviation in infrastructure in
Subsection 2.6.3.2 of the appendix. I show that the gain is a function of α and τ only. Then, I compute
the correlation between the long-run changes in infrastructure and α or τ . The correlation coefficient with
α is equal to 0.23, while the correlation with τ is equal to -0.82. In the case of endogenous brain drain, I
can not identify the exact relationship. However, I can numerically compute the correlation between the
extra effect on infrastructure and the actual emigration rate observed in the year 2000. The correlation
is equal to 0.28. Figure 19 shows that a small permanent increase in taxation reduces the long-run level
of the brain drain. In line with the previous experiments, I report the results obtained for the subset of
countries characterized by emigration rates above 20% in the year 2000. The black bars give the long-run
brain drain levels after the fiscal reform, while the grey bars report the level observed in the year 2000.
The variation in the brain drain is greater in countries where the initial brain drain is important. When
brain drain decreases, the fiscal base increases and this reinforces the effectiveness of the fiscal policy.
Finally, Figure 20 depicts the long-run effect of the fiscal policy on the high-skilled wage rate. I focus
on the subset of countries with brain drain rates above 20% in the year 2000. The Figure shows that a
small increase in the tax rate substantially benefit the highly skilled. The relative changes in wages are
in the same order of magnitude under the two variants of the model. For some countries such as Ghana,
the effect is larger when brain drain is endogenous (the positive effect triggered by the human capital
externality prevails), while the effect is smaller for other countries such as Mali (due to the decreasing
skill premium).
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Remember that, if there is no regime switching (this is the case for a one-percent increase in the tax
rate), the net income of the low-skilled is unaffected both in the short run and in the long run. Overall,
the stock of infrastructure per worker is always greater than in the initial steady state, the brain drain
is smaller, and high-skilled workers earn more. This leads to a long-run increase in GDP per capita for
both variants of the model.
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Figure 18: Fiscal policy: effect on ∆k2100/kss
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Percentage increase of the infrastructure stock at year 2100
Africa
This graph shows the long-run effect a one-percent increase in taxation on the stock of infrastructure per worker, as percentage of
the initial steady state. The grey bars show the effect obtained under the exogenous brain drain scenario, while the black bars
show the effect obtained with endogenous emigration rates.
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Figure 19: Fiscal policy: effect on m¯2100 − m¯2000
(Grey bars: actual emig. rate in 2000; Black bars: long-run emig. rate)
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This graph shows the long-run changes in the brain drain for a sub-set of countries with emigration rates above 20% in the year
2000. Grey bars show the actual brain drain levels observed in the year 2000, while black bars give the long-run brain drain rate
after the fiscal reform.
Figure 20: Fiscal Policy: effect on ∆wh,2100/wh,ss




























COG GHA GMB GTM HRV KEN LBR LKA LSO MLI MWI NAM RWA SLE SLV UGA YEM ZWE
Brain Drain endogenous Brain Drain fixed at the 2000 level
This graph shows the long-run changes in the brain drain for a sub-set of countries with emigration rates above 20% in the year
2000. Grey bars show the actual brain drain levels observed in the year 2000, while black bars give the long-run brain drain rate
after the fiscal reform.
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2.4.3 Robustness checks
I now consider the same counterfactual experiments as the ones discussed in the previous sections, and I
conduct a sensitivity analysis using both variants of the model (i.e. exogenous vs endogenous brain drain).
It allows me to assess the robustness of my results to the level of the structural parameters {ε, φ, n} and
to the hypothesis that public infrastructure only affects the total factor productivity of formal firms. It
is worth noticing that when a parameter changes, I re-calibrate the model following the same strategy as
in Section 2.4.1.
Four robustness checks are conducted in this section:
 First, I reduce the elasticity of productivity to public infrastructure, ε, from 0.17 to 0.10. The latter
value is the upper bound of the range reported in Caldero´n et al. (2015), as discussed in Section
2.2.
 Second, I reduce the elasticity of productivity to the skill ratio, φ from 0.277 to 0.177, in the same
vein as in the previous robustness check.
 Third, I consider a greater value for the differential fertility, i.e. the ratio of the high-skilled fertility
rate to the low-skilled one. I use n = 0.705 instead of the benchmark level 0.605.
 Fourth, I assume that the stock of public infrastructure per worker also affects the total factor
productivity of informal firms. I assume that the elasticity of the informal productivity to infras-
tructure is equal to 0.07, which corresponds to the lower bound of the interval reported in Caldero´n
et al. (2015), whereas the elasticity in the formal sector is kept at its benchmark level, 0.17.
For the key variables, {k,wl, wh, m¯}, the tables below report the average-cross-country difference be-
tween robustness-check and benchmark-variations. These deviations are computed for each experiment,39
for the short run (year 2025) and the long run (year 2100) and considering both variants of the model.
39I remind that the three experiments considered are: “removing informality”, “taxing informality”and “fiscal policy”.
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2.4.3.1 Smaller infrastructure externality
In the simulation with ε = 0.10, the effectiveness of the expansive fiscal policy is smaller. Table 7 reports
the average difference between the new steady-state variations and the benchmark ones. It shows that
the long-run levels of infrastructure and brain drain differ from the benchmark. However, the low-skilled
and high-skilled wage rates are slightly affected by the change in ε.
Table 7: Robustness check: ε = 0.10
Exogenous Brain Drain
Counterfactual %4k ∗ %4wl ∗ %4wh ∗ %4m¯ ∗
2025 Fis. policy 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Banning inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Taxing inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
2100 Fis. policy -10.35 0.00 -0.13 -
Banning inf. -7.80 -3.01 -0.05 -
Taxing inf. -3.79 -0.04 -0.12 -
Endogenous Brain Drain
Counterfactual %4k ∗ %4wl ∗ %4wh ∗ %4m¯ ∗
2025 Fis. policy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Banning inf. 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01
Taxing inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2100 Fis. policy -13.40 0.00 -0.14 6.92
Banning inf. -11.16 -4.45 -0.06 2.36
Taxing inf. -5.78 -0.52 -0.12 11.03
This table reports for the key variables of the model {k, wl, wh, m¯}, for each numerical experiment and for both variants of the
model, the average-cross-country difference between robustness-check and benchmark-variations.
∗Average-cross-country difference between robustness-check and benchmark-variations.
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2.4.3.2 Smaller human capital externality
In the simulation with φ = 0.177, banning informality has a smaller effect on the economy. Table 8 reports
the average difference between the new steady-state variations and the benchmark ones. It shows that the
long-run levels of infrastructure and brain drain differ from the benchmark. Due to the complementarity
between low-skilled and high-skilled workers, reducing φ decreases the long-run change in the low-skilled
wage rate. For the same reason the contraction of brain drain rates would be stronger. However, the
trajectory of the other variables are very similar to the benchmark ones.
Table 8: Robustness check: φ = 0.177
Exogenous Brain Drain
Counterfactual %4k ∗ %4wl ∗ %4wh ∗ %4m¯ ∗
2025 Fis. policy 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Banning inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Taxing inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
2100 Fis. policy 4.69 0.00 0.05 -
Banning inf. 18.53 6.75 0.12 -
Taxing inf. 2.33 0.10 0.07 -
Endogenous Brain Drain
Counterfactual %4k ∗ %4wl ∗ %4wh ∗ %4m¯ ∗
2025 Fis. policy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45
Banning inf. -0.07 4.99 0.07 -6.87
Taxing inf. 0.00 0.04 0.02 -1.43
2100 Fis. policy 6.75 0.27 0.06 -5.63
Banning inf. 17.89 6.57 0.07 -6.45
Taxing inf. 4.90 1.11 0.08 -6.94
This table reports for the key variables of the model {k, wl, wh, m¯}, for each numerical experiment and for both variants of the
model, the average-cross-country difference between robustness-check and benchmark-variations.
∗Average-cross-country difference between robustness-check and benchmark-variations.
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2.4.3.3 Greater differential fertility
In the simulation with n = 0.705, the number of high-skilled workers increases over time relative to
the benchmark. Table 9 reports the average difference between the new steady-state variations and the
benchmark ones. It shows that results are very similar to those of the benchmark.
Table 9: Robustness check: n = 0.705
Exogenous Brain Drain
Counterfactual %4k ∗ %4wl ∗ %4wh ∗ %4m¯ ∗
2025 Fis. policy 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Banning inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Taxing inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
2100 Fis. policy 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Banning inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Taxing inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Endogenous Brain Drain
Counterfactual %4k ∗ %4wl ∗ %4wh ∗ %4m¯ ∗
2025 Fis. policy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Banning inf. 0.02 -0.22 0.00 3.21
Taxing inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2100 Fis. policy 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Banning inf. 0.11 0.20 0.00 3.20
Taxing inf. -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.50
This table reports for the key variables of the model {k, wl, wh, m¯}, for each numerical experiment and for both variants of the
model, the average-cross-country difference between robustness-check and benchmark-variations.
∗Average-cross-country difference between robustness-check and benchmark-variations.
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2.4.3.4 Infrastructure externality in the informal sector
Finally, I now consider that the productivity of informal firms is also affected by the stock of public
infrastructure per worker. I assume that the elasticity in the informal sector, ε, is equal to 0.07. Hence,




This hypothesis changes the properties of the model. However, as Table 10 shows, the long-run effects
are almost identical to those obtained in the benchmark model.
Table 10: Robustness Check: ε = 0.07
Exogenous Brain Drain
Counterfactual %4k ∗ %4wl ∗ %4wh ∗ %4m¯ ∗
2025 Fis. policy 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Banning inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Taxing inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
2100 Fis. policy -5.23 3.47 -0.07 -
Banning inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Taxing inf. 14.02 7.17 -0.04 -
Endogenous Brain Drain
Counterfactual %4k ∗ %4wl ∗ %4wh ∗ %4m¯ ∗
2025 Fis. policy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Banning inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Taxing inf. 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
2100 Fis. policy -7.05 3.60 -0.07 3.62
Banning inf. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Taxing inf. 12.50 6.73 -0.04 4.75
This table reports for the key variables of the model {k, wl, wh, m¯}, for each numerical experiment and for both variants of the
model, the average-cross-country difference between robustness-check and benchmark-variations.
∗Average-cross-country difference between robustness-check and benchmark-variations.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I develop a stylized model that highlights the dynamic interdependencies between infras-
tructure accumulation, brain drain and the size of the informal sector. I first distinguish between two
possible equilibrium regimes: the formal regime (all economic activities are formal and taxable) and the
informal regime (part of the low-skilled labor force is employed in the non-taxable, informal economy).
The equilibrium regime depends on initial the levels of infrastructure and human capital, as well as on
country characteristics (such as the relative productivity of the informal sector, openness to migration,
education policy, etc.). Assuming developing countries are in the informal regime, I study the effect of
expansive fiscal policies designed to increase the level of infrastructure per worker. Depending on two
96
Essays on the Macro-Analysis of International Migration
simple conditions on the parameters, an increase in the taxation of formal workers boosts or deteriorates
the level of infrastructure and the income of high-skilled workers.
Then, a calibration strategy is used to match country-specific observations, i.e. data on the size of the
informal employment, on formal GDP, on skill premia and on emigration flows. The calibrated model
is then used to simulate the effects of various policy experiments in 60 developing countries. As a first
thought experiment, I first simulate the effect of a full ban of the informal sector. This forces a regime
switching which is beneficial for the high-skilled, but detrimental for the low-skilled workers. The latter
face tremendous wage losses in the short-run, and these losses usually persist in the long-run. My results
show that informality is responsible for huge losses in public infrastructure. Once I consider endogenous
brain drain I also find that informality explains larger brain drain rates, in some countries even by a
factor of two. In spite of the larger infrastructure-stock the adverse effect prevail even in the long run,
average income decreases in most of the countries. The second experiment consists in taxing informal and
formal activities at the same rate. This reform has sizable impact on both infrastructure and brain drain
without worsening too much the welfare of the low-skilled. Long-run gains may accrue to low-skilled
workers if and only if the economy switches to the formal regime, something that the model predicts for
a few countries only. These results confirm that a large informal sector slows down the accumulation of
infrastructure and human capital accumulation, while protecting the low-skilled from extreme poverty.
The third experiment consists in increasing the tax rate in the formal sector. This policy has adverse
effects in the short-run, while inducing large gains in the long-run. These short- and long-run effects are
amplified when brain drain is endogenous, they are also greater where the initial level of infrastructure is
low and the brain drain is large. High-skilled workers are unambiguously better off whereas low-skilled
workers are unaffected, the welfare of low-skilled can change only after a regime switching, and for this
policy experiment none of the countries considered switch regime.
It is worth noticing that my model disregards some ingredients. First, it disregards the possibility
that developing countries finance infrastructure by taking loans on the international capital market. The
reasons are twofold: developing countries have not complete access to the international capital market
and, in most cases, these resources are not employed to finance infrastructure projects. Second, It does not
consider the role of international aid in the financing of public infrastructure. This is because it is difficult
to distinguish the part of international aid that goes directly to individuals from the part invested in
infrastructure or used in corruption.40 Finally, my model considers the tax rate as exogenous. Exploiting
tools developed in the political economy literature allows endogenizing taxation. These extensions are
left for further research.
40It is easy to guess the implications of using aid. Financing new infrastructure with aid unambiguously decreases the
brain drain and the size of the informal sector. If the amount of aid does not induce a regime switching, the welfare of the
low-skilled is not affected.
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2.6 Appendix
Section 2.6.1 of the appendix provides equations and proofs recalled in the theoretical part of the paper.
Section 2.6.3 provides tables and equations recalled in the quantitative part of this study.
2.6.1 Technical Appendix
Subsection 2.6.1.1 provides the equation which defines infrastructure and skill ratio loci for the model
with exogenous brain drain. It also provides the qualitative proof of the steady state stability for the
exogenous brain drain case. Subsection 2.6.1.2 provides the proofs of the proposition stated in Section
2.3.8 of the paper. Subsection 2.6.1.3 characterizes the phase diagram for the model with endogenous
brain drain. Subsection 2.6.1.4 provides the complete proof of proposition 9. Finally Subsection 2.6.2
determines the optimal tax rate for the model with exogenous brain drain under the formal regime.
2.6.1.1 Characterization of the Phase Diagram. Exogenous Brain Drain.
I first determine the skill ratio steady state which also coincides with the skill ratio loci in the space





(1− q) (1−m)− n (1− m¯) . (49)
As a second step I determine the infrastructure loci in the space (kt, zt). For the formal regime setting






nh (1− m¯) zt + Θ
) 1
1−ε
= ϕ (zt) . (50)













= ξ (zt) . (51)
I prove that Eq. (50) and Eq. (51) cross each other at the informality frontier setting zt equal to the







which proves that both equations that define the infrastructure loci in the space (kt, zt) cross the
informality frontier at the same point.
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By replacing zt with zss in Eq. (50) and Eq. (51) the steady state level of infrastructure, depending
on the prevailing economic regime, is determined:























Phase Diagram Here I determine the direction of change for both zt and kt around the steady state.
Section 2.3.7 already proved the uniqueness and the stability of the steady state. Additionally, this
paragraph also determines the direction field around the steady state. I first consider Eq. (38), then
zt+1 − zt > 0←→ (1−m) (nzt + q)
(1− q) (1−m) − zt > 0,
which is equivalent to
zt+1 − zt > 0←→ zt < (1− m¯) q
(1− q) (1−m)− n (1− m¯) = zss.
The next step is to consider the infrastructure law of motion, around the steady state. I start with
the informal regime






nh (1−m) zt + Θ − kt > 0
Exploiting Eq. (35), which sets zf,t, and then solving for kt












nh (1−m) zt + Θ > 1,
I further assume that ε < (α+ φ). Finally I analyze the equation in a neighborhood of the steady
state
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Doing the same for the formal regime I have:





nh (1−m) zt + nh (1−m) zt + Θ − kt > 0
Solving for kt and recalling the assumption made on ε, namely ε < 1, it follows:









Consequently, the directions field suggest the steady-state stability. Further, this stability is irrespec-




I start considering Eq. (41), which defines infrastructure accumulation for the formal regime. Clearly
an increase in the tax rate makes larger the RHS of Eq. (41). Then, a larger tax rate will make bigger the
amount of infrastructure in the next period, assuming that the economy does not switch to the informal
regime. The same does not hold under the informal regime, in such a case after a tax increase some low
skilled workers will find profitable to join the informal sector thus reducing the tax base. By computing


















the first term of the RHS is clearly positive. Hence I focus on the second one and after collecting for











the first term, Ψ, is always positive whereas the second one is not negative if and only if the condition
stated in Eq. (44) holds.
Proposition 8
Proof.
I start considering Eq. (28) for period t+ 1. In the case of no regime switching Eq. (42) determines
the stock of infrastructure, after the tax increase. Computing the derivative of wh,t+1 with respect to the





)− (1− φ− α)ε+ (α+ φ)
(α+ φ)
2 (1− τ)−1 > 0,
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the disequation above reduces to Eq. (45). The second case considers a regime switching, from the
informal to the formal regime. In this case, Eq. (41) determines infrastructure on the high-skilled wage
equation for period t + 1. Applying the same procedure used for the no regime switching case, I obtain
the second threshold stated in proposition 8.
2.6.1.3 Characterization of the Phase Diagram. Endogenous Brain Drain
I start providing the equations which characterize the law of motions of both infrastructure and skill
ratio. For the skill ratio law of motion I take Eq. (38) and substitute into it the exogenous high skilled
migration rate, m¯, with the one defined by Eq. (46). It follows
zt+1 =
(1− m¯t+1) (nzt + q)
(1−m) (1− q) , (54)
the equation above implies the following:
formal regime m¯t+1 = f (zt, k) ,
informal regime m¯t+1 = g (kt) .
Consequently, the equation which determines the skill ratio law of motion depends on the economy
regime. Eq. (54) also clarifies that the skill ratio is not a predetermined variable anymore.
It remains to provide the equations which determine the evolution of infrastructure depending on the
prevailing regime. Plugging Eq. (46) into the infrastructure law of motions obtained for the exogenous
high skilled migration rate case allows me to obtain the law of motions for the endogenous migration
case.







(1− m¯t+1) (ztnh + nlq) + nl ((1−m) (1− q)) (55)
where in Eq. (55), as for the skill ratio law of motion, both zf,t and m¯t+1 depends on the economy
regime. Applying to Eq. (54) the condition (zt+1 = zt), and considering separately for the formal and
the informal regime, I obtain:







t (n− (1− q) (1−m))
)
 1ε = λ (zt) . (56)
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= γ (zt) , (57)
where
Λ = wt (1− xt) (1− q) (1−m) .
The skill ratio loci can be drawn in the space (kt+1, zt). The next step consists in obtaining the
infrastructure loci. Before showing the equation which define the infrastructure loci I provide, for the
sake of clearness, the equation which characterize the fraction of stayers for the formal regime.





wt (1− xt) + (1− τ)αA0zα+φ−1t kεt
,
The amount of stayers is a function of both infrastructure and the skill ratio, hence it is not a
predetermined variable anymore. Applying to Eq. (55) the condition (kt+1 = kt), separately the formal
and the informal regime, I obtain:
 Infrastructure loci, Formal Region
nl ((1−m) (1− q)) kt + (1− m¯t,f ) kt ∗ (nhzt + nlq)− τA0zφ+αt kεt = 0. (58)



























The comparison of Eq. (58) with Eq. (59) reveals that the infrastructure loci is a function of both
zt and zt+1 under the formal regime, while the loci for the informal regime can be drawn in the space
{kt+1, zt}.
2.6.1.4 Proof of Proposition 9.
In the following proposition 9 is proved.
Proof.
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((1− m¯t,i) (nhHt−1 + qnlLt−1)) + nl (1−m) (1− q)Lt−1 ,
by plugging the value of kt defined by the equation above into Eq. (46) and also assuming that the
economy is under the informal regime the equation defining the brain drain level is obtained:
m¯t,i =
w∗t





= f (mt,i) .
An equilibrium high skilled migration rate should should equalize the LHS and the RHS of the equation
above. Namely, I am looking for a fixed point, the one at which a 45 degree line crosses the function
defined by the RHS of the above equation. The next step is to prove that the above equation has one
solution and that it is unique. Let consider the limits of f (mt,i) first as mt,i approaches to 0 and secondly
















The disequation above holds because the first component of the second term appearing in the denom-















((nhHt−1 + qnlLt−1)) + nl (1−m) (1− q)Lt−1 > 0,
makes evident that as the brain drain approaches to zero the RHS gets a value between (0 1). Let















=< limm¯t→0f (m¯t) < 1.
The components which determine the denominator of the equation defining infrastructure accumulation
satisfy the following:
((nhHt−1 + qnlLt−1)) + nl (1−m) (1− q)Lt−1 > nl (1−m) (1− q)Lt−1,
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kt = kt =
τYf,t−1
nl (1−m) (1− q)Lt−1 > limmt,i→0kt
Both limits are lower than 1 and the second one is lower than the first one. Having that Eq. (46) is
clearly continuous I eventually prove that f (mt,i) crosses at least one time the 45 degree line. Proving
















(((1− m¯i,t) (nhH−1 + qnlL−1)) + nl (1−m) (1− q))
The equation above is clearly negative, and this is enough to show the uniqueness of the equilibrium
HS migration rate under for the informal regime. It remains to analyze the formal regime, thereby zf,t,
the skill ratio in the formal sector is now equal to the skill ratio in the whole economy, zt.
zt =
(1−m¯t,f ) (nz−1 + q)
(1− q) (1−m) .
It follows that the equilibrium brain drain for the formal regime must satisfy the following equation:
m¯t,f =
w∗t
w∗t + (1− τ)αA0 (zt)α+φ−1 (kt)ε
= f (mt,f ) . (60)
As done for the informal regime case, let consider the limit of the RHS of the above equation when














)ε = C < 1.
The limit of f (mt,f ) as mt approaches 1 is not as straightforward as it was for the informal regime.
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The function goes from a number lower than 1 to zero in the interval [0 1]. The next step is to



























w∗t + (1− τ)αA0 (zt)α+φ−1 (kt)ε
)2 .
In such a case the derivative is made up by two components. The second is always negative while the
first one is negative if α+ φ < 1, otherwise the sign is ambiguous. This proofs the uniqueness when the
latter condition on parameters holds.
I complete the proof showing that once the condition on α+φ gets relaxed multiplicity of equilibrium
may arise.















Under the formal regime, if α + φ > 1, it follows that an high skilled migration rate equal to 1 is
always a fixed point. The sign of the derivative is ambiguous, (see the first part of the proof), hence there
may be multiplicity of solutions with at least one fixed point equal to mt = 1.
2.6.2 Optimal tax rate in the Formal Regime
I determine the tax rate which maximize both low- and high-skilled wages in the formal regime for the
model with exogenous brain drain. I define the Bellman equation as following:
W (kt) = ln ((wh,t (kt))Ht + (wh,t (kt))Lt) + βW (kt+1) .
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Eq. (42) defines the law of motion of infrastructure.
I guess that the value function has the following form
W (kt) = E + F (ln (kt)) .








which implies a value of F equal to
F = ε1−εβ
Exploiting the equation above and Eq. (42) I obtain that the optimal tax rate is equal to εβ, the
same value obtained by Glomm and Ravikumar (1994).
2.6.3 Quantitative Appendix
I first report the complete list of the countries for which I calibrated and simulated both variants of the
model. Then I also report the equations recalled in Subsections 2.4.2.1, 2.4.2.2 and 2.4.2.3 of the paper.
2.6.3.1 Countries and Calibrated values
The table below report the countries’ list, the relative country codes and the calibrated values for α, A0,γ
and k.
Country Code Country Continent α2000,j Ass,j γss,j kss,j
AGO Angola Africa 0,237 3453 0,31 16
BEN Benin Africa 0,284 10211 0,27 14
BWA Botswana Africa 0,270 28665 0,38 107
BFA Burkina Faso Africa 0,226 5615 0,29 15
CMR Cameroon Africa 0,204 10225 0,34 32
TCD Chad Africa 0,022 2442 0,31 8
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. of the Africa 0,251 4597 0,23 5
COG Congo, Rep. of the Africa 0,322 11889 0,31 46
CIV Cote d’Ivoire Africa 0,315 11406 0,29 27
ETH Ethiopia Africa 0,206 2619 0,25 6
GAB Gabon Africa 0,563 32832 0,46 145
GMB Gambia, The Africa 0,085 17329 0,36 21
GHA Ghana Africa 0,126 5791 0,35 10
GIN Guinea Africa 0,360 12116 0,25 16
KEN Kenya Africa 0,092 5333 0,35 18
LSO Lesotho Africa 0,075 4427 0,37 26
LBR Liberia Africa 0,158 1872 0,29 8
MDG Madagascar Africa 0,235 4308 0,27 11
MWI Malawi Africa 0,051 2884 0,29 7
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MLI Mali Africa 0,045 2891 0,32 14
MRT Mauritania Africa 0,137 5366 0,36 26
NAM Namibia Africa 0,282 20092 0,38 105
NER Niger Africa 0,047 3166 0,29 7
NGA Nigeria Africa 0,236 5508 0,30 18
RWA Rwanda Africa 0,086 6990 0,33 13
SEN Senegal Africa 0,222 8568 0,31 22
SLE Sierra Leone Africa 0,138 3435 0,29 8
SDN Sudan Africa 0,143 4081 0,32 15
TZA Tanzania Africa 0,143 3753 0,31 13
TGO Togo Africa 0,142 3205 0,30 11
TUN Tunisia Africa 0,383 19333 0,37 69
UGA Uganda Africa 0,091 5118 0,34 15
ZWE Zimbabwe Africa 0,291 6048 0,30 26
ARM Armenia Asia 0,892 2804 0,58 27
CHN China Asia 0,050 2667 0,63 95
IND India Asia 0,302 4525 0,31 24
IDN Indonesia Asia 0,260 5619 0,33 26
KAZ Kazakhstan Asia 0,520 4835 0,46 53
KGZ Kyrgyzstan Asia 0,493 1738 0,38 15
MNG Mongolia Asia 0,176 4756 0,32 17
NPL Nepal Asia 0,364 7018 0,24 10
PAK Pakistan Asia 0,181 6768 0,40 21
PHL Philippines Asia 0,599 5088 0,39 52
LKA Sri Lanka Asia 0,157 4710 0,37 33
YEM Yemen Asia 0,214 11623 0,32 21
BGR Bulgaria Europe 0,602 5585 0,84 71
HRV Croatia Europe 0,617 24917 0,49 199
GEO Georgia Europe 0,469 2513 0,45 29
ROM Romania Europe 0,382 7653 0,40 70
RUS Russia Europe 0,425 4980 0,73 64
SVN Slovenia Europe 0,280 19878 0,90 354
BOL Bolivia South-Central America 0,457 7734 0,48 23
BRA Brazil South-Central America 0,543 31010 0,24 61
CHL Chile South-Central America 0,485 20591 0,49 82
COL Colombia South-Central America 0,557 20723 0,27 38
ECU Ecuador South-Central America 0,675 8646 0,45 22
SLV El Salvador South-Central America 0,443 15851 0,39 45
GTM Guatemala South-Central America 0,419 23127 0,26 44
PRY Paraguay South-Central America 0,313 10921 0,40 25
PER Peru South-Central America 0,700 10524 0,53 38
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2.6.3.2 Percentage deviation increase of the infrastructure stock- exogenous brain drain
case
In this subsection I report the equations recalled in Subsections 2.4.2.1, 2.4.2.2 and 2.4.2.3. These
equations determine the percentage deviation of the infrastructure for each counterfactual experiment for
the model with exogenous brain drain.
Removing Informality
In this case the dynamic equation which defines the accumulation of the infrastructure stock becomes
the one that characterize the formal economy, see Eq. (41). I determine the equation which defines the
percentage change of the infrastructure stock by considering the difference between Eq. (41) and Eq.















(εlog (kt) + log ((1− τ) (1− α))) .
The equation above makes evident that the difference in the predicted infrastructure levels computed
exploiting the baseline model for the counterfactual experiment “Removing Informality” are a function
of {zss, kss, α, γ, τ}. I remind that both {ε, φ} do not vary across across countries.
Taxing Informality
The taxation of the informal sector workers changes the dynamic equation that determines the infrastructure-














where z∗f,t does not depend on the tax rate anymore. It follows that the percentage change in the
infrastructure stock with respect its steady-state level is a function of {zss, kss, α, γ, τ}.
Fiscal Policy
In this case it suffices to consider the difference between Eq. (41) considered with a tax rate larger of one



















It follows that the percentage change in the infrastructure stocks reported in Section 2.4.2.3, for the
model with exogenous brain drain, are a function only of {α, τ}. I remind that both {ε, φ} do not vary
across across countries.
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3The role of Fees in foreign education:
evidence from Italy and the UK.
This paper is a joint work with Prof. Dr. Michel Beine and Prof. Dr.
Lionel Ragot
Abstract
This paper studies the determinants of international students mobility at the university level, focusing
specifically on the role of tuition fees. We derive a gravity model based on a Random Utility Maximization
model of location choice for international students. The last layer of the model is estimated using new
data on students migration flows at the university level for Italy and the UK. The particular institutional
setting of the two destination countries allows to control for the potential endogeneity of tuition fees.
We obtain evidence for a clear and negative effect of tuition fees on international student mobility and
confirm the positive impact of quality of education. The estimations find also support for an important
role of additional destination-specific variables such as host capacity, expected return of education and
cost of living in the vicinity of the university.
3.1 Introduction
Foreign higher education has become an increasingly important phenomenon nowadays. The degree of
mobility of prospective student wishing to acquire their educational skills abroad has been constantly
on the rise for more than 50 years. Large numbers of foreign students emigrating for the explicit sake
of completing their graduate and postgraduate studies in renowned universities are today very usual in
any country and city of most industrial countries. While there were 0.6 millions international students
in 1975, this number amounted to 2.2 millions in 2008. In spite of the turmoil due to the financial crisis,
the global quest for talented workers has pushed these numbers further up, with a 23% increase between
2009 and 2013 (OECD (2015)). Even if these global numbers obviously hide some uneven developments,
the number of students emigrating abroad to complete their education has increased in all origin regions
of the world. For more than 15 years, foreign students have represented the fastest growing category of
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international migrants.
The striking development of foreign education is an important economic phenomenon for the desti-
nation countries. For many developed countries like the United States, the UK, France and Australia,
foreign education has become a real industry. Attracting students from abroad and charging significant
tuition fees allow their universities to climb up the educational scale and in turn to act as important
research institutions. Many cities in the main destination countries of foreign students favor the devel-
opment of their university thus trying to take benefit from the various spillovers that these institutions
generate for the public and private sector. For governments, attracting foreign students is also an im-
portant objective in the global race of quest for talented workers in which industrialized countries are
engaged today. In fact, student migration might be seen as a concealed phenomenon of brain drain.
Governments attract promising students and provide through foreign education the skills corresponding
to their domestic labour market. By employing various schemes such as special transition visas, gov-
ernments of destination countries allow those students to stay in the country and integrate more easily
the national labour market. Understanding the determinants of the location choice for prospective stu-
dents is therefore of utmost importance for conducting appropriate policies aiming at attracting talented
international students.
This paper contributes to the literature devoted to the identification of the factors influencing the
choice in terms of location made by students to complete their education abroad. In particular, we
assess the importance of the various determinants of foreign students using data at the university level
for two European countries, namely the UK and Italy for the academic year 2011/2012. Unlike in other
European countries such as France, Belgium or Germany, the British and Italian universities display
significant variation in the tuition fees across institutions, (European Commission (2012)). This in turn
allows to study the role of the fees for foreign students in choosing one specific location, on top of the
other institutional characteristics such as quality, host capacity, expected income and cost of living. We
compile and use data of foreign student flows between (almost) all countries of the world as origins, and
each university at destination of the two countries of destination under investigation. Our econometric
investigation, derived from a traditional Random Utility Framework (RUM) adapted to student migration,
pays special attention to the role of tuition fees. We empirically deal with the endogeneity of student fees
with two proposed different solutions across the countries of destination.
We find support for a role of university quality, a result already found in some previous work, (Beine
et al. (2014); Van Bouwel and Veugelers (2013)). We also find a clear role for the host capacity of the
university as well as the expected return of education of the city where education is acquired, in line with
the spirit of the migration model of foreign education (Rosenzweig (2008)). Regarding the role of tuition
fees, we first stress the importance of dealing with endogeneity of these fees in isolating their impact on
the location choice of foreign students. When dealing with that issue, we find a negative and significant
effect of tuition fees on the choice of a specific university, a result new to the existing literature.
Our paper is related to the extensive literature on foreign education. At the theoretical level, as
reminded by (Rosenzweig (2006, 2008)), there are first basically two complementary explanations of why
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students decide to go abroad to complete their higher education. The first model, from an human capital
perspective, states that students go abroad because of a lack or even absence of education infrastructure
in their home country. Foreign education in medicine provides lots of examples of this type of motivation.
The second one, the migration model, suggests that students might favor foreign education because it
raises the prospects of attractive jobs in the country (or the place) where education was obtained. As
said before, this motivation is in line with the evidence that previous students tend to have easier access
to the domestic labour market.1 Our theoretical model, based on the RUM approach, integrate this type
of arguments.
While the education and the migration models are about the decision to study abroad, a large part of
the literature has been devoted to the location choice. Our paper definitely belongs to this strand. Most
of the literature makes use of country level data and combines a multi-origin approach. Bessey (2012)
focuses on foreign students in Germany, finding that the stock and the flow of students of the same
nationality are positively correlated. Dreher and Poutvaara (2005) and Rosenzweig (2006) look at the
determinants of foreign education in the United States. The former stresses the importance of networks
Dreher and Poutvaara (2005) while the latter highlights the importance of the skill premia (Rosenzweig
(2006)). Other studies combine various origins and destinations carrying out estimations in the context
of a gravity model. Perkins and Neumayer (2014) consider many origin (151) and destination countries
(105) over a couple of years and evaluate the role of geographic factors. Van Bouwel and Veugelers (2013)
look at student migration between 18 European countries and assess the role of the university quality,
evaluated through the number of institutions appearing in the most widely known international university
rankings. They show that quality matters, but tend to find a positive impact of tuition fees. Beine et al.
(2014) derive a gravity specification and focus on the 13 main destinations for foreign education. They
estimate the role of determinants such as network, quality and fees in explaining the size of the bilateral
flows of foreign students. They also find a role for quality and network. Regarding fees, while they fail
to identify a negative impact of tuition fees, they show that the positive impact of fees that is obtained
in “naive” regressions might be due to endogeneity.2
This paper aims at contributing to the literature devoted to the identification of the factors influencing
the location decision of foreign students. One of main value added of the paper is that we conduct our
analysis at the university level as the destination. So far, the contributions of the literature devoted to
the international mobility of students have exclusively focused on factors observed at the country level.
While this is important to understand the reasons of the uneven distribution of students across countries
of destination, information at the country level conceals significant variation across universities of the
same country. For instance, the average national quality of universities might not provide an accurate
reflection of the attractiveness of the country as a provider of tertiary education. Foreign students might
concentrate for instance in the upper tier of the universities of the country. If this is true, the fact that
1For instance, in the United States, the H1B visa is subject to a cap (65000 per year nowadays), with an additional
20000 quota for foreign students having graduated with an MBA or higher from a US University.
2Other interesting papers of the literature using dyadic flows include Abbott and Silles (2015), Jena and Reilly (2013),
Gonza´lez et al. (2011) and Kahanec and Kra´likova´ (2011). Gravity models have also been used to explain student mobility
between regions of the same country. See for instance Agasisti and Dal Bianco (2007) for Italy.
111
Essays on the Macro-Analysis of International Migration
a country hosts many universities of relatively modest quality might not be an important factor, at least
to explain inflows of foreign students to that country. This requires to make use of the information
at the university level. The same applies to fees. Average level of fees might not mean anything for
students since they might end up in rather good universities charging relatively high fees. To overcome
this limitation, we study the role of these factors observed at the university level in a given country.
While we ignore the first step in the decision making process (the choice of the destination country),
we identify very precisely the various university-specific factors that lead students to choose between
institutions in a given destination. Such an investigation is unique in the literature in that respect.
The second related contribution is our focus on the role of tuition fees for the location choice of foreign
students. The literature has failed to find a clearly negative impact of fees on the size of student inflows.
Of course, failure to find a negative impact does not mean that these results are spurious per se. Indeed,
fees include more than a pure cost component for prospective students. High fees obviously signal quality
and a commitment of the institution to provide to the students all the necessary means to absorb the
delivered learning. Students may also interpret higher tuition fees as a signal of the accountability of
the education providers. Another possible explanation is that fees can be covered by grants. This is
especially true for foreign students who can benefit from grants of different sources (government of the
origin country, university of destination, association promoting bilateral contacts, ...). While this is not
true for all students, the partial coverage of fees by grants might explain the insignificant impact that is
sometimes observed, see Beine et al. (2014) for instance.
On the contrary, obtained positive impacts of fees or even zero impact might be spurious due to the
high degree of endogeneity of fees. Fees are higher when universities succeed to attract a lot of students,
which leads to reverse causality issues. Fees levels might be correlated to unobserved factors such as
unobserved amenities in the destination countries (e.g. Australian universities might charge higher fees
due to their nice environment) or by unobserved institutional factors at the country level (regulation
of subsidized institutions). This calls for a causal identification accounting for the possible endogenous
status of the observed fees in the econometric regression. We pay specific attention to that taking two
specific approaches. For Italy, we use a classical instrumental variable (IV) approach. We instrument the
tuition fees by the status of the university (private vs public). For this country we also provide additional
regressions including in the set of the covariates a dummy variable which captures the availability of
English-speaking programs. We find that the estimate of the coefficient of the dummy variable is both
positive and significant, while the baseline results only slightly change. Private institutions tend to
charge higher fees to cover specific costs and to offset the lower degree of public subsidies, compared to
public institutions. Our exclusion restriction assumes that students have no particular preferences for
private vs public institutions beyond the costs and the quality of education (for which we control for in
the regression) when choosing a specific university. For the UK, such an instrument is not possible to
implement since there is no clear-cut distinction between private and public institutions. Rather than
the IV strategy, we make use of the fact that British institutions faced caps on the tuition fees that they
could charge to natives and European students. These caps are almost all binding in the sense that all
112
Essays on the Macro-Analysis of International Migration
universities put tuition fees level equal to the maximum allowed by the law. Importantly, the cap did
not apply for first degree student originating from EU enrolled in Scottish universities. The Scottish
authorities indeed cover tuition fees for Scottish and EU students. By restricting our investigation to
students coming from EU countries, we can estimate the impact of fees in a context in which endogeneity
is clearly absent. The estimates of our model generate interesting findings. To the best of our knowledge
this paper is the first one devoting a specific attention to the effect of fees.
Finally, we look carefully at the technical and econometric details of the empirical investigation.
First, we use a micro-founded model based on the RUM approach, which facilitates the choice of the
specification. While this has been advocated by many authors in the general literature devoted to
economic international migration (Beine et al. (2015, 2011); Grogger and Hanson (2011)), the use of
a theoretically consistent specification in the student literature has been very limited. Second, given
the high prevalence of zero bilateral flows in the data set, the use of Poisson ML estimators is much
favored (Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)) in order to provide unbiased estimates of the key variables.
Furthermore, we combine Poisson estimations with the use of instrumental variable as to account the
possible endogeneity of tuition fees.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 develops a small theoretical model useful to derive the
estimable gravity equations. Section 3.3 is devoted to the exposition and clarification of the data that we
use in the econometric estimations. Section 3.4 presents the estimable gravity equations and discusses
the main econometric issues, including the treatment of the zeros for the dependent variable and the way
we deal with endogeneity issues. Section 3.5 presents the results while section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical background
This section derives a tractable students’ migration equation from a simple theoretical model based on the
human capital literature. Education is considered as an investment in future earnings and employment
(see Becker (1975)) for rational students who seek to maximize their lifetime earnings. The quality of
education may affect their expected returns to education (Card and Krueger (1992)). The prospective
student migrant compares the present value of future earnings if he/she decides to study at home to the
one obtained from studying abroad. If the increase in the present value of the future income is greater
than the cost of migrating as well as other education costs, students will move to the University yielding
the highest net present value. However studying at home does not rule out to migrate after graduation
for the sake of working in another country. Similarly, studying abroad facilitates access to the local
labor market, but does not preclude the possibility of returning home or migrating, after graduation,
to a third country. Student’s location decisions before and after education are not independent but are
taken sequentially; first the educational location and then the working location. Students form (myopic)
expectations about future income by observing the current skill prices, (Freeman (1971)), and the working
migrations probabilities. The relevant probabilities are (i) the probability to migrate, once the studies
at home are completed; (ii) the probability of getting a job in the destination country in which schooling
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has been obtained; (iii) the probability of return migration and (iv) the probability to migrate to a third
country.
The set of destination countries is D = {D1, ..., Dnd} with nd the number of destination countries and
the set of origin countries is O = {O1, ..., Ono} with no the number of origin countries. Countries can be
both inside D as well as inside O. The set of universities in country j is Uj =
{
Uj,1, Uj,2, ..., Uj,nj
}
with
nj the total number of universities in country j, the index j identifies the destination country. Finally, i
is the index for the origin country, u labels the university and k stands for a particular student.
Let the indirect utility derived from studying in University u located in country j of student k from
country i (V Ski,j,u) be expressed as:
V Ski,j,u = V S (Aj,u, CEj,u, CLj,u, CMj,u) = Au − CEu − CLu − CMi,j,u + k,j,u, (61)
where Au is a vector of unpriced amenities in University u, capturing also city-of destination related
amenities, CEu the cost of education (namely the fees charged by University u to students coming from
country i), CLu the cost of living in the city of University u and CMi,j,u the costs of migrating from
country i to country j at the specifically university u. Migration costs, CMi,j,u are composed of two parts,
fixed costs (Ci) and variable costs (Ci,j,u). The fixed part measures the costs of moving, independently
of the destination country (home-specific costs) whereas the variable part depends both on country
bilateral factors (such as transportation costs, assimilation costs), and on country/city of destination
bilateral factor, Ci,u, (for instance transportation costs are smaller in cities that host an airport) . The
variable migration costs depends on dyadic factors such as physical distance (di,j), origin and destination
countries’ cultural and linguistic proximity such as the use of a common official language (li,j) or the
existence of colonial links (coli,j).
3 In line with the empirical literature, see Beine et al. (2011) , we
assume that migration cost are a decreasing function of the size the network at the city of destination,
Mi,u.
4 Finally, k,j,u is an individual-specific random component which captures the individual-specific
preference to enroll at university u located in country j. The cost function is given by:
CMi,j,u = Ci + Ci,j,u (di,j , li,j , coli,j , Mi,j,u) . (62)
We assume that the migration costs, except the network component, depend only on the destination
country and not on the specific location within the country. We further assume that CMi,i,u = 0.
The indirect utility working lifetime VW ki,j,u of student k coming from country i and who is a graduate
of University u in country j is given by:
VW ki,j,u = VW
(
Aj,u, CLj,u, P
s, P f , P r,Wj,u, W¯i, W¯j , W¯ ,Qj,u, Q¯i, Q¯j , Q¯
)















1− P s − P f − P r) (W¯ + S (Qj,u − Q¯))+Aj,u − CLj,u
3We acknowledge that some cities, for instance the ones hosting airports, are easier to reach than others. However, for
the sake of tractability we keep physical distance as a country-of-destination bilateral variable.
4Data on the size of the network at the city of destination layer is not available for both Italy and the UK. This leads
us to omit this variable from the empirical analysis conducted in Section 3.4.
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and VW ki,i is the indirect utility working lifetime of student k born in country i and getting higher
education in her/his native country.
VW ki,i = VW
(
Aj,u, CLj,u, P
s, P f ,Wj,u, W¯i, W¯ ,Qj,u, Q¯i, Q¯
)









1− P s − P f) (W¯ + S (Qj,u − Q¯))+Aj,u − CLj,u,
where P s is the probability to stay and work in the same area where he has studied. P f is the probability
of staying in the same country but none in the same area (the vicinity of University u) and P r the return
probability after graduation. We assume that all these probabilities are not country specific.5 Wu is the
expected value of earnings in area u, W¯i the expected value of earnings based on the average (in country i)
skill prices and W¯ the expected value of earnings based on the average skill prices. S(.) a premium which
depends on the difference between the quality of education where the higher education has been attained
(Qj,u) and the average quality of education in the working country which we denote, abusing notation,









a is a parameter that captures the effect of quality of education on wages.
The intertemporal lifetime indirect utility of student k native of country i studying in University u








e−ρtV Ski,j,u (.) dt+
ˆ T
Ts




eρtV Ski,j,u (.) dt representing the studying lifetime indirect utility and
´ T
Ts
eρtVW ki,j,u (.) dt the
remaining working lifetime indirect utility. Ts = T
∗
k − yk where T ∗k is the end of education age of k and
yk is the individual’s age. e
−ρt is a discount factor with ρ the rate of time preference, T stands for a
fixed retirement age. Individuals have the same rate of time preference and the same indirect utility
functions.7
We assume that individuals expectations regarding the arguments in the two indirect utility function















5There are two main arguments in favor of this assumption. First, agents need to form expectations about P s, P f and
P r. To that aim, they need to rely on the available information. In that respect, there is so far no information available
across a whole range of origin and destination countries. As a result, agents are more likely to form expectations based
on average levels. Second, stay rates of students in a limited number of OECD countries have not been found to differ
significantly, ranging from 14.7% to 29.5% (see in particular OECD, 2010, Page 45, Table I.8).
6By definition, this premium is not taken into account when the educational area (the vicinity of University u) will also
be the working area. Also, it can be negative when the difference in quality gets a negative value.
7In the absence of individual information in our database, we assume thereafter ∀k T ∗k = T ∗ and yk = y.
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Therefore, the intertemporal lifetime indirect utility is a function of:
ILV ki,j,u = ILV
(
ρ,Aj,u, CEj,u, CLj,u,Wj,u, W¯j , Qj,u, Q¯j , Ci, di,j , li,j , coli,j ,Mi,j,u
)
. (65)
A convenient way to represent the student’s University (location) choice is given by a tree diagram,
see Figure 21. There are 3 levels in this tree structure. In the upper-level, the student decides whether to
study at home (h=Stay) or abroad (h=Move). If the choice of this upper-level is to move abroad, there is
a subset of destination countries (Foreign country 1 to Foreign country d) from which the student must
choose its location (middle-level of the tree). This choice is trivial for the Stay branch, the origin country
is the only choice. At the lower-level, the student chooses the university in which he would like to study.
This lower-level consists of all the alternatives of this decision tree, denoted u = {Ui,1, · · · , Ud,nd}.



















This figure summarizes the three international-students’ location choices. First they decide if to migrate or not. Conditionally to
the migration choice, the student decides on which country to migrate. Finally, conditionally to the country of destination
previously chosen, the student chooses on which university to enroll.
The lower-level indirect utility depends on characteristics that vary across university area. The cor-
responding factors are X = {Aj,u, CEj,u, CLj,u, Wj,u, Qj,u, Mi,j,u}. The middle-level indirect utility
depends on factors that differ across countries: Y =
{
W¯j , Q¯j , di,j , li,j , coli,j
}
. The upper-level indirect
utility depends on factor that vary with the choice of migrating (h = m) or staying (h = s), Z = {Ci, Fi}
(where Ci denotes the fixed part of the migration costs and Fi is a vectors of origin-specific fixed effects).
Following the random utility approach to discrete choice problems, (McFadden (1984)), the conditional








ILV ki,j,v + k,j,v
)]
, u 6= v (66)
with k,u being an iid extreme-value distributed random term.
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At the middle-level, the conditional probability that student k coming from country i decides to study
in University u∗ located in foreign country j can be written as:
Pi,j|h = Prob
[(




ILV ki,l,u∗ + k,l,u
)]
, j 6= l (67)
where u∗ is the University that maximizes indirect utility in the lower-level.
At the upper-level, the unconditional (marginal) probability that student k decides to study in a
foreign country j∗ rather than in home country i can be written as:
Pi,h = Prob
[(




ILV ki,i,u∗ + k,i
)]
i 6= j∗, (68)
where u∗ is the University that maximizes indirect utility in the lower-level and j∗ is the foreign
country that maximizes utility in the middle-level. Finally, the probability (Pi,j,u) that student k from
country i decides to study in University u in foreign country j is defined as the product of these three
probabilities:
Pi,j,u = Pi,u|j,hPi,j,|hPi,h. (69)
Assuming that the random terms follow an iid extreme-value distribution, this three-stage discrete
choice model can be estimated using a nested logit, (Train (2003)). We can notice that this structure is
more precisely a partially degenerate nested logit, with degeneracy in the Stay branch, in which the origin
country is the only choice. While Move branch distinguishes between all non origin countries. Using the


















where β, α and γ denote parameters vectors and the inclusive values Iu and Ij are defined by














The conditional probability for the degenerate branch (Stay branch), Pi,h|s, is trivially equal to 1.
The inclusive value coefficient λu measures the correlation among the random terms due to universities
similarity within a country j, with λu = 0 denoting no correlation and λu = 1 indicating nearly identical
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unobserved attributes. Similarly, the inclusive value coefficient λj is a measure of correlation among
unobserved countries related attributes.
The nested multinomial logit model defined by Eqs. (69)-(74) connects the levels of the tree outlined
in Figure 21 with each other in the sense that the attributes of the lower branch alternatives influence the
choice among any choice set of upper branches. In a sequential choice model, the levels of the hierarchy
are unrelated.
Estimation of this nested multinomial logit model can be done by FIML (Full Information Maximum
Likelihood) or by a sequential procedure.
The full estimation of the model defined by Eqs. (70-72) is in practice cumbersome for two main
reasons. The first reason is technical: the nested logit estimation is computationally very demanding and
has not been done in the literature using grouped data. As a result, the sequential procedure might be
favored. Sequential estimation leads to consistent estimates but less efficient than FIML estimation.
The sequential estimation procedure is made of the 5 following steps:8
1. Estimate the parameters β by applying maximum likelihood estimation to the conditional choice
model Pi,u|j,h. See Eq. (70).
2. Use the previous estimates to compute the inclusive values Iu (j, h) for each (j, h) from Eq. (73).
3. Using Iu(j, h) as a separate independent variable, estimate the parameters α and λu via maximum
likelihood from the conditional choice model Pi,j|h. See Eq. (71).
4. Use the previous estimates to compute the inclusive values Ij (s) and Ij (m) from Eq. (74).
5. Using Ij (h) as a separate variable and estimate the parameters γ and λj via maximum likelihood
from the unconditional (marginal) choice model Pi,h. See Eq. (72).
The second reason for not estimating the full model concerns data availability. The full estimation of
the model defined by Eqs. (70-72) requires the availability of data at all levels, i.e. at the origin level as
well as at the two destination-specific levels including country-specific and university-specific information.
Furthermore, this means that a large subset of the main destination countries of the international students
should be included. The value added of this paper is that we have very complete information at the
university level. Nevertheless, we have only 2 countries of destination for which such a data is available,
preventing the estimation of the middle-level part. Therefore, our estimation can be seen as the first step
of the sequential procedure outlined above and provide interesting information of the specific location,
conditionally upon the two other choices depicted by decision tree of Figure 21.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section presents the data that we use to estimate Eq. (70). The section details the sources, the
development of some indicators, such as the one capturing university quality, and provides descriptive
8Even if the estimation procedure is sequential we have shown that the nested logit model is not sequential but recursive.
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statistics for each of them. Table 28 in Appendix (see Section 3.7) provides a brief summary of the data
used in the econometric analysis.
3.3.1 International students flows
Our empirical analysis takes advantage of data of flows of international students from all countries of the
world to Italy and UK for the academic year 2011/2012. Following Beine et al. (2014), the international
students we consider are the ones who migrated exclusively for the sake of education. Those who spent
either one or more semesters abroad into institutional programs, such as the ERASMUS students, do
not comply with our definition of international students and are therefore excluded from the data. Two
reasons lead us to exclude these students from the analysis. First, bilateral agreements constraint the
student’s choice in terms of location. Second, in some curricula, it may be compulsory to attend a period
of study abroad.
Data on foreign students in the UK comes from the Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA),
which provides data on international students flows for 163 United Kingdom universities.9 The statistical
office of the Italian ministry of education (MIUR) provides similar information for 79 Italian higher
education providers.
Table 12 reports some descriptive statistics on the number of foreign students for the two countries.
United Kingdom hosts more than the 10% of the foreign students at the world level, (OECD (2015)),
and represents the second most popular destination after the US. Consequently, international students
represent a consistent share of students enrolled in UK higher institutions, which amounts to 13.55% of all
students. The foreign students origin from 210 different countries.10 Italy is a less popular destination for
international students, who represent 3.65% of the total students’ population. These students originate
from 168 different countries. Figure 22 shows the distribution of the share of foreign students across
universities for Italy and UK separately. Most Italian universities have a share of foreign students below
the 10% with respect to their total students’ population.
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics of foreign student flows (2011/2012)
Italy UK
Number of universities (a) 79 163
Origin countries (b) 168 210
Number of observations (axb) 13272 34230
% of zeroes∗∗ 68.64% 60.16%
Total number of students (Host capacity)∗ (c) 1710701 2518640
Number of foreign students∗ (d) 62512 341389
Foreign student in % of total students∗ (d/c) 3.65% 13.55%
∗Numbers are computed aggregating all origin countries.
∗∗The flow of students coming from country i and studying
in university u is nil.
9Specifically, data is available for institutions located in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.
10In the empirical part, we pay attention of not loosing the information relative to the empty corridors. The total number
of observation is then equal to the number of universities multiplied by the number of origin countries.
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Figure 22 shows the distribution of the share of foreign students across universities for Italy and the
UK separately. It confirms that the share of foreigners is on average much larger in UK universities, with
a large proportion of institutions in which foreign students represent more than 20% of the whole student
population. The two UK institutions with the largest proportion of foreigners are LSE and London
Business School, where the share of foreigner among students is even larger than 60%. While for Italy
the average share is lower, there are still a significant number of universities for which the share is above
5%. This illustrates the importance of the phenomenon of foreign education.
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Figure 22 reports, separately for Italy and the UK, the distribution of the share of foreign students by university.
To gauge how diverse is the foreign students’ population in our data, we refer to the Herfindhal index
as a measure of concentration. We do that in the two dimensions: (i) across origins for each institution
and (ii) across institutions for each origin country.11 We compute this measure for both countries of
destination.
Figure 23 reports the distribution of the Herfindahl index across universities. The index is small for
most of the institutions, suggesting that they host foreign students coming from a wide range of origin
countries. On the other hand, Figure 24 reports the distribution of the Herfindahl, but across origin
countries. Specifically, for each origin country, we compute the Herfindhal index as to have an hint of
how international students of the same country are split across Italian and UK universities. The figure
suggests that, on average, students coming from a specific country do not tend to concentrate in a single
university. Both figures illustrate that the dyadic dimension of the data is important to capture the
patterns of emigration of students to both destination countries.
11The Herfindahl index is simply equal to the squared sum of the shares, Hi =
J∑
s2ij . In our case sij is the share of foreign
students coming from country j enrolled in institution i with respect to the overall number of foreign students enrolled
in institution i. We remind that the measure is comprised between 1
n
(perfect diversification in terms of origins, with n
being the number of origins) and 1 when the incoming population originates from a single country. Some papers measured
diversity using the diversity index which is simply equal to 1 minus the Herfindahl index.
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Figure 23 reports, separately for Italy and the UK, the distribution of the Herfindahl index, by University of destination.
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Figure 24 reports, separately for Italy and the UK, the distribution of the Herfindahl index, by country of origin.
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Additionally, to gauge how diverse is the foreign students’ population in these two countries, we
also refer to four multigroup segregation measures. Since we are more interested by the location choice
of students than the universities’ recruitment policies, we compute these indexes on diversity across
institutions for each origin country, rather than diversity across origins for each institution.
The four multigroup segregation measures of Table 13 are presented and evaluated in Reardon and
Firebaugh (2002). The first two measures, Dissimilarity Index and Gini index, view segregation as
a disproportion in the proportions of each origin country across universities. This also refers to the
measurement of inequality. The higher the index, the greater the segregation. Both measures indicate
that the two countries display a significant variation of foreign students by origin across institutions.
The comparison between the two destinations suggests that foreign students in Italy tend to experience
a higher level of segregation than foreign students in UK.12 Figure 25 provides the distribution of the
dissimilarity index for each origin country birthplace of international students. This evenness index varies
between 0 (similar distribution of each origin country and the total student population distribution) and
1 (maximum segregation). It could be interpreted as the share of the students from each origin that
would have to move (to another university) to match the dispersion of the total students population. The
large share of origin groups with a high dissimilarity index (between 0.9 and 1), in both countries, is due
to the large number of origin countries with very few individuals.
Entropy is another way to measure segregation. It is given by the last two indices, i.e. the Informa-
tion theory criterion and the relative diversity. In contrast with the previous indicators, segregation is
decreasing function of the index value. Again, these two other indices suggest that there is a significant
degree of segregation in the two countries and, as before, that Italy faces a higher level of segregation
compared to the one prevailing in the UK.
12The multigroup dissimilarity index is a weighted average of origin indices.
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(Reardon and Firebaugh (2002))
Information Theory 0,289 0,963
(Theil (1972))
Relative Diversity 2,284 6,119
(Carlson (1992))
The reference is the original citation for multigroup form
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3.3.2 Covariates
3.3.2.1 Cost of living
Data on cost of living comes from the Numbeo website. This website provides, for each city considered
various indexes of the cost of living. We use the “Consumer Price plus Rent index” for the year 2011.13
Numbeo computes the index relying either on user input data or on data manually collected from author-
itative sources such as websites of supermarkets, governmental institutions or other surveys. Numbeoo
applies different techniques to filter out noisy data.
The 163 UK universities are located in 87 different locations. This website provides us information
for 39 cities out of 87. For the remaining locations, we compute the closest city in terms of geodesic
distance to the ones for which the data is available and we input the respective cost of living index of
that city. The same approach was used for the Italian dataset. Figure 26 provides the distribution of the
indicator for both countries. Table 14 reports the moments and the quantiles of the distribution. Both
suggest that the cost of living considerably varies across cities in both destination countries.





















Index, base 100 for New-York city
Data on cost of living comes from the Numbeoo website.
13Specifically, the indexes are relative to New York city for which the index is normalized to 100.
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Data on cost of living comes from the Numbeoo website. The left panel shows the estimated distribution for the considered
Italian cities while the right panel does the same for the UK cities.
3.3.2.2 Expected income
We proxy expected income at destination either using the GDP per capita of the city of destination or,
when the data is not available, the one relative to the district in which the city is located. We compute
this measure using both GDP and population data provided by EUROSTAT.14 Figure 27 and Table 15
suggest that the income distribution across locations, for both countries, is quite heterogeneous across
cities.





















GDP per capita ( in thousands of Euro)
Data on GDP (in thousands of Euro) per capita comes from EUROSTAT.
14We use the data provided at the Nuts 3 level of the EUROSTAT dataset.
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Data on cost of living comes from the Eurostat, at the Nuts 3 level. The left panel shows the estimated distribution for the
Italian cities/districts which hosts at least one university. The right panel does the same for the UK.
3.3.2.3 Tuitions fees
Italy and United Kingdom are some of the few European countries in which tuition fees varies across
institutions. European Commission (2012) reports key information on tuition fees charged by European
universities during the academic year 2011-2012.
For the UK, tuition fees charged to European students were subject to a cap, equal to £3375, for
institutions based in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.15 This level is set by the central government.
Importantly, the institutional setting was different in Scotland. The government covered the first degree
tuition fees for both Scottish and EU students. Students coming from the rest of the UK were subject
to a fee equal to £1800. In contrast, universities were allowed to set tuition fees without any cap for non
European students in all UK institutions.
The Tuition Reddin Survey provides only information on first cycle tuition fees charged by UK uni-
versities, differentiating between the ones charged to European students and to non European ones. Data
is available for 115 institutions out of the 163 that make up the baseline dataset. Table 16 compares the
restricted sample with the baseline one.
15As of September 2012 this level was increased in England to a new level set between £6000 and a maximum of £9000.
See European Commission (2012) for more details.
126
Essays on the Macro-Analysis of International Migration
Table 16: United Kingdom : benchmark and restricted sample (2011/2012)
All institutions (163) Restricted sample (115)




Foreign 341389 All=185208 309406 All = 171696
students E U= 63237 EU = 56692
% of 60.1% All = 68.1% 52.1% All = 61.6%
zeroes EU = 38% EU = 16.72%
Table 16 compares the sub-sample of UK universities for which data on tuition fees is available with the full sample.
In order to account for the endogeneity of tuition fees, the empirical analysis for the UK mainly focuses
only on first cycle international students. Our estimation strategy exploits the particular institutional
setting of the UK, Sub-Section 3.4.3 provides a detailed analysis on this aspect. Table 17 reports the
distribution of fees in the UK and Italy while Figure 28 shows the distribution for the UK differentiating
between European and non-European international students. European students enrolled in Scottish
universities had access to higher education for free, while in the remaining UK institutions they were
charged an amount equal to £3375.16





















∗ For non-EU students
Table 17 provides basic descriptive statistics on average tuition fees across Italian universities and on
tuition fees charged to non-European students by UK universities.
16The only important exception is the University of Buckingham which is considered as the only private higher education
in the UK (Baskerville (2013)). This institution charged EU students an amount close to 9000 e.
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The left panel shows the distribution of fees charged to European students by UK universities during the academic year
2011/2012. The right panel reports a similar distribution for non-European students.
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Figure 29 shows the distribution of average tuition fees charged by Italian universities during the academic year 2011/2012.
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Figure 29 shows the estimated distribution of tuition fees across Italian universities. These institutions
differ by their legal status, as they classified either as private or public institutions. In contrast with most
Continental European countries, tuition fees charged by Italian public universities are not uniformly
determined by the central government. According to the Italian law (Decree of the President of the
Republic of 25.07.1997, 306), the total amount of fees raised cannot overcome the 20% of the funding
received by each public university from the Italian Ministry of Education. Conversely, for Italian private
institutions, the aforementioned limit does not apply, and they do charge higher fees. Tuition fees in
Italian public universities depend on many determinants, in particular on the student family income and
on the year of enrollment. Furthermore, Italian institutions do not charge higher tuition fees to non
European students.17
Our primary source of data on (average) tuition fees in Italy is based on a survey conducted by the
economic newspaper “Il Sole 24 Ore”.18 Data was missing for few public Italian universities. In that
case, we use an average computed at the regional level by an Italian association of consumer (FederCon-
sumatori). Data relative to private institutions is available for 9 out of the 17 institutions that make up
the baseline dataset. Only private institutions charged average fees above the level of 2000 e.
3.3.2.4 University quality
In line with Beine et al. (2014) and Perkins and Neumayer (2014) we proxy university quality exploiting
the Top 500 Shanghai ranking, referring to the one relative to year 2011 (ARWU).19 This ranking deter-
mines the best 500 universities in the world. Although the index is widely known among international
students and firms, its use is subject to discussion. The index should basically be interpreted as a measure
of how international students perceived quality of education.
For any university appearing in the ranking we know both its position and the relative score (with
respect the best one) that the university obtained. By exploiting this information we compute two
quality indexes. The first one is obtained by a simple rescaling of the ARWU ranking. Specifically, if
the university does not appear in the ARWU list, our index takes a value equal to 1, whereas if the
university shows up its position determines the index being then equal to (500 + 2) − ranking.20 The
implicit assumption is that the index increases in a monotonic way with the ranking.
The ranking indicator has nevertheless some limitations. It assumes that quality is reflected in a
linear way by the position in the ranking. In other terms, it disregards the fact that the score on which
the ranking is based might be quite similar between a set of universities.21 In order to account for the
17Only other five European countries treat equally non European students: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Liechten-
stein and Norway, (European Commission (2012)).
18We include first degree and master degree students.
19The ARWU considers every university that has any Nobel Laureates, Fields Medalists, highly cited publications or
papers published in Nature or Science. 1000 universities are considered and the best 500 are included in the ranking. For
a full explanation on the index development the interest reader is referred to http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU-
Methodology-2011.html.. Perkins and Neumayer (2014) proxied quality also using the World University Ranking (WUR).
On the contrary of the ARWU the WUR among the criteria used considers also the number of international students. This
leads us to refer only to the ARWU to avoid endogeneity issues.
20In the empirical analysis we consider the log of the index. This lead us to sum 2 to 500 to keep the correspondence
between the index and the its log transformation.
21For instance, while the first university (Harvard) has a global score of 100, universities ranked between position 2 and 5
have scores between 72.6 and 70.0. Universities comprised between top 50 and top 500 have scores between 31.7 and 24.2,
129
Essays on the Macro-Analysis of International Migration
specific empirical distribution of the score, we also use the score of the Shanghai ranking instead of the
position. Our quality measure takes a value equal to score if the university appears in the top 500
ranking. Otherwise, the index is simply equal to 0.22 31 universities from the UK and 20 Italian high
education institutions were included in the 2011 top 500 ARWU ranking.
Figure 30 reports the two indicators of quality for each country. The graphs in the upper side of the
figure show the distributions of the Ranking separately for Italian and UK universities. The other two
graphs show the distribution of the score index. Figure 30 makes evident that UK universities appearing
in the ranking have on average a better position, and consequently a better score, than Italian ones.
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The two upper-side graph reports the distribution of the ranking index, on the left for Italy and on the right for the UK. The two
panel below reports similar graph for the Score index. Data on quality refer to the ARWU (Shanghai Ranking) for year 2011.
suggesting that the distribution is significantly skewed to the right.
22In the empirical analysis we regress for log (score+ 1).
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3.3.2.5 Host capacity
Host capacity is captured by the total number of students enrolled at the university of destination
during the academic year considered. Even if the median is the same for both countries (see Table
18 ), distributions (see Figure 31) highlight significant differences. United Kingdom has smaller size
universities than Italy (with an average of 14575 students enrolled the 21932 for Italy) and a relatively
smaller standard deviation. In Italy the number of universities with more than 40000 students is high
and close to the number of Universities with less than 5000 students, while such huge host capacity is
very rare in the UK.
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The left panel shows the distribution of the total amount of students enrolled in Italian university while the right panel reports
the same distribution but for. UK universities.




Standard deviation 21721 5619
Min 405 290
1st Quintile 5789 3252
2nd Quintile 10735 10698
3rd Quintile 17672 17400
4th Quintile 33961 23480
Max 113040 40680
Total number of students
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3.4 Econometric specification
3.4.1 Benchmark specification
Our econometric specification is based on Eq. (70), that provides the determinants of choosing a specific
university, conditionally upon studying abroad in a specific destination country. Strictly speaking, this
estimation entails the estimation of a multinomial logit, which requires the choice of a benchmark uni-
versity or a “numeraire”. In other terms, the estimation should capture the determinants of choosing a
specific university compared to a university of reference. Our specification does not include the choice of
a numeraire and therefore slightly diverges from Eq. (70). It takes the following form:
ln (Ni,u) = α+ αi + β1 ∗ ln (feesu) + β2 ∗ ln (livingcostu) + β3 ∗ ln (qualityu) +
β4 ∗ ln (hostcapacityu) + β5 ∗ ln (expreturnu) + iu (75)
where Ni,u denotes the number of students coming from country i and studying in university u. As said
before this is applied to two countries separately, namely Italy and the UK, and to one specific academic
year, 2011/2012. The data are therefore dyadic and time-invariant in nature. feesu, livingcostu, qualityu,
hostcapacityu and expreturnu denote respectively the amount of annual tuition fee charged by university
u, the costs of living in city where university u is located, the quality of university u, the host capacity
of university u as well as the job prospects in the region where university u is located. αi is a set of fixed
effects controlling for all factors that are specific to the country of origin of the foreign students. Given
that we focus on a specific country in separate regressions, αi also controls for bilateral factors between the
origin country and this destination country, such as geodesic distance, colonial links, linguistic proximity
and so on. iu is an error term which is supposed to be independently and identically distributed.
Before we proceed to the estimation, we discuss here a couple of issues that are relevant to the
estimation of Eq. (75). We make clear that Eq. (75) corresponds to the last stage of the migration
process of foreign students. Previous stages concern (i) the decision to invest in education or not (ii) the
decision to study abroad or domestically and (iii) the choice of the country of destination. This paper
focuses only on the last stage. Another possibility would have been to integrate in the same analysis
several countries of destination, i.e. to pool universities of different countries. Beyond limitations in
data availability, this is not desirable for several reasons. The main reason is that pooling universities of
different countries would lead to a clear rejection of the IIA hypothesis which is implicit in the estimation
of Eq. (75). The rejection of the IIA hypothesis would occur by the fact that the choice structure involves
two countries that might be considered as nests in the decision process. Given that is very likely that
the degree of substitution between two universities changes with respect to the country of destination,
we eventually prefer to estimate the model separately for each country of destination. This issue is
also related to the well known problem of multilateral resistance of migration (Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-
Huertas Moraga (2013); Beine et al. (2015)). In other terms, pooling several countries and integrating the
choice of the destination country would entail the estimation of a nested logit model with two potential
nests. This is obviously beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future investigation.
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3.4.2 Econometric method
Another issue is the prevalence of a high share of zero values for the bilateral migration flows. In our
sample, for the year 2011 under investigation, we have 61.6% of zero values for the bilateral flow of first
degree foreign students for the UK. The corresponding proportion for Italy is 68.84%. The presence of
a high proportion of zero values is well-known to generate biases in the key estimates using traditional
panel fixed effect estimates (Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The use of log (1 + y) as the dependent
where y is the bilateral flow (the so-called scaled OLS estimator) allows to solve the selection problem
due to the drop of the zero observations. Nevertheless, the scaled OLS estimation technique would give
inconsistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) shows
that Poisson regressions are robust to different pattern of heteroskedasticity. We follow this route in the
subsequent estimation and use the Poisson estimates as the benchmark ones. However, our tables will
report the Scaled OLS estimates of model (75) for robustness checks.
3.4.3 Dealing with endogeneity concerns
In the model of Section 3.2, tuition fees are exogenous and universities set their level independently
on the number of students enrolled or other characteristics. In reality, the exogenous nature of fees in
specification (75) is questionable on several grounds. First, fees might depend on the attractiveness of
the university: successful universities attracting a large number of (foreign) students can easily raise
the tuition fees compared to other universities. This leads to a reverse causality issue between student
flows and fees. While the bilateral nature of Ni,j,u mitigates this aspect, it is important to deal with the
potential endogeneity of fees. On top of that, fees might be correlated to some unobserved characteristics
of the university such as the quality of amenities on the campus or of the hosting city. This also leads
to the endogeneity of tuition fees and calls for a specific treatment. This paper tackles the endogeneity
of fees differently for each country of destination, by taking advantage of the two different institutional
contexts.
For Italy, we deal with the endogeneity of fees using a traditional IV approach. Basically, we use the
public vs private status of the university as an instrument of tuition fees, following a similar solution
adopted in Beine et al. (2014) at the country level. In particular, we create and use a dummy variable
capturing whether the university is private or not. The underlying assumption is that private universities
have a higher control on tuition fees. These institutions tend to increase fees not only because of the costs
but also in the reason of the fact that they receive less subsidies from the public sector. Furthermore,
private institutions are not constrained by the regulation in terms of cap that applies to public universities.
We should expect a positive correlation between the private status and the level of tuition fees. In terms
of exclusion restriction, the underlying assumption is that foreign students should have not particular
preferences for private or public universities on top of quality, host capacity, cost of living and income
of the destination area. This seems to be a reasonable assumption and is confirmed by the examples of
many successful public universities in the US such as Berkeley or Michigan state university.
For the UK, unfortunately, the traditional IV solution is not possible. Indeed, the status of the
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university is not as clear-cut as in the Italian case.23 Some alternative instrument such as the share
of the budget subsidized by the central government turned out to be a weak instrument, and generate
inconsistent results.24
Instead of a traditional IV, we deal with endogeneity taking advantage of the institutional context
of universities in the UK. During the academic year 2011/2012 UK universities were in fact subject to
caps on the amount of fees that they could charge to native and European first cycle students. These
caps did not apply to students originating from outside the EU. On top of that, there is some regional
variation of the caps applied to universities. Scottish universities were subject to lower caps compared to
those applied to other institutions in the UK. Moreover, the cap set by the Scottish government applied
only for the non Scottish UK students. The Scottish government covered first degree tuition fees to both
natives and European students, thus allowing them to get first cycle education in Scottish universities
for free (European Commission (2012)). In contrast the other UK universities set tuition fees charged to
EU students equal to the £3375 cap.25 It follows that by restricting the sample to European countries
as origins, we estimate model (75) in a context in which fees are clearly exogenous. Furthermore, the
comparison of the results obtained with the full sample of origin countries or countries originating outside
the EU allows to gauge, in a simple way, the degree of endogeneity of fees in using specification (75).
3.5 Results
We present the results separately for the two countries under investigation. For each set of estimates, we
present results obtained using Scaled OLS and Poisson. On top of these benchmark results, for Italy, we
present also results based on the combination of these techniques with the use of instrumental variable.
3.5.1 Italy
The inclusion of origin country fixed effects allows us to control for the role of usual push factors (for
instance, GDP at origin) as well as the influence of bilateral determinants (colonial links, proximity,
languages). The estimates reported in Table 19 are in line with a traditional view of the role of fees and
of quality. In particular, both types of estimation techniques deliver a negative and significant role for fees
on the university choice of foreign student, in line with the view that fees are part of the cost function.
Estimates vary little with respect to the two quality indexes. Nevertheless, a couple of comments are in
order. First, while fees appear to have a negative role, failure to account for their possible endogeneity
leads us to take these results with caution. Second, while the benchmark results suggest an important
and intuitive role for fees, quality of the university, host capacity and expected income in the area, we
fail to find any evidence of a role for the cost of living. Since all estimates are potentially biased by the
presence of endogenous fees, it is also important to check whether this result survives after an explicit
treatment of endogeneity through IV estimates. Table 20 reports these results.
23According to Baskerville (2013) the only UK private institution is the university of Buckingham. All the others are
defined as independent legal entities.
24Results are available upon request.
25The only exception is the already mentioned University of Buckingham.
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Table 19: Italy: Benchmark estimates of determinants
Variables Scaled OLS Poisson Scaled OLS Poisson
Fees -0.082∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Cost of living 0.046 -0.625 -0.011 -0.741
(0.06) (0.41) (0.06) (0.41)
Quality (ranking) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ - -
(0.01) (0.02)
Quality (score) - - 0.114∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.04)
Host capacity 0.156∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Income 0.625∗∗∗ 1.585∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 1.612∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.16) (0.03) (0.16)
Origin FE yes yes yes yes
R2 0.569 - 0.568 -
Pseudo R2 - 0.743 - 0.744
Nber Obs 11928 11928 11928 11928
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 20: Italy: Instrumental variable estimates of determinants
Variables Scaled IV Poisson IV Scaled IV Poisson IV
Fees -0.246∗∗∗ -0.580∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.12)
Cost of living -0.132∗ -1.419∗∗ -0.191∗∗ -1.410∗∗
(0.06) (0.47) (0.06) (0.45)
Quality=ranking 0.081∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ - -
(0.01) (0.02)
Quality=score - - 0.119∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.06)
Host capacity 0.128∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Income 0.878∗∗∗ 2.211∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 2.166∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.25) (0.04) (0.24)
Origin FE yes yes yes yes
R2 0.562 - 0.560 -
F first stage 5014.4 - 5057.6 -
Robust Score 131.4 - 142.9 -
Robust Regression 132.7 - 134.1 -
Nber Obs 11928 11928 11928 11928
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Instrument: dummy variable indicating private vs public institution.
The estimates of Table 20 provide interesting insights. First, the use of instrumental variable estima-
tion leads to a significant correction in the estimate of the influence of tuition fees. Endogeneity of fees
might be due to either reverse causality (i.e. attractive universities are more keen to charge higher fees)
or some positive correlation of fees with unobserved factors of attractiveness (e.g. universities with better
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amenities tend to charge higher fees). In both cases, this results in a positive correlation between fees
and the error term of model (75), resulting in an upward biased estimate of the impact of tuition fees. A
comparison of Tables 19 and 20 shows that the use of instrumentation corrects the bias in the expected
direction, with a more negative impact of fees on the university choice. This holds for both estimation
techniques.
Second, the IV results lead a significant change in all the estimates of the determinants of university’s
choice except quality. The correction of the impact of fees could suggest that the non-IV Poisson estimate
tends to overestimate the true impact, or in other terms underestimate the impact in absolute terms.
Such a bias is consistent with a positive correlation between fees and unobserved amenities. It is also
consistent with a phenomenon of reverse causality (attractive universities are more expensive). The IV
estimates of Eq. (75) provide support for a role of all possible determinants of the model suggesting that
the choice of a particular university results from a complex assessment of benefits and costs as outlined in
the theoretical RUM framework of Section 3.2. Interestingly, the estimates for Italy suggests that foreign
students explicitly take into account the cost of living and the expected income at the city of destination.
The estimated elasticity suggests that a 10% increase in the tuition fees tends to decrease the average
bilateral flow to that university by about 5%.
We acknowledge that the exclusion restriction of our instrumental variable might be object of dis-
cussion. Even if we control for city- and university- determinants it could be that some foreign students
explicitly consider the status of the university when taking their enrollment choice. For instance, it could
be that foreign students believe that private universities are better organized and thus providing better
services in terms of students’ advices, personal tutoring and so on. It could be also the case that students
believe that private universities are more accountable to students for the quality of teaching. The higher
attractiveness of private institutions seems to be the prevailing dominant view. Nevertheless, this view
is predominant but not the only one. On the contrary, it may be expected that degrees delivered by
public universities are recognized in an easier way by private firms and public institutions; this suggests
that the private status deters rather than to attract students. In these cases, there might be a positive
or negative correlation between our status variable and the error term of Eq. (75) which may eventually
invalidate the exclusion restriction of our IV procedure.
To cope with such concern, we exploit econometric procedures introduced by Conley et al. (2012).
By doing so, we are able to account for possible deviations from the exclusion restriction. The idea
is to consider the parameter capturing the restriction (the coefficient of the instrumental variable in
the structural equation) as a random parameter drawn from a given distribution. The procedures, (see
Conley et al. (2012) for details), allow for possible means different from zero i.e. for asymmetric deviation
from the exclusion restriction. We consider two methods. The first one, coined “Union of Confidence
Interval” (UCI) provides an alternative IV estimation assuming that the exclusion parameter belong to a
prior defined support. The other one, called “Local to Zero Approximation”, assumes that the exclusion
restriction parameter follows a normal distribution with given mean and standard deviation.
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In Table 21 we report the results for the UCI procedure.26 In this Table we report the estimates of
the elasticity of foreign students to tuition fees obtained by considering different supports for the range
of possible values taken by the parameter capturing the deviation from the exclusion restriction.27
The higher the range of possible values less precise would be the estimate of the coefficient. Symmetric
ranges around zero corresponds to an agnostic view about the possible departure from the exclusion
restriction. On the contrary, a positive interval (resp. negative) range corresponds to the view that
foreign students value more (resp. less) private universities.
Table 21: Italy - Estimated impact of tuition fees accounting for plausible endogenous instrument
Interval Range
min dev max dev Estimate of β1 std. dev t-ratio
Symmetric intervals
-0.1 0.1 -0.248∗∗∗ 0.057 -4.36
-0.2 0.2 -0.248∗∗∗ 0.096 -2.59
-0.3 0.3 -0.248∗ 0.134 1.85
Asymmetric intervals
-0.3 0 -0.134∗ 0.076 -1.77
-0.2 0 -0.172∗∗∗ 0.057 -3.03
0 0.2 -0.324∗∗∗ 0.057 -5.67
0 0.3 -0.362∗∗∗ 0.076 -4.73
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.01
This Table provides additional estimates of β1, the tuition-fees coefficient, by estimating Eq. (75) employing the Union of
Confidence Intervals method described in Conley et al. (2012). Tuition fees are still instrumented using the status, private vs
public, of the university. Columns 1 and 2 report the minimum and maximum values of the parameter capturing the deviation
from the exclusion restriction. Column 3 provides the mean estimate of the tuition-fees elasticity, β1. Column 4 reports the
respective standard deviation.
Table 21 provides evidence that the obtained negative and significant elasticity of tuition fees obtained
by employing the traditional IV estimation is also robust to deviations from the exclusion restriction.
The significance level drops below the 5% only for values of the parameter larger than 0.3 in absolute
terms. This means that even if the mere private status of the university deters or attracts on average less
than 0.3% of foreign students coming from each origin country, our IV estimates still find support for a
negative effect of tuition fees. When the parameter gets a value larger than 0.3, our estimates become less
significant, albeit still negative and significant for a 10% confidence interval. The bottom panel of Table 21
also reports results obtained with asymmetric interval of values of the deviation parameter. Interestingly
our estimations show that if foreign students are more attracted by private Italian universities the impact
of tuition fees becomes even more negative.
3.5.1.1 English-Speaking Programs
International students may opt to enroll in Italian universities but attending courses taught in English.
Among the other factors considered, choosing to enroll in an university offering an English-speaking
26The results obtained employing the Local to Zero Estimation are available upon request.
27Estimates of the other coefficients (cost-of living, Income, Quality and host capacity) are not reported but are available
upon requests. Importantly, they are in general unaffected and close to the benchmark estimations of Table 20.
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program could be one the key determinants taken into account by international students. Above all, such
programs allow students to develop additional skills by using the current business/academic lingua franca.
This should increase their probability to find a job after graduation either in Italy or elsewhere.28 In This
section we extend the model of Eq. (75) by including in the set of covariates a dummy variable with the
aim to account for the availability of English-speaking programs. The baseline model, Eq. (75), could
be mispecified, in fact one could argue that average fees are positively correlated with the availability of
English-Speaking programs. The same reasoning could apply also to the quality indicators, thus making
our previous estimates potentially biased for another reason. 29
ln (Niu) = α+ αi + β1 ∗ ln (feesu) + β2 ∗ ln (livingcostu) + β3 ∗ ln (qualityu) +
β4 ∗ ln (hostcapacityu) + β5 ∗ ln (expreturnu) + +β5 ∗ (EngDummy) + iu (76)
Specifically, the dummy variable, labeled EngDummy, takes a value equal to 1 if the university u
provided at least one bachelor or master program in English for the academic year 2011/2012 and 0
otherwise. From the website of the Italian association of Dean, “Fondazione Crui”,30 we borrow this
information. According to this data source 39 Italian universities were providing at least a program
taught in English during the academic year 2011/2012. Table 22 report the results obtained estimating
model (76).
Table 22: Italy: Accounting for the availability of English-speaking programs
Variables Scaled OLS Poisson Scaled OLS Poisson
Fees -0.085∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Cost of living 0.014 -0.743 -0.011 -0.865 ∗
(0.06) (0.42) (0.06) (0.41)
Quality (ranking) 0.079∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ - -
(0.01) (0.02) - -
Quality (score) - - 0.114∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
- - (0.01) (0.04)
Host capacity 0.148∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Income 0.622∗∗∗ 1.583∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 1.603∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.16) (0.03) (0.16)
EngDummy 0.049∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.09)
Origin FE yes yes yes yes
R2 0.570 - 0.568 -
Pseudo R2 - 0.746 - 0.747
Nber Obs 11928 11928 11928 11928
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This robustness check gives additional reliability to our previous estimates. Although the added
estimated coefficient of EngDummy is both positive and significant, as we expect, the coefficient of fees,
28Interestingly, Kahanec and Kra´likova´ (2011), find that the availability of English-speaking programs act as a pull factor.
29Even though, if such a bias exists our previous estimate on fees should be upward biased.
30This data is freely available in PDF format at: https://www.crui.it/images/documenti/2012/courses english.pdf.
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in all cases, is larger in absolute value and, more importantly, always highly significant. The sign and
the significance of all other variables obtain supplementary confirmation as well. Again for the sake of
robustness, we also estimate model (76) accounting for the possible endogeneity of fees, employing the
IV strategy described in Section 3.5.1. Table 23 report our findings. Essentially, the coefficient on fees
gets larger in absolute value and remains negative and highly significant. Interestingly, as it was the case
with the estimates reported by Table 20, the Cost of living coefficient becomes both negative and highly
significant.
Table 23: Italy: IV estimates accounting for the availability of English-speaking programs
Variables Scaled IV Poisson IV Scaled IV Poisson IV
Fees -0.261∗∗∗ -0.666∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.626∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.12)
Cost of living -0.188∗* -1.806∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -1.756∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.52) (0.06) (0.49)
Quality=ranking 0.080∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ - -
(0.01) (0.02) - -
Quality=score - - 0.118∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
- - (0.01) (0.04)
Host capacity 0.114∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Income 0.888∗∗∗ 2.365∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗ 2.282∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.28) (0.04) (0.27)
EngDummy 0.072∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.09)
Origin FE yes yes yes yes
R2 0.561 - 0.560 -
F first stage 5537 5560 - -
Robust Score 145 146.3 - -
Robust Regression 148 149.6 - -
Nber Obs 11928 11928 11928 11928
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Instrument: dummy variable indicating private vs public institution.
139
Essays on the Macro-Analysis of International Migration
3.5.2 United Kingdom
In contrast with Italy, universities in the UK cannot be distinguished between public or private institu-
tions. This prevents the use of the instrument capturing the public vs private status of the university.
We deal with the issue of the endogeneity of fees taking benefit of the institutional context, namely ex-
ploiting the regional variation in the first-cycle tuition fees caps. We run regressions based on model (75)
for various sub-samples in terms of origin countries. We first restrict the analysis to first-cycle students,
i.e. those that are subject to caps on fees. For the reasons exposed above, restricting the sample to EU
countries as origins should solve the endogenous nature of tuition fees. In contrast, if using all countries
or the non-EU origins should lead to results subject to the endogeneity bias. A comparison between the
results based on different samples allows to shed some light on the magnitude of the bias associated to the
endogeneity of tuition fees. Based on this strategy, Tables 24 and 25 present the results of the estimation
of model (75) for the three sub-samples of origin countries and for the two estimation techniques. Table
24 presents the result with the indicator of quality based on the ranking, while Table 25 reports the
findings obtained with the score indicator.
Table 24: UK: Determinants of student migration, first-cycle students- Quality=ranking
SCALED OLS Poisson
Variables all EU No EU all EU No EU
Fees -0.064∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ 0.432∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21)
Cost of living 0.560∗∗∗ 1.956∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗ 1.220∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗
(0.04) (0.19) (0.04) (0.20) (0.32) (0.25)
Quality (ranking) 0.037∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Host capacity 0.290∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.892 ∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Income 0.104∗∗∗ -0.057 0.102∗∗∗ -0.015 0.027 -0.096
(0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16)
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.661 0.581 0.621 - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - 0.706 0.464 0.737
Nber Obs 24360 2900 21460 21228 2900 18328
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The estimation results of Tables 24 and 25 yield basically two lessons. First, using EU countries as
origin only, we find some support in favor of a negative impact of tuition fees. This finding therefore
confirms the negative impact found in the case of Italy. The estimated elasticity is much lower in terms
of magnitude than for Italy. This might be due to the fact that we focus on bachelor students that are
less mobile than master students.
Second, the results for the sample of non-EU regions suggest that failure to deal with the endogeneity
of tuition fees lead to significant biases in the estimation of their impact. Focusing on the Poisson
regressions, the results obtained for the non-EU countries exhibit a positive and a barely significant effect
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of tuition fees. While fees can have in practice additional dimensions that the pure cost component
outlined in the theoretical framework of Section 3.2 (such as a signal of quality or a mitigation of the cost
through coverage by education grants), such a strong and positive impact would be nevertheless difficult
to rationalize. While we do not account for the existence of education grants, our estimations account
for the variation in the quality of universities, which rules out the signaling effect of fees. Our results for
the different samples suggest rather that the positive impact obtained in previous work is in great part
driven by endogeneity issues.
Table 25: UK: Determinants of student migration, first-cycle students- Quality = score
SCALED OLS Poisson
Variables all EU No EU all EU No EU
Fees -0.064∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ -0.079 ∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ 0.395
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.22)
Cost of living 0.555∗∗∗ 1.947∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.19) (0.04) (0.20) (0.32) (0.25)
Quality (score) 0.059∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Host capacity 0.289∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.888 ∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Income 0.103∗∗∗ -0.061 0.102∗∗∗ -0.017 0.021 -0.089
(0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16)
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.661 0.581 0.621 - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - 0.722 0.465 0.736
Nber Obs 24360 2900 21460 24360 2900 18328
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Tables 24 and 25 also exhibit counterintuitive results for both the cost of living and income. These
implausible coefficients may be due to multicollinearity problems; once we compute the correlation coeffi-
cient between cost of living and income we obtain a value equal to 0.78. This high correlation coefficient
leads us to compute the variance inflation factor (VIF). We obtain an average VIF equal to 1.88, for
cost of living and income we obtain VIF equal to 2.55 and 2.51 respectively. Consequently we do not
find evidence of multicollinearity issues.31 The fact that the income coefficient is not significant could be
due that our baseline sample contains only first cycle students. The prospects of finding a good job are
much more obvious for master students compared to bachelor students. First cycle in higher education
primarily aims at providing a good training to favour the access to graduate studies rather than to provide
a degree directly used to find a good job.
The elasticity of quality is also found to be lower than for Italy. It might be the case that first cycle
react less to quality of the university as bachelor programs are quite similar across universities and that the
differences across bachelors are not that great. To check this conjecture we run similar regressions using
31One may argue that also fees and quality are highly correlated. For the subset of only European student this is clearly
not an issue, given that fees are exogenously set by the central government. Also, the already reported values of the VIF
coefficient suggest that there is no multicollinearity issue due to the correlation between quality and fees.
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master students’ flows instead of first-cycle students.32 Tables 26 and 27 report the result obtained. Once
we use only master student flows, the coefficient on income becomes both positive and highly significant.33
Interestingly the quality coefficients turn being both positive and highly significant for both estimation
techniques. Consequently, the failure of Tables 24 and 25 to find such an evidence could be driven by the
fact that first-degree students are more likely to change location after graduation, for instance to take
benefit of job opportunities or to pursue their education elsewhere.
Nevertheless, even for master students, the coefficient relative to the cost of living remains positive.34
It may be the case that in the UK, our measure of cost of living is highly related with unobserved
amenities at destination, generating endogeneity of this variable. To take care of that issue, we carry out
some IV estimation, instrumenting the cost of living. The results are reported in Appendix, see Section
3.7.1.2. The results suggest that the positive coefficient obtained in Tables 24-27 might be, once again,
affected by endogeneity issues.
Table 26: Uk: Master Students - Quality = ranking
SCALED OLS Poisson
Variables all EU No EU all EU No EU
Fees -0.022∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ 0.068∗ -0.028 -0.003 0.131
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.24)
Cost of living 0.535∗∗∗ 1.526∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 1.246∗∗∗ 1.220∗ 1.171∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.28) (0.51) (0.33)
Quality 0.051∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
Ranking (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Host capacity 0.276∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.958 ∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Income 0.175∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.114 0.958∗∗∗ -0.046
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.15) (0.23) (0.17)
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.619 0.590 0.616 - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - 0.748 0.564 0.769
Nber Obs 24360 2900 21460 24360 2900 18328
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
32Fees for master students are unregulated in UK, hence the reader should not rely on the coefficients on fees there
obtained.
33Tables 31 and 32 in the Appendix (Section 3.7.1.2) report estimation results using the whole flows of international
students to UK (first degree and master students).
34In the Appendix (see Section 3.7.2) we report results obtained by employing IV for the cost of living. We fail to find
conclusive results.
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Table 27: Uk: Master Students - Quality = score
SCALED OLS Poisson
Variables all EU No EU all EU No EU
Fees -0.023∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.063∗ -0.030 -0.005 0.128
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.25)
Cost of living 0.528∗∗∗ 1.513∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗∗ 1.179∗ 1.114∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.28) (0.51) (0.33)
Quality 0.081∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
Score (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Host capacity 0.275∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.957 ∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Income 0.175∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.127 0.962∗∗∗ -0.031
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.15) (0.23) (0.17)
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.619 0.591 0.616 - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - 0.746 0.564 0.767
Nber Obs 24360 2900 21460 24360 2900 18328
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.6 Conclusions
This paper revisits the issue of the determinants of student migration. In contrast with the existing
literature that has focused so far on country-specific factors, we look at the determinants at the university
level. This allows to address specifically the role of important factors such as the tuition fees or the quality
of the university. The impact of those factors is difficult to grasp in country-level studies due to the high
heterogeneity between institutions in many countries. While the analysis considers a set of university
specific factors, we give a special attention to the role of tuition fees on the propensity of foreign students
to choose a specific university. The existing literature has obtained so far mixed results concerning the
impact of tuition fees.
We build our empirical investigation on a nested logit model capturing the decision to choose a specific
university abroad. We focus on the last decision nest, i.e. the choice of a specific university for a student
conditional on going abroad and conditional on choosing a specific destination country. Our model allows
to identify the main factors such as the tuition fees, the quality of university, the host capacity, the
expected return on education at destination and the cost of living. We estimate the role of those factors
making use of data at the university level for two countries, namely the UK and Italy. One of the
important issues at the econometric level is the endogeneity of fees. We propose two different solutions
for the two countries. For Italy, we use a classical IV approach based on the status of the universities.
In this case, we check the validity of our exclusion restriction by employing the procedures defined by
Conley et al. (2012). For the UK, we make use of the regional variation in the caps that the authorities
impose on the fees for native students and European ones.
Our analysis generate interesting and new findings. First, we find evidence of a negative role of the
tuition fees set by a university on the flow of students choosing to study in this university. Surprisingly,
this negative and significant role is new in the literature. We stress the importance of dealing with
the endogeneity of tuition fees. Tuition fees are likely to be endogenous due to reverse causality or
correlation with unobservable factors of attractiveness at the university level. Failure to account for
endogeneity results in a positive and significant result. While such a positive impact is not to be ruled
out at a theoretical level, it is nevertheless difficult to rationalize in practice. While tuition fees are found
to play some influence on the location of foreign students, our analysis also emphasizes and confirms the
role of other important factors. We find support in favor of a role of the university quality. Also, the
expected return of education after graduation, which is proxied by the income per head of the region of
location of the university is also found to be important. This last result is in line with the implications
of the migration model of foreign education.
Appendix
3.7 Summary of the data
Table 3.7 summarizes our variables and the related data sources.
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Table 28: Data sources and definitions
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3.7.1 Additional Estimation results
3.7.1.1 Scaled Regressions
In this Section, we check the validity of our analysis defining and empirically testing an extension of
model (75). For each origin country, i, we determine the university, u∗, that hosted during the academic
year 2011/2012 the largest number of international students. We label the largest bilateral flow between
origin country i and universities (ui)
∗
. It may be also the case that some universities share the largest
bilateral student inflow from a given country i, this happens quite often for bilateral flows originating
from small countries. Then, for each bilateral flow, we determine the share with respect to the largest
student inflow (ui)
∗
. These numbers will become our dependent variables. In the same vein for each
one of the covariates (Fees, Cost of living, Income and Quality) we compute scaled values with respect
to the ones of the university characterized by the largest flow, namely (ui)
∗
. When the largest flow
characterizing a given sending country, i, is shared among several universities, for each covariate we scale




































Our results gets additional confirmation from these new estimations. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 29
report the baseline estimates of model (77) for Italy. Instead, Columns 4 and 5 contain the results
obtained applying the IV strategy described in Section 3.5.1. As a quality indicator we considered the
Score.35
Table 29: Italy, Scaled Estimations
Benchmark Estimates IV
Variables Scaled OLS Poisson Scaled OLS Poisson
Fees(ui)∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.106∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗
(0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06)
Cost of living(ui)∗ -0.013 0.181 -0.058 ∗∗∗ -0.741
(0.02) (0.24) (0.02) (0.41)
Quality(ui)∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
Score (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Host capacity(ui)∗ 0.046
∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
Income(ui)∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 1.517∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 1.812∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.13)
Origin FE yes yes yes yes
R2 0.393 - 0.385 -
Pseudo R2 - 0.174 - -
Nber Obs 11857 11857 11928 11928
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
35Estimations with the Ranking as a proxy of university quality are available upon request.
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Table 29 provides additional evidence for a negative impact of fees on international students inflows.
Also, the estimates of the other covariates almost perfectly mirror the results obtained considering the
baseline model (75). For UK we employ model (77) for the subset of first degree of students. Those are
the ones, as Section 3.5.2 explains, for which we are sure about the exogeneity of tuition-fees, when we
consider as values of the dependent only international first-degree students coming from EU countries.
Table 30 report the result obtained. As in Tables 24 and 25 we obtain a positive estimate for the coefficient
on fees only when we consider the subset of non European countries; those for which we suppose that
the tuition-fees estimate is biased due to endogeneity issues.
Table 30: UK: Scaled regressions, first-cycle students
SCALED OLS Poisson
Variables all EU No EU all EU No EU
Fees(ui)∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ 0.197
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)
Cost of living(ui)∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 1.947∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 1.069∗∗∗ 1.778∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.19) (0.05) (0.12) (0.21) (0.15)
Quality(ui)∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.027∗
Score (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Host capacity(ui)∗ 0.335
∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.837 ∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Income(ui)∗ 0.120∗∗∗ -0.061 0.123∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.004 0.355∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16)
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.611 0.451 0.642
Pseudo R2 - - - 0.096 0.088 0.091
Nber Obs 20996 2900 18096 20996 2900 18096
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Employing model (77) for UK we find additional evidence for a negative impact of tuition-fees on
international students inflows. For the estimate concerning Cost of living and income apply the same
consideration made in Section 3.5.2.
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3.7.1.2 First and Master degree students combined (UK).
The two tables below report the coefficients estimated using the whole flows of international students to
UK, i.e flows merging first cycle and master students.
Table 31: UK: All students (first and master degree, Quality = ranking)
SCALED OLS Poisson
Variables all EU No EU all EU No EU
Fees -0.059∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ 0.284
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.20)
Cost of living 0.726∗∗∗ 2.199∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 1.108∗∗∗ 1.270∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.18) (0.05) (0.20) (0.36) (0.25)
Quality 0.056∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
Ranking (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Host capacity 0.382∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.919 ∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Income 0.171∗∗∗ 0.093 0.157∗∗∗ 0.044 0.269 -0.070
(0.02) (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) (0.16) (0.14)
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.694 0.629 0.667 - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - 0.757 0.521 0.784
Nber Obs 24360 2900 21460 21228 2900 18328
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 32: All students (first and master degree, Quality = score)
SCALED OLS Poisson
Variables all EU No EU all EU No EU
Fees -0.060∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ -0.065 ∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ 0.264
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.20)
Cost of living 0.718∗∗∗ 2.187∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.261∗∗∗ 0.950∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.18) (0.05) (0.20) (0.36) (0.25)
Quality 0.087∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
Score (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Host capacity 0.382∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.916 ∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Income 0.170∗∗∗ 0.088 0.158∗∗∗ 0.0048 0.264 -0.060
(0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.11) (0.16) (0.14)
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.694 0.629 0.667 - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - 0.756 0.522 0.783
Nber Obs 24360 2900 21460 24360 2900 18328
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
148
Essays on the Macro-Analysis of International Migration
3.7.2 An IV approach to cost of living
Unlike the results obtained for Italy, all our estimations relative to the UK find a positive impact of the
cost of living on the choice of a specific education location. We suspect that this might be driven by the
fact that costs of living are positively associated to some unobserved factors of attractiveness at the city
level, such as urban amenities. This in turn induces a positive correlation of cost of living with the error
term of Eq. (75), biasing upwards the estimated coefficient. This calls for some instrumentation of this
variable.
The instrument that we propose for the cost of living is based on the distance from the most touristic
cities of the UK. In fact, attractive cities in terms of tourism tend to be more expensive but do not
necessarily attract more foreign students. Based on that idea, we first identify the 20 most visited cities
in the UK.36 Then, for each city, we compute the log of (1+ the distance) with respect to the closest
of these 20 most visited UK cities. As expected, the data confirms that this measure is negatively
associated to the cost of living.37 The table below reports the result obtained for the sub-sample of EU
origin countries for both estimation techniques with our instrumented cost of living variable.
Table 33: UK: Instrumental variable estimates of determinants (EU sub-sample)
Variables Scaled IV Poisson IV Scaled IV Poisson IV
Fees -0.040 -0.013 -0.042 -0.013
(0.02) (0.3) (0.02) (0.03)
Cost of living -1.741 -2.983∗ -1.699 -3.016∗
(0.70) (1.41) (1.69) (1.42)
Quality (ranking) 0.077∗∗∗ 0.019 - -
(0.01) (0.02)
Quality (score) - - 0.127∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.01) (0.02)
Host capacity 0.691∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
Income 1.504∗ 1.829∗∗∗ 1.478∗ 1.832∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.55) (0.72) (0.55)
Origin FE yes yes yes yes
R2 0.505 - 0.508 -
F first stage 39.8 - 39.6 -
Robust Score 7.33** - 7.06** -
Robust Regression 7.99** - 7.03** -
Nber Obs 2900 2900 2900 2900
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Instrument cost of living: minimal distance to top 20 most visited UK cities.
Focusing on the IV Poisson estimation results, we find that (part of) the explanation of the previously
obtained positive impact of the cost of living could be driven by endogeneity issues. Instrumenting the
36The 20 most visited cities by tourists are: London, Edinburgh, Manchester, Birmingham, Glas-
gow, Liverpool, Bristol, Oxford, Cambridge, Cardiff, Brighton, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Leeds, York, Inver-
ness, Bath, Nottingham, Reading, Aberdeen, Chester. This information comes from the following website
ouk.about.com/od/getawaysandshorthops/ss/top20.htm, according to data provided by the UK office of national statis-
tics.
37The correlation coefficient is found being equal to −0.15.
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cost of living with the minimal distance, we find a barely negative significant coefficient. Unfortunately
results obtained for quality and fees are at odds with our baseline results, thus calling for a further quest
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